PROCEEDINGS OF THE
1964 SPRING MEETING

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1964 ANNUAL MEETING

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1965 SPRING MEETING

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Industrial Relations
Research Association

PROCEEDINGS OF THE
1964 SPRING MEETING

Edited by Gerald G. Somers

Gatlinburg, Tennessee
May 4 and 5, 1964

Industrial Relations Research Association

Spring Meeting

May 4 and 5, 1964   Gatlinburg, Tennessee

PREFACE

to the

Industrial Relations Research Association
Spring Meeting Proceedings

The Association's Spring Meeting in Gatlinburg was appropriately focused on two central areas of current interest in industrial relations: labor in the South and government in labor relations.

A session was held on retraining programs in Tennessee, West Virginia and the entire Appalachian area, appraising results to date, future plans and cultural factors which influence the success of retraining.

The campaigns of union organization in the South were appraised by a sociologist and a union organizer located in the midst of the Southern organizing efforts. The relationship between race relations and industrial relations in the South was analyzed by a prominent Negro leader.

Labor relations in the government service were discussed from the standpoint of dispute settlement procedures, the TVA program of labor-management cooperation, and collective bargaining procedures and techniques in the federal service.

The Association is indebted to Professor Charles A. Myers and Professor J. Earl Williams for their excellent program and local arrangements. The hospitality of the members of the Tennessee Chapter is especially appreciated.

As in previous years, we are grateful to Commerce Clearing House, Inc. for making these *Proceedings* available to our members.

Gerald G. Somers, Editor

Special Government Dispute Settlement Panels -- Four Views

A Brief Comparison of Two Special Panels in the Atomic Energy Industry

By H. T. HERRICK

General Counsel, Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service and Executive Secretary, Atom-
ic Energy Labor-Management Relations Panel

GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION in labor-management disputes has been a source of controversy ever since then-Secretary Goldberg went from the Inaugural Ball to the New York waterfront, hardly pausing to remove his white tie and tails. The controversy comes to a boil at least once a month, and sometimes twice. Last month, for instance, the Committee for Economic Development criticized a "marked and excessive tendency by the Government to intervene in the collective bargaining process." Within three weeks George Meany struck from the other side by scoring any use of the Council of Economic Advisers' "Guidelines" as a yardstick for measuring wage settlements.

I don't want to add fuel to the fire by pointing out that this Administration's intervention policies have stimulated both labor and management to recognize the "public interest" residing in many of their significant disputes. It can be argued that a policy of active intervention has led many members of the labor-management community to accept former Secretary Goldberg's proposition that the new and difficult issues encountered at today's bargaining tables are "far too complex, far too potent, and far too influential on the rest of society to be resolved on the old testing ground of clash of selfish interest." However, I intend to discuss intervention in a context in which the existence of a public interest is too obvious to require extended explanation or debate.

I assume that the government has not only a right but an obligation to concern itself with disputes in those industries which are of great importance to our national security. This is particularly true at plants or establishments which are owned by the government, whether they are operated by cost-plus-fixed-fee contractors, or are the site of major construction operations by private builders working on a lump-sum basis.

It is one thing to assert, however, that the government is entitled to intervene in labor disputes at its contractor-operated plants, but quite another to claim that all such intervention is useful, desirable, or even successful. In the best of all possible worlds, free collective bargaining will always work so well that intervention will never be necessary. But since our world is not yet perfect, and since free collective bargaining does not always produce settlements without strikes, I propose to examine and compare two government-sponsored dispute settlement mechanisms, the Atomic Energy Labor-Management Relations Panel and the Nevada Test and Space Site Construction Labor Board.

The Panel has existed in almost its present form for about ten years. During the last seven of these years, it has intervened in about 10 per cent of the 300-odd settlements reached by AEC's operating contractors and their employees' representatives.

Put another way, free collective bargaining has worked unaided about 90 per cent of the time in an industry which was, until recently, so critical to our defense posture that strikes have been deemed intolerable; an industry whose unions are hampered by the sure knowledge that it is almost impossible to inflict real economic harm on employers whose costs are completely reimbursed by the government.

The original Panel—The Davis Panel —was established at a time of serious public concern over strikes in the newly organized atomic energy industry. It had auspicious beginnings, for it was the beneficiary of a no strike-no lockout agreement which prevented stoppages until its expert and impartial membership could have a chance to produce a satisfactory settlement by a combination of super-

mediation, necromancy, and arm twisting. The no-strike pledge expired when President Eisenhower accepted the Panel's resignation in 1953. By this time Panel procedures were well established and accepted, and loss of the no-strike agreement did not hamper the Ching Panel when it was created shortly after the Davis Panel expired.

It is now understood that parties to disputes in the atomic energy industry are free to reject Panel jurisdiction. It is also understood that parties which accept jurisdiction must preserve the status quo until 30 days after the Panel issues its recommendations.

In its early years the Davis Panel handled labor disputes which affected the Commission's plant construction program, in some cases by assisting in working out project agreements. However, the Ching Panel's recent cases have reflected the shifting emphasis of Commission activity. For a time most of the disputes in which it intervened involved plants which produced fissionable materials—Oak Ridge, Hanford, Pudacah and Portsmouth— but the emphasis then shifted to the weapons plants—Medina, Burlington and Sandia. The last two years have seen a concentration of cases in the testing facility at Las Vegas.

Most of AEC's major production contractors are large multiplant corporations with organizations geared for mass production in the private sector of our economy. These include Union Carbide, duPont, General Electric, Dow, Goodyear, Bendix, Westinghouse, Phillips Petroleum and Western Electric. All of these major contractors have had to concern themselves with the effect of precedent for their private operations, of concessions made to unions in the government-owned plants they operate. For this reason they have not allowed

themselves to rationalize excessive settlements on the ground that all labor costs would be reimbursed.

Moreover the contractors, or so it seems to me with the limited opportunities I have had to form judgments of this kind, have made it a matter of corporate integrity to establish conditions of work in government-owned plants which are fair both to the employees and to the public which pays the bill.

Another factor which has helped to keep labor costs comparable with those in private industry has been the relatively weak position of the unions in AEC plants. There is little chance of a General Electric or a Union Carbide being over-generous to a union which cannot inflict material economic damage by striking a plant whose expenses, overhead, and nonproductive labor costs during times of strike or shutdown are absorbed by the government.

This combination of circumstances has enabled AEC to pursue a general policy of accepting labor costs embodied in collective bargaining agreements, and to avoid the painful business of making subjective judgments as to whether this cost or that benefit is reasonable or economical.

The Panel has been a beneficiary of this general policy. It has not had to review settlements already reached by the parties. It has in most cases had the far easier job of finding a satisfactory ground for settlement within limits marked out by demands and offers.

Labor relations is not an exact science. It is not easy to reach judgments as to the abstract "effectiveness" of a disputes settlement device such as the Panel. Limited value judgments can be based, in part, upon demonstrated performance over a period of time. But we can always be sure that the statistics we use to support such judgments have been influenced by intangibles which can't be measured or weighed.

We can also be sure that evaluations of past performance are not always reliable guides to the future. Conditions change, and techniques which have worked in the past may be inapplicable tomorrow, or even today. Changes are now under way in the atomic energy industry which may affect the Panel's future both as to techniques and purpose. It is with this in mind that the Panel has recently examined its past performance, and has undertaken to have prepared a catch-up annual report which will cover Fiscal Years 1957 through 1964.*

While it is not easy to find reