VI. LERA Refereed Papers I

Does It Pay to Contact the Same Voters Across Multiple Elections? The Effects of Cumulative Labor-Led Political Mobilization on Turnout

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Abstract

Voter mobilization by unions and union-led coalitions has garnered considerable attention from scholars and is seen as an important political tool. To raise turnout in key regions, union-led groups often mobilize potential voters across multiple elections. However, researchers have yet to longitudinally track individual voters to measure the effects of cumulative contacts on turnout over time. This study provides such an analysis, using a panel of almost 100,000 individual voters over an 18-month period and five elections. Controlling for known determinants of voting behavior, this study employs negative binomial regressions and estimated marginal means to quantitatively assess the total and marginal effects of multiple contacts on turnout. The results indicate that, relative to no contact, each level of cumulative contact significantly influences cumulative turnout over time. The largest total and marginal increase occurs at two contacts, with marginal declines after two. The results vary by type of contact and voter ethnicity.

For many decades political scientists have sought to explain why some people vote in any given election when others do not, under non-compulsory voting systems. It has become clear over time that several factors are known to predict voting behavior and the act of voting itself. Individual-based characteristics, such as age, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, party identification, and prior political participation, among other considerations, are known to influence a person's political behavior. Broader factors, such as the closeness of the race, the type of election, and the amount of money spent on advertising, can also influence turnout, largely at a macro level.

Political mobilization efforts can provide both macro- and microlevel effects, raising turnout at the individual level and, potentially, significantly increasing the vote level of an entire group. These efforts sometimes work to remove impediments to turnout, making voting easier for those typically unable to cast ballots. Often, mobilization can be used to raise enthusiasm for a base of already likely voters or as a means to persuade these voters to favor one candidate over another. Although mobilization has been studied at length in cross-sectional, election-by-election research, the cumulative effects of mobilization over time are not well understood within the political science literature—that is, there is very little research on the additive influence of multiple contacts, compared both with each other and with a single contact (or no contact at all).

Labor organizations have long held a considerable political voice, manifested through campaign contributions, COPE endorsements, legislative lobbying, and, increasingly, mobilization of both union members and, in some cases (particularly as part of coalition efforts), non-members, in support of labor-friendly candidates. Union membership, as an individual characteristic, is often included by political scientists as a determinant of

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turnout. Political campaign contributions and efforts to push through pro-labor legislation are well-established facets of union activity; recent data show that labor spent $43.9 million on political lobbying in 2009 and contributed $74.5 million during the 2008 election cycle, almost exclusively to Democratic Party candidates.1 A central issue within the 2011 legislative battles in Wisconsin, Indiana, Ohio, and several other states related to Republican efforts to curtail organized labor's political strength (see Curry 2011; Silver 2011).

Voter mobilization by unions and union-led coalitions has garnered considerable attention from scholars, particularly given its substantial importance to labor groups as a political tool. The AFL-CIO's Labor 2008 program consisted of its largest-ever mobilization drive at the time, recruiting and training more than 200,000 volunteers in an effort to raise turnout among union members (Hall 2007). The group's 2010 program mobilized voters in more than 400 elections (Terkel 2010). The combined political budgets of the AFL-CIO and the SEIU in 2010 were at least $88 million, substantially higher than their combined 2006 figures; increasing turnout through mobilization was seen as a key goal (Trottman 2010).

Recent scholarly work on the issue has addressed union-led mobilization efforts in several ways (Radcliff and Davis 2000; Zullo 2004, 2008; Lamare 2010a, 2010b). However, a number of gaps within this literature remain. Notably, as with the political science literature, little has been done by way of quantitative longitudinal analysis of contact on a panel of subjects over multiple elections. Given the continued mobilization efforts by labor organizations, often of the same individuals (union members) in the same areas (key battleground states, many—such as Ohio and Pennsylvania, for instance—that have maintained their importance over recent years), a series of research questions can be asked. What is the marginal effect of additional union-led contact on the cumulative turnout of a potential voter over several elections? Does each additional contact bring the same benefits as the first, or are there diminishing marginal returns of contact? Do these findings vary by the type of contact employed, or by certain demographic characteristics of the population?

My study answers each of these questions, using a sample of more than 50,000 individual voters over an 18-month period, during which five separate elections occurred. I control for several known determinants of voting behavior while quantitatively assessing the effects of cumulative contact on cumulative turnout by employing negative binomial regressions. I compare the estimated marginal means of each level of contact (up to five) longitudinally over the five-election period to establish the extent to which additional contacts raise aggregate individual vote likelihoods while controlling for age, socioeconomic status, gender, party affiliation, ethnicity, and vote history, as well as the individual election. I assess the extent to which the total and marginal effects of multiple contacts vary by ethnicity (Latinos and non-Latinos) and by the type of contact employed (personal visits and phone calls). In so doing, I aim to contribute to both the political science and industrial relations literatures and to fill a clear gap in research related to vote-getting mobilization efforts.

Literature on Turnout Determinants and Mobilization Over Time

The political science literature suggests that, when considering the relationship between personal characteristics and voting, an individual's age, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, partisanship, and prior behavior all influence the decision to vote. In terms of age, it is accepted that turnout is lower among the young and largely increases with age (Lipset 1960; Converse and Niemi 1971; Flanigan and Zingale 1975; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). The literature also indicates that socioeconomic status plays a significant role in whether people register and cast ballots in elections, though there is less uniformity regarding what measure is the most appropriate proxy (income, education, occupation, etc.) for this variable (Bennett and Klecka 1970; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978).

Another known determinant of voter turnout is ethnicity. The literature indicates that, generally speaking, minorities turn out at a lower rate than whites (Cassel 1979; Presser, Traugott, and Traugott 1990; Leighley and Negler 1991; Teixeira 1992; Conway 2000). However, the existing size of the racial gap in voting is debatable; some argue that African Americans now tend to vote at a rate generally similar to whites, and research suggests that, although Latinos vote at lower rates than whites, their share of the electorate is on the rise (Roberts 2009; Library Index 2010). Further, an individual's party affiliation has long been tied to turnout rates. Campbell et al. (1960) emphasized this factor, though critics argue that they tend to overstate the role of party identity; however, this variable is consistently recognized as significant to voting behavior (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Hill 2006).

Political science studies show that an individual's previous voting behavior is an extremely strong indicator of turnout in any given election (Gerber and Green 2000; Niven 2001; Nickerson 2008). It is not particularly surprising that past behavior serves as a strong predictor of future actions. However, scholars are beginning to assess the interactive effects of past voting behavior and other variables on turnout, particularly studying the connection between this variable and voter mobilization (Niven 2001; Nickerson 2008).

Political mobilization efforts might be considered as influences that lie beyond the personal characteristics of individual voters; these can be seen as, essentially, stimuli that are thrust onto potential voters, sometimes interacting with their personal characteristics. The literature on mobilization demonstrates its importance to the political process (Gosnell 1927; Eldersveld 1956; Cutright 1963; Kramer 1970; Blydenburgh 1971; Miller, Bositis and Baer 1981; Nagel 1987; Winders 1999; Kornbluh 2000), with some intimating that variation in mobilization efforts is a stronger predictor of turnout over time than many other electoral stimuli (Avey 1989; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Recent studies, which have challenged the older survey-based approaches, affirm the significance of mobilization (Gerber and Green 2000; Gerber, Green, and Green 2003; Bergan et al. 2005; Green and Gerber 2005). However, there remains some debate as to the relative influence of variations in mobilization type on turnout (Gerber and Green 2000, 2001; Ramirez 2005).

Recent studies have begun to attempt to highlight the interactive effects of mobilization on turnout. One example of this research can be seen in research on the influence of mobilization by way of social pressure, whereby vote-getting organizations use the prior turnout history of an individual's neighbors as a means of enticing potential voters to cast ballots. These studies have determined that social pressure mail can influence turnout by considerably higher amounts than regular mobilization-by-mail efforts (Gerber et al. 2008, 2010; Mann 2010; Panagopoulos 2010). Similar results have been found when looking at personal visits (Davenport 2010) and automated phone calls (Gerber et al. 2010).

There has been very little research into the longitudinal effects of political mobilization on voter turnout over time. However, there is a developing literature into this topic. Goldstein and Rideout (2002) addressed at the macro level effects of mobilization on turnout over time in assessing whether aggregate mobilization changes or declines have a broad influence on turnout. Stein et al. (2005) looked at the relationship between mobilization and electoral reforms on increasing turnout in Texas. Niven (2001) studied face-to-face mobilization over seven months during a Florida primary race, determining that the effectiveness of mobilization on voting in the race was time dependent. Perhaps the most substantial contribution comes from Davenport et al. (2010), who tracked voters mobilized by social pressure groups during a single campaign, finding that the message communicated during the campaign sometimes resonated for up to two years.

However, within the political science literature, there is no evidence of research that has been able to track the relative marginal influence of multiple and cumulative contacts on the same panel of voters over the course of several elections. Nor has the literature approximated research of this type by using quantitative and objective measures of turnout while concurrently controlling for vote history over time. In accomplishing both of these, my study is able, therefore, to fill a considerable gap within this literature.

Literature on Union-Led Political Mobilization and Turnout

Organized labor places considerable importance on its ability to mobilize potential voters in a given election. In 2010, the AFL-CIO proclaimed that it provided the largest non-party mobilization operation in the United States (Shear 2010). As part of their political strategy, union groups often target high-density battleground states, where they are able to reach the most members. These states, such as Pennsylvania and Ohio, have remained hotly contested over time at the federal, and in many cases, local electoral levels. In Pennsylvania, for instance, labor claimed that its 2010 vote-getting efforts on behalf of Joe Sestak had contributed substantially to closing the gap between the candidate and his Republican challenger (Shear 2010). Pennsylvania was also considered a battleground state for unions in 2008 (as well as 2004 and 2000), where a substantial vote-getting campaign occurred on behalf of Barack Obama (and, in earlier electoral cycles, John Kerry and Al Gore, respectively) and other members of Congress deemed labor friendly (Michaels 2008).

Yet for all the evidence that labor acts as a considerable force in attempting to mobilize potential voters, there is only a small body of scholarly work dedicated to comprehending its significance to the political process (Delaney, Masters and Schowchau 1988; Uhlaner 1989; Sousa 1993; Ganz 1994; Verba,

Schlozman and Brady 1995; Radcliff and Davis 2000; Freeman 2003). Some scholars have addressed the issue at the macro level, studying turnout in conjunction with overall union density levels (Radcliff and Davis 2000) or using countywide data to analyze the interactions between union density levels and socioeconomic status as predictors of turnout (Zullo 2009). At the individual level, Zullo (2004) considered the influence of vote-getting efforts by labor councils on grocery workers in Wisconsin during the 2000 election, finding that telephone contact significantly influenced turnout, particularly when performed close to the election date. Lamare (2010a) found distinctions between mobilization types, and variations by ethnicity, when studying union-led mobilization efforts across a series of elections. He also determined (2010b) that the interaction between prior vote history and contact in any given election proved meaningful, with occasional voters generally more likely to cast ballots when contacted.

Though scholarly research into the connections between union-driven mobilization and voter turnout has increased recently, there are still many gaps in the literature and considerable methodological concerns to overcome. Similar to the political science literature on the subject, no work has considered the effects of multiple contacts on the same sample of individuals over time. Given that unions often direct substantial resources into the same battleground areas (Pennsylvania, Ohio, Nevada, etc.) with the same targeted constituents (union members and other low-wage or "blue-collar" workers), it is critical to know whether the marginal effect of each additional contact meaningfully influences turnout, and, if so, whether there are nuanced variations in effectiveness by type or demographic and whether returns from additional contact diminish over time.

Methodologically, much of the work on turnout faces challenges in three ways. First, the data often come from surveys, which upwardly bias response rates. Second, the sample sizes are small, leading to reliability problems. Third, many studies are unable to account for prior political behavior when studying the effects of mobilization; these studies are unable to tell whether mobilizing groups targeted only likely voters, which inflates the influence attributed to the mobilization effort alone. My research overcomes each of these methodological concerns. The data come from public records of turnout, removing any response biases. The final sample includes more than 65,000 individuals, providing more than enough N values. Finally, I am able to capture and track the vote history of each individual over time and treat it as an independent variable. I have used both quantitative tests and qualitative interviews to determine that the union-led mobilization efforts I track were not meaningfully influenced by the prior behavior of the targeted individuals (or any other available variable or known cause). (See the appendix for a full discussion of the quantitative and qualitative techniques I used to determine that the contacted group did not differ in any meaningful way from the non-contacted group.)

I am able to track the panel of registered voters over the course of five elections. I control for what I consider fixed effects (age, gender, ethnicity, party affiliation, socioeconomic status) and variable effects (vote history, the election at hand, and, critically, contact by labor-led mobilization groups). I am able to assess the influence of each additional contact compared to both a reference category (those who were not contacted) and also relative to all the other levels of contact (i.e., the marginal influence of three contacts versus one or two contacts on turnout, while still controlling for the aforementioned factors).

Hypotheses

The literature on mobilization provides a useful foundation for the development of this paper's hypotheses. On the one hand, no research has looked at multiple individual-level contacts of a panel over time, so some consideration of work into similar areas is required. On the other hand, there is a strong body of literature that, if extrapolated, should provide reasonable hypotheses to test.

Hypothesis 1: Each Additional Contact Over the Five Elections Will Yield Higher Aggregate Levels of Turnout Than the Previous Contact

Recent mobilization studies, mentioned earlier, have suggested that, when organizations know the vote history of the individuals they mobilize, they can engage in social pressure, which increases turnout in the election at hand and in subsequent elections up to two years later. Given this and the other literature on mobilization, I expect that there will be something of an additive effect of contact on turnout over time, with each additional cumulative level of contact yielding an increase in cumulative turnout.

Hypothesis 2: The Marginal Level of Turnout Increase Provided by Each Additional Contact Diminishes Over Time

Although it is known that mobilization raises turnout, and therefore one would expect union-led mobilization to remain influential on turnout when compared to the non-contacted group across all five levels of contact, it is not clear that the rate of cumulative turnout will be proportionate to the rate of cumulative contact. That is, research has not yet tested whether the turnout increase that occurs when moving from zero to one (or more) contacts will remain equal when comparing one to two contacts, two to three contacts, and so on. Political science literature on voter fatigue suggests that voters are less likely to cast ballots if a number of elections occur in rapid succession (see Boyd 1981, 1986, 1989; Jackman et al. 1995; Rallings et al. 2003). Applying this idea, as well as those related to market (and message) saturation, diminishing marginal returns, plateau effects, and the like, I anticipate that, at each interval of contact, the message loses some level of influence on a potential voter, until a point is reached at which additional contacts no longer produce marginal turnout gains. I do not mean to suggest that this saturation point would influence voters' responses to other political mobilization efforts in the medium- or long-term; however, given the short time frame and similarity of the mobilization efforts, I hypothesize that the marginal returns of contact by the labor–community alliance will likely diminish in the short term, until a point is reached at which additional contacts yield no marginal benefit.

Hypothesis 3: The Effectiveness of Contact Over Time Will Vary by Both Contact Type and Voter Ethnicity

There is a substantial literature showing a connection between labor-led mobilization groups and Latinos in South Los Angeles (Milkman and Wong 2002; Meyerson 2003; Milkman 2006b, 2007; Zahniser 2006; Reynolds 2007; Lamare 2010a, 2010b). Given this literature, I anticipate that contacted Latinos will have higher overall turnout rates and should be more receptive to additional contacts than non-Latinos. There is also a well-known literature on variation in mobilization effectiveness according to the approach taken. Although some argue that personal visits are more effective than phone calls, others suggest a more mixed picture (Gerber and Green 2000; Ramirez 2005; Davenport et al. 2010).

The Five Elections

I look at turnout rates of contacted and non-contacted voters over the course of five consecutive elections for which an alliance of labor and community groups provided mobilization efforts in South Los Angeles, from November 2002 to March 2004. The five elections were the November 2002 general election, the March 2003 citywide primary election, the May 2003 citywide general election, the October 2003 special election, and the March 2004 presidential primary. In each of these elections, labor and community organizations attempted to increase turnout by phoning and visiting union members and other workers in the South Los Angeles community.[2]

The constituent parties within the alliance are not particularly easy to identify—however, one group that is known to have engaged in a substantial mobilization effort across these elections is the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor (or County Fed). The success of this group in raising turnout in elections featuring pro-labor candidates is extremely well documented within the literature (Rodriguez 1998; Milkman and Wong 2002; Milkman 2002, 2006a; Cooper 2003; Meyerson 2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; Frank and Wong 2004; Zahniser 2006). Others working under the umbrella of this alliance included paid and volunteer labor members and community activists. The groups involved within this alliance can be considered essentially indistinct in their ambitions, strategies, and efforts to mobilize voters. For instance, one was known as The Alliance for Local Leaders for Education, Registration and Turnout (ALLERT), who define themselves as "an alliance of community-based organizations, labor unions and community members," with the goal of increasing civic participation and voter turnout among low-income and other traditionally underrepresented entities (ALLERT 2010). Aside from the County Fed, which was specifically union affiliated, the remainder of the groups had ostensibly similar characteristics to ALLERT; as such, the "labor–community alliance" was essentially homogenous in its makeup.

Literature shows that within each election, the County Fed (and, given the Fed's influence on mobilization in L.A., likely the alliance as a whole) held particular ambitions. In November 2002, the goal was that increased turnout would lead to the election of Fabian Núñez to the state assembly; the group also took stances on several ballot measures (Frank and Wong 2004). Both the March 2003 and May 2003 efforts were driven largely by the hopes that increased turnout would provide victory for Martin Ludlow in his city council (District 10) primary and

runoff elections (Meyerson 2003; Frank and Wong 2004; Zahniser 2006; Lamare 2010a, 2010b). In October 2003, the group hoped to raise turnout in an effort to protect Gray Davis from recall, and, if the recall were to occur, to back Cruz Bustamante (Marquez and Woodruff 2003). Finally, a key ambition in March 2004 was to help community activist Karen Bass in her state assembly race (Frank and Wong 2004; Lamare 2010a, 2010b). However, it is not clear whether the labor–community alliance encouraged those they contacted to specifically support any or all of these issues or whether the message simply encouraged turnout in general.[3]

The Data and Models

The data I use come from two sources. The first is a list of registered voters in South Los Angeles as of mid-2004. The list is provided from a group called Political Data that specializes in generating voting populations (and associated demographic information) for mobilization groups in California. This list provides general demographic information about the registered voters and also their turnout record for every election between the 1990s and 2004.4 The demographic information included every individual's age, ethnicity, gender, party affiliation, address, and vote history. Age was based on the person's birth date. Ethnicities were determined by using the individuals' last names, a common practice employed when creating potential voter universes.5 The individual's address was used to determine whether he or she owned a home or rented an apartment—used as a proxy for socioeconomic status, on the assumption that, generally speaking, renters of apartments in South Los Angeles would likely have lower socioeconomic status than home owners. When labor-led mobilization groups contacted individuals on this list, they recorded the voter's unique ID number and the type of contact they employed (personal visit or live phone call). When an individual was contacted by a personal visit in any one election, it does not appear that he or she was contacted by phone, or vice versa.

Given that I was interested in looking at effects over time, I ordered the data so that every individual appeared five times (once per election), and a single variable measured contact and turnout each time. I aggregated turnout and contact over the five elections and varied individual vote histories based on how the individual had voted in the five elections prior to the race of interest. So, for the last election (March 2004), I based the individual's vote history on the sum of all votes cast for the five elections between March 2002 and October 2003. For the first election, vote history was determined from turnout across the five elections between March 2000 and March 2002, and so on. In every election, the individual's vote history could range from 0 to 5. I analyzed the full panel using any contact as my key independent variable. I also subdivided contact by type, to compare the relative effects of personal visits against live phone calls. Further, I created ethnic subsets, splitting the panel into Latino and non-Latino groups. I chose to count total contacts over the course of the five elections, where, for instance, a person contacted during only the November 2002 and May 2003 races would receive a 1 for November 2002, a 0 for March 2003, a 2 for May 2002, and a 0 for the remainder of the elections. I took the same approach with turnout over the five elections.[6]

I analyzed the data using negative binomial regressions.[7] Categorical reference points were male gender, Democratic Party affiliation, generic ethnicity, U.S. birthplace, home ownership, March 2004 election, and no contact. Age and vote history were treated as continuous variables.[8] To test the relative influence of each contact on turnout over time, I ran pairwise estimated marginal means for the contact variable. Whereas the traditional regression results compare each additional contact against the reference category (non-contacted individuals), the estimated marginal means allow me to compare each level of contact against the others, while continuing to account for all other effects.

Descriptive Information

Table 1a provides the basic descriptive information for the panel, including the size, individuals' demographic characteristics, and vote histories. The two cumulative variables were contact and turnout. Although the basic frequency information on these is somewhat interesting, perhaps more useful descriptive data can be found by looking at election-specific data. Table 1b provides the election-specific frequencies and means for these variables. The table shows that contacts were quite well distributed across each of the elections, with the lowest number (6,642) occurring in November 2002 and the highest (11,993) taking place in May 2003. Turnout levels were somewhat more varied; higher turnout occurred in the three general elections than in the two local races (because of this variation, I have controlled for each election within the

regression analysis). Finally, Table 1c provides the total number of contacts that occurred for each individual voter across the five elections. The table shows that, by the end of the five-election period, about 13% of the panel (10,973 individuals) had been contacted in at least one election, with a further 8.3% of the panel (7,060 individuals) having been contacted more than once.

TABLE 1a
Variable Names, Coding Schemes, and Means for the Full Panel

Variable Name	Coding Scheme	Mean
Turnout (November 02)	Cumulative across all elections (0 to 5)	.69
Turnout (March 03)	Cumulative across all elections (0 to 5)	.62
Turnout (May 03)	Cumulative across all elections (0 to 5)	.59
Turnout (October 03)	Cumulative across all elections (0 to 5)	1.77
Turnout (March 04)	Cumulative across all elections (0 to 5)	1.76
Age	Continuous (18 to 99)	51.27
Gender	Dummy (1 = male; 0 = female)	.40
Democratic affiliation	Dummy (1 = Democrat; 0 = not Democrat)	.89
Republican affiliation	Dummy (1 = Republican; 0 = not Republican)	.07
Other party affiliation	Dummy (1 = other party; 0 = not other party)	.04
Latino ethnicity	Dummy (1 = Latino; 0 = not Latino)	.31
Asian ethnicity	Dummy (1 = Asian; 0 = not Asian)	.05
Jewish ethnicity	Dummy (1 = Jewish; 0 = not Jewish)	.02
Generic ethnicity	Dummy (1 = generic; 0 = not generic)	.63
Foreign birthplace	Dummy (1 = foreign born; 0 = U.S. born)	.22
Live in apartment	Dummy (1 = live in apartment; 0 = live in house)	.17
Election	Categorical (1 to 5)	3.00
Vote history (November 02)	Votes in prior five elections (0 to 5)	3.13
Vote history (March 03)	Votes in prior five elections (0 to 5)	3.18
Vote history (May 03)	Votes in prior five elections (0 to 5)	2.66
Vote history (October 03)	Votes in prior five elections (0 to 5)	2.33
Vote history (March 04)	Votes in prior five elections (0 to 5)	2.41
Contact (November 02)	Cumulative across all elections (0 to 5)	.08
Contact (March 03)	Cumulative across all elections (0 to 5)	.14
Contact (May 03)	Cumulative across all elections (0 to 5)	.24
Contact (October 03)	Cumulative across all elections (0 to 5)	.23
Contact (March 04)	Cumulative across all elections (0 to 5)	.30

TABLE 1b
Election-Specific Contact and Turnout Frequencies and Means

	Contact		Turnout	
Election	Frequency	Mean	Frequency	Mean
November 2002	6,642	.08	58,758	.69
March 2003	11,286	.13	28,221	.33
May 2003	11,993	.14	19,291	.23
October 2003	10,990	.13	62,470	.73
March 2004	10,955	.13	41,886	.49

TABLE 1c
Percentage of Contacts per Person Over Five Elections (*N* = 85,064)

Number of Contacts Per Person	November 2002	March 2003	May 2003	October 2003	March 2004
0	92.2	86.7	85.9	87.1	87.1
1	7.8	12.1	4.7	6.7	4.5
2	—	1.1	8.5	2.8	2.8
3	—	—	0.9	3.0	3.1
4	—	—	—	0.4	2.1
5	—	—	—	—	0.3

Regression Analysis

Any Contact

The first regression tested the influence of all cumulative contact levels on cumulative turnout. Table 2a provides the regression output. The results indicate that any type of contact over time substantially raised cumulative turnout levels when compared to the non-contacted reference group ($p < .01$ for each level of contact). Somewhat surprisingly, the largest coefficient (.609) occurred at two contacts when compared against the non-contacted base. The results also indicate that there was no gender effect on aggregate turnout, though small but significant age and party affiliation effects were found. Latinos were less likely than the generic base to cast ballots over time ($p <. 01$). Those born outside the United States were slightly more likely to cast ballots on aggregate ($p <. 01$), though apartment status was significant ($p <. 01$), the magnitude was extremely small. Vote history was a strong predictor of aggregate turnout, with a coefficient of .442 ($p <. 01$) at each step along the scale. Finally, the election at hand proved the strongest predictor of turnout, with all four elections significantly ($p < .01$) less likely to increase cumulative turnout when compared against the March 2004 election.

Although the regression results show that cumulative levels of contact were each influential on turnout when compared against the non-contacted reference, the marginal influence of the additional contact levels on turnout is of considerable importance. Table 2b provides both the overall mean total turnout rates across all contacts (0 to 5) and the percent difference between those means for each level of contact. It is important to note that the marginal means comparisons are derived from the negative binomial model and to take into account all variables included in the regression (vote history, election, etc.).

TABLE 2a
Negative Binomial Regression for Any Contact

Variable	Unstd. B	Std. Error	Odds Ratio
One Contact	.295***	.006	1.343
Two Contacts	.609***	.010	1.838
Three Contacts	.241***	.011	1.272
Four Contacts	.188***	.016	1.207
Five Contacts	.230***	.043	1.259
Age	.003***	.000	1.003
Gender	.001	.004	1.001
Republican	–.007	.010	.993
Other Party	–.036***	.013	.965
Spanish	–.396***	.009	.673
Asian	–.014	.012	.986
Jewish	.060***	.014	1.062
Foreign Born	.079***	.009	1.083
Apartment	.032***	.006	1.020
Vote History	.442***	.002	1.147
November 2002	–1.102***	.006	.332
March 2003	–1.367***	.007	.255
May 2003	–1.353***	.008	.258
October 2003	.137***	.004	1.147
Intercept	–.938***	.010	.392

N = 62,786 (missing data excluded listwise)
*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level
No R^2 information is available for GEE (general estimating equation); election-specific Nagelkerke R^2 values were between .191 and .329

TABLE 2b
Pairwise Comparisons of Estimated Marginal Means of Any Contact

Mean Difference	0	1	2	3	4	5
0	—	.23*** (.006)	.55*** (.013)	.18*** (.009)	.14*** (.013)	.17*** (.036)
1	–.23*** (.006)	—	.33*** (.012)	–.05*** (.010)	–.09*** (.013)	–.06 (.036)
2	–.55*** (.013)	–.33*** (.012)	—	–.37*** (.015)	–.42*** (.017)	–.38*** (.038)
3	–.18*** (.009)	.05*** (.010)	.37*** (.015)	—	–.04*** (.015)	.00 (.037)
4	–.14*** (.013)	.09*** (.013)	.42*** (.017)	.04*** (.015)	—	.03 (.038)
5	–.17*** (.036)	.06 (.036)	.38*** (.038)	.01 (.037)	–.03 (.038)	—
Overall Mean	0.66 (.008)	0.89 (.012)	1.22 (.018)	0.84 (.013)	0.80 (.016)	0.83 (.037)
% Change		+34.8***	+37.0***	–31.1***	–4.7***	+3.7

*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level
Note: The marginal means take into account all other variables in the model
Wald chi-square significance: .000

The results show statistically significant differences for mean turnout rates across almost all pairwise comparisons of contact. The majority of means comparison were significant at the .01 level. Although each level of contact proved better than no contact at all, the strongest effect occurred at two contacts (with a total turnout level of 1.22). Those contacted three and four times had lower aggregate mean voting rates ($p < .01$)

than those contacted twice, indicating that, relative to two contacts, a third and fourth attempt at mobilization actually lowered aggregate turnout levels; a fifth contact did not significantly influence mean turnout when compared against any mobilization effort following the second contact. Finally, the percentage point differences in mean turnout rates between each contact are worth noting—between zero and one contacts, mean turnout increased by about 35%. Between one and two contacts, turnout rose even more substantially, with a 37% increase. As noted, the percent change became negative at three and four contacts.

Personal Visits and Live Phone Calls

The data included a measurement of contact type (personal visits and live phone calls). To measure contact type, I created two dummy variables; in the first, individuals contacted by personal visits received a 1, and all others were given a 0. In the second, those contacted by live phone calls were awarded a 1, and the rest of the sample received a 0. This allowed me to run visit and phone in the same negative binomial regression on the full sample. Table 3a provides the regression output. The results suggest that both personal visits and live phone calls worked extremely well over time when compared to their reference points. Over the five elections, both mobilization types yielded broadly similar outcomes. The largest coefficients occurred at two contacts for each type ($p < .01$ for both). A single phone call appeared to be slightly more effective than a single visit, but visits worked more effectively at two and three contacts. Finally, there was no significant turnout difference between five and zero contacts for both types. The other variables were, as expected, essentially identical to those found for the first regressions, with age, party affiliation, ethnicity, birthplace, and prior vote history all influencing turnout to varying degrees.

TABLE 3a
Negative Binomial Regression for Personal Visits Versus Live Phone Calls

Variable	Unstd. B	Std. Error	Odds Ratio
One Contact (Visit)	.263***	.007	1.301
Two Contacts (Visit)	.347***	.014	1.415
Three Contacts (Visit)	.271***	.029	1.311
Four Contacts (Visit)	.167**	.082	1.182
Five Contacts (Visit)	.011	.267	1.011
One Contact (Phone)	.323***	.008	1.382
Two Contacts (Phone)	.311***	.014	1.364
Three Contacts (Phone)	.147***	.022	1.158
Four Contacts (Phone)	.166***	.044	1.181
Five Contacts (Phone)	.179	.170	1.196
Age	.003***	.000	1.003
Gender	.001	.004	.993
Republican	–.009	.010	.972
Other Party	–.039***	.013	.937
Spanish	–.399***	.009	.659
Asian	–.019	.012	.959
Jewish	.058***	.014	1.032
Foreign Born	.080***	.009	1.065
Apartment	.031***	.006	1.020
Vote History	.444***	.002	1.554
November 2002	–1.109***	.006	.326
March 2003	–1.369***	.007	.251
May 2003	–1.285***	.008	.272
October 2003	.138***	.004	1.138
Intercept	–.940***	.010	.384

N = 62,786 (missing data excluded listwise)
*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level
No R^2 information is available for GEE (general estimating equation); election-specific Nagelkerke R^2 values were between .191 and .329

Tables 3b and 3c provide the estimated marginal turnout means for each additional contact by either personal visit or live phone call. In terms of personal visits, a single contact raised turnout by 29.6%, and a second contacted added an additional 8.6%. However, a third contact lowered turnout relative to two contacts, and there was no significant marginal change at four or five contacts. Looking at phone calls, the overall mean results were quite similar to those for personal visits. A single contact garnered a 37.5% increase in mean turnout. However, there was no change in aggregate turnout between one and two contacts, and there was a significant decline at three contacts. Four contacts did not yield significantly different results from three, and the fifth contact was not significantly different from any of the other levels.

TABLE 3b
Pairwise Comparisons of Estimated Marginal Means of Personal Visits

Mean Difference	0	1	2	3	4	5
0	—	.24*** (.011)	.34*** (.020)	.25*** (.031)	.15* (.079)	.00 (.219)
1	–.24*** (.011)	—	.09*** (.017)	.00 (.031)	–.10 (.079)	–.23 (.219)
2	–.34*** (.020)	–.09*** (.017)	—	–.08*** (.033)	–.19** (.080)	–.33 (.219)
3	–.25*** (.031)	.00 (.031)	.08*** (.033)	—	–.10 (.083)	–.24 (.222)
4	–.15* (.079)	.10 (.079)	.19** (.080)	.10 (.083)	—	–.14 (.231)
5	.00 (.219)	.23 (.219)	.33 (.219)	.24 (.222)	.14 (.231)	—
Overall Mean	0.81 (.026)	1.05 (.035)	1.14 (.041)	1.06 (.046)	0.96 (.085)	0.81 (.026)
% Change		+29.6%***	+8.6%***	–7.0%***	–9.4%	–15.6%

*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level
Note: The marginal means take into account all other variables in the model.
Wald chi-square significance: .000

TABLE 3c
Pairwise Comparisons of Estimated Marginal Means of Live Phone Calls

Mean Difference	0	1	2	3	4	5
0	—	.31*** (.017)	.29*** (.021)	.13*** (.021)	.14*** (.042)	.16 (.162)
1	–.31*** (.017)	—	–.01 (.016)	–.18*** (.023)	–.16*** (.043)	–.15 (.163)
2	–.29*** (.021)	.01 (.016)	—	–.16*** (.025)	–.15*** (.044)	–.13 (.163)
3	–.13*** (.021)	.18*** (.023)	.16*** (.025)	—	.02 (.045)	.03 (.164)
4	–.14*** (.042)	.16*** (.043)	.15*** (.044)	–.02 (.045)	—	.01 (.164)
5	–.16 (.162)	.15 (.163)	.13 (.163)	–.03 (.164)	–.01 (.164)	—
Overall Mean	0.80 (.039)	1.10 (.055)	1.09 (.055)	0.93 (.049)	0.94 (.062)	0.96 (.169)
% Change		+37.5%***	–0.9%	–14.7%***	+1.1%	+2.1%

*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level
Note: The marginal means take into account all other variables in the model
Wald chi-square significance: .000

Latino and Non-Latino Subset Analysis

In dividing the sample by ethnicity, I created two subsets within the data—one consisting of Latinos only and another comprising non-Latinos only. I removed the ethnicity variables from the analysis, as this information was implicit within the subset division.9 Table 4a shows the negative binomial regressions for both the subsets. The influence of contact over time was again substantial for both ethnic subsets, garnering positive coefficients significant at the .01 level within essentially each group. In the non-Latino subset, the coefficients generated odds ratios ranging between 1.155 and 1.737. In the Latino subset, only the fifth contact did not yield results significantly different from zero contacts, and the highest coefficient again occurred at two contacts. The remainder of the variables were largely consistent across the subsets, with the only substantive difference occurring for party affiliation (not significant for Latinos, but slightly significant for non-Latinos).

TABLE 4a
Negative Binomial Regression for Latino and Non-Latino Ethnic Subsets

	Non–Latino Subset			Latino Subset		
Variable	Unstd. B	Std. Error	Odds Ratio	Unstd. B	Std. Error	Odds Ratio
One Contact (Non–Latino)	.259***	.006	1.296	—	—	—
Two Contacts (Non–Latino)	.552***	.010	1.737	—	—	—
Three Contacts (Non–Latino)	.207***	.011	1.230	—	—	—
Four Contacts (Non–Latino)	.144***	.016	1.155	—	—	—
Five Contacts (Non–Latino)	.236***	.040	1.266	—	—	—
One Contact (Latino)	—	—	—	.414***	.015	1.513
Two Contacts (Latino)	—	—	—	.770***	.023	2.160
Three Contacts (Latino)	—	—	—	.290***	.027	1.337
Four Contacts (Latino)	—	—	—	.241***	.039	1.273
Five Contacts (Latino)	—	—	—	.181	.131	1.198
Age	.003***	.000	1.003	.006***	.000	1.006
Gender	.000	.005	1.000	–.007	.011	.993
Republican	.009	.010	1.009	.024	.020	1.025
Other Party	–.038***	.014	.962	–.007	.035	.993
Foreign Born	–.014	.010	.986	.014	.014	1.014
Apartment	.029***	.006	1.029	.048***	.016	1.049
Vote History	.392***	.002	1.480	.613***	.004	1.847
November 2002	–1.109***	.006	.330	–1.155***	.015	.315
March 2003	–1.276***	.007	.279	–1.819***	.020	.162
May 2003	–1.332***	.008	.264	–1.446***	.021	.235
October 2003	.071***	.005	1.073	.347***	.012	1.415
Intercept	–.750***	.010	.472	–1.908***	.022	.148

N = 45,165 (Non-Latino subset), 17,621 (Latino subset); missing data excluded listwise
*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level
No R^2 information is available for GEE (general estimating equation); however, election-specific Nagelkerke R^2 values were between .191 and .329.

Tables 4b and 4c provide the pairwise marginal means comparisons for Latinos and non-Latinos. The results from Table 4b indicate that, among Latinos, moving from zero to one contact raised aggregate turnout by 29.5%. However, moving from one to two contacts increased the mean turnout figures even more substantially, yielding a 34.2% jump in mean turnout. As with the other marginal results, a third contact caused turnout to drop considerably among non-Latinos, as did a fourth contact. However, there was a slight improvement at the fifth contact relative to four, though five contacts fared more poorly than two and were not significantly different from three.

Among Latinos, again the largest overall mean turnout rate occurred at two contacts (0.72), and there was a decrease in mean turnout at three, four, and five contacts when compared against two contacts. In terms of percent change, adding a third contact appeared to be particularly damaging to overall turnout relative to one or two contacts, with the marginal decline in mean turnout between two and three contacts

falling by 38.9% (though again, the result at three contacts remained significantly higher than the result at zero contacts). There was no significant percent change between three, four, and five contacts. Finally, the highest overall turnout rise between zero and one contacts occurred within the non-Latino subset (an increase of 51.5%), and the second highest marginal turnout increase also occurred in this group (a positive change of 44.0% when moving from one to two contacts). However, unlike the findings for the non-Latino subset, these results demonstrate that, although two contacts garnered the largest overall turnout numbers, the percent increase was highest when moving from zero to one contact.

TABLE 4b
Pairwise Comparisons of Estimated Marginal Means of Non-Latino Contacts

Mean Difference	0	1	2	3	4	5
0	—	.26*** (.008)	.65*** (.017)	.20*** (.013)	.14*** (.017)	.24*** (.044)
1	–.26*** (.008)	—	.39*** (.016)	.06*** (.014)	.12*** (.018)	.03 (.045)
2	–.65*** (.017)	–.39*** (.016)	—	–.45*** (.020)	–.51*** (.022)	–.42*** (.046)
3	–.20*** (.013)	.06*** (.014)	.45*** (.020)	—	–.07*** (.020)	.03 (.046)
4	–.14*** (.017)	.12*** (.018)	.51*** (022)	.07*** (.020)	—	.10** (.046)
5	–.24*** (.044)	.03 (.045)	.42*** (.046)	–.03 (.046)	–.10** (.046)	—
Overall Mean	0.88 (.008)	1.14 (.013)	1.53 (.021)	1.09 (.016)	1.02 (.019)	1.12 (.046)
% Change		+29.5%***	+34.2%***	–28.8%***	–6.4%***	+9.8%**

*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level
Note: The marginal means take into account all other variables in the model
Wald chi-square significance: .000

TABLE 4c
Pairwise Comparisons of Estimated Marginal Means of Latino Contacts

Mean Difference	0	1	2	3	4	5
0	—	.17*** (.008)	.38*** (.018)	.11*** (.012)	.09*** (.017)	.07 (.052)
1	–.17*** (.008)	—	.21*** (.06)	–.06*** (.014)	–.08*** (.018)	–.10** (.053)
2	–.38*** (.018)	–.21*** (.06)	—	–.27*** (.019)	–.29*** (.023)	–.32*** (.055)
3	–.11*** (.012)	.06*** (.014)	.27*** (.019)	—	–.02 (.019)	–.05 (.054)
4	–.09*** (.017)	.08*** (.018)	.29*** (.023)	.02 (.019)	—	–.02 (.054)
5	–.07 (.052)	.10** (.053)	.32*** (.055)	.05 (.054)	.02 (.054)	—
Overall Mean	0.33 (.007)	0.50 (.013)	0.72 (.022)	0.44 (.015)	0.42 (.019)	0.40 (.053)
% Change		+51.5%***	+44.0%***	–38.9%***	–4.5%	–4.8%

*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level
Note: The marginal means take into account all other variables in the model
Wald chi-square significance: .000

Discussion and Implications

The goal of this paper was to take a relatively well-trodden subject (voter turnout determinants), one facet of which there is a growing body of literature and interest (union-led political mobilization). and add a series of research questions that have yet been explored at any level within this area (related to the effects of cumulative contacts on turnout over time). These research questions should find particular relevance for a labor movement heavily embedded within the U.S. political process and increasingly invested in mobilization of union members and, often in conjunction with non-labor groups, the community at large. With nearly a hundred million dollars spent on political activity, much of that devoted to increasing participation, the effects of the labor movement's mobilization efforts over time are certainly worth study. Many populations are targeted repeatedly by unions over several elections, especially those in political battleground areas. If repetition of contact proved beneficial over the short term, it would warrant continued mobilization investment in these areas. Further, findings that demonstrated diminishing returns after a certain number of contacts would be useful when considering resource allocation.

My first hypothesis suggested that each additional contact over the five elections would yield higher aggregate levels of turnout than the previous contact. My results indicated that, somewhat surprisingly, the largest coefficients almost always occurred at the second contact, and that the coefficients decreased (though remained positive) with the third and sometimes fourth contacts. Quite often, the substantial influence provided by the second contact appeared to be undone by adding a third contact, so that many times the net effect was that three contacts were roughly equivalent in total value to a single contact (both of which effects were far lower than two contacts). This indicates that there may have been something of a rebellion by potential voters when they were contacted more than two times in rapid succession; though they were still significantly more likely to cast ballots than if they had not been contacted at all, they appeared to be less inclined to vote than those contacted only twice. The exception to this occurred when analyzing phone calls—in this case, the overall turnout means tended to decrease after a single contact. In all, the evidence from the regressions suggests that the first hypothesis must be rejected.

My second hypothesis considered whether multiple contacts over a short period by the same groups yielded declining marginal increases in turnout. I found that, for the full sample, mean turnout increased more substantially between one and two contacts than between zero and one contact. This same result held true among non-Latinos, though not among Latinos. On the whole, the results tend to support my hypothesis regarding diminishing returns; however, the hypothesis is not fully confirmed, given that marginal returns increased between a first and second contact in some key instances.

When dividing the sample into those contacted by personal visit or live phone calls, I found that both visits and calls worked well to raise turnout on the whole but that a single phone call increased turnout more substantially than a single personal visit, whereas a second visit was both marginally and absolutely more effective than a second phone call. Previous findings generally show that, although personal visits tend to be most beneficial, live phone calls can be an effective means of mobilization as well, particularly when those engaging in the mobilization effort employ a level of social pressure. In terms of my hypothesis, although the results when dividing by type were similar insofar as both methods of mobilization proved effective, the coefficients and marginal means did vary over time.[10]

Although contact over time was significant and positive for both Latinos and non-Latinos, I found variation by ethnicity in terms of regression outcomes and the estimated marginal means. The regression coefficients indicate that Latinos were most substantially influenced by a single contact. This result is supported within the previously cited literature on union-led mobilization. Although adding a second contact also heavily influenced turnout levels, more than doubling aggregate turnout when compared to the non-contacted group and raising mean turnout by 44% when compared to a single contact, this increase was lower than that found when moving from zero to one contact (a marginal gain of 51%). However, for the full sample, both the largest and second largest marginal increases occurred among Latinos, indicating that this ethnic group was highly receptive to contact (particularly at one and two contacts).

The non-Latino turnout rate was, on the whole, much higher than the Latino turnout rate, even for those who were not contacted. Perhaps the most interesting finding within the non-Latino subset relates to the percent change in turnout rates between contacts. Within this group, marginal turnout increased at a

higher rate when moving from one to two contacts than when comparing zero to one contact. The implications of this finding are quite striking insofar as they suggest that, at least among non-Latinos, two contacts are more effective in increasing aggregate turnout than one contact, after accounting for other voting determinants.

In all, the findings support the notion that political mobilization by labor groups influences turnout; in essentially all the regressions, contact over time was positively and significantly influential on raising aggregate turnout when compared against those not contacted. However, the question becomes to what extent the labor movement should allocate these resources to repeatedly contacting the same individuals across a number of elections occurring in quick succession. The answer, according to these empirical results, tends to suggest that unions should contact potential voters no more than two times over the short term and that any further contacts after two would be inefficient. A subsequent consideration becomes the extent to which unions ought to invest in multiple mobilization efforts for the same individual or in single contacts among a number of individuals. The answer here may depend on the amount of resources that unions are willing to commit to each mobilization effort, the type of contact employed, and the characteristics of the individual voter.

Among Latinos, mobilizers would be well served to perform a single contact and would likely find almost (though not quite) the same marginal vote increase when adding a second contact. Among non-Latinos, the clearest implication is that mobilizers should add an additional contact following the first vote-getting effort, as the marginal change in turnout is higher for the second contact than the first. However, the heterogeneity of the non-Latino group (complicated by my inability to discern ethnicity from "generic" names) prevents me from being able to provide anything more than a broad conclusion on this. In terms of phone calls, it appears that a single call is all that is needed and that anything beyond one call proves inefficient. However, for personal visits, a second visit would generate considerable returns for mobilizers. In all, this study demonstrates that the effects of labor-led political mobilization remain tremendously influential in raising voter turnout levels but that multiple contacts do not raise turnout in a linear manner over time and that the effects of several mobilization drives over a short timeframe are not necessarily more beneficial than one or two contacts.

Appendix A

I relied on qualitative and quantitative techniques to establish that there were no substantial observable differences between the contacted and non-contacted groups. Qualitatively, I used both personal interviews with union political directors and literature on the targets of labor-led vote-getting efforts, which suggested that the goal of the groups involved in the mobilizing was to simply approach as many people as possible (Alexander 2005; Hicks 2008). Quantitatively, I used condition indexes, tolerance/variation influence factor (VIF) tests, and correlation matrices to assess the independence of contact compared to vote history and all other variables. I also ran a negative binomial regression that used the independent variables, rather than turnout, to predict contact. I found that contact did not depend on the demographic or vote history variables in any meaningful way. Finally, I ran a series of regressions including random effects, individual fixed effects, and population-averaged models across the individuals in the sample. I found only small differences in the coefficients for contact across each of these models. Of course, there may be unobserved characteristics of the contacted individuals for which the data could not account, but my understanding is that the mobilizers did not deliberately or strategically select for any unobserved characteristics when identifying targeted voters. All tables detailing these findings are available on request.

Endnotes

[1] These figures are provided by Open Secrets (www.opensecrets.org).

[2] Unfortunately, the data on contacted individuals do not distinguish union members from non-members. However, the labor–community alliance poured substantial resources into contacting union members and those not in a union.

[3] The political science literature does not demonstrate evidence that a partisan message influences turnout in a manner distinct from non-partisan mobilization, particularly for phone calls and personal visits.

[4] A total of 188,551 individuals are included within this list. However, I applied a number of filters to the data so that an appropriate panel could be identified. Perhaps most important, I excluded all individuals who were not registered as of March 2000. This allowed me to track only those who were eligible to vote (and therefore had an accurate vote history) as early as five elections prior to my first election of interest.

[5] There are some methodological concerns about this approach; for example, it becomes impossible to differentiate among ethnicities when the last name is not tied to a distinct ethnic group. This made it so that I could not distinguish between Caucasian and African American individuals. As another example, individuals with Spanish last names may not always identify themselves as Latinos. However, the method was used by the mobilization groups themselves in identifying Latino and non-Latino voters they wished to target; as such, the error was shared by those performing the contacts, and, given the large sample size, is likely not significant enough to substantially bias the ethnicity outcomes.

[6] I also ran regressions where contact could only increase over time (i.e., if a person was contacted in November 2002 and May 2003 only, he/she would receive a 1 in November 2002, a 1 in March 2003, and a 2 in the remaining elections between May 2003 and March 2004, with the same technique applied for turnout). This approach yielded outcomes broadly similar to those included in the paper, but I was advised by statistical consultants that the approach presented here was more appropriate. Another option was to look at only the final (March 2004) election and measure how contact (from 0 to 5) influenced turnout (from 0 to 5) for this election only. This also provided highly significant and positive results for the contact variable, but I chose to use the longitudinal approach to track individuals over time. All additional regressions are available on request.

[7] The negative binomial regression is particularly effective with count data over time and is very similar to a Poisson, though in this case the negative binomial fit the data more appropriately. I also ran Poisson regressions for each model (and for those discussed in endnote 6) and found similar outcomes to those reported here.

[8] Contact could, theoretically, be treated as a continuous variable as well. However, SPSS cannot assess estimated marginal means for continuous variables, so I used a categorical approach. When I ran the regressions with contact as a continuous variable, it was uniformly positive and significant.

[9] Although another option might have been to run interaction terms between each level of contact and a Latino ethnicity dummy, a far simpler and more efficient way to report the estimated marginal means was to create data subsets.

[10] I used Hosmer and Lemeshow's (2000) test for coefficient difference significance to determine that the beta coefficients for the independent variables were statistically different.

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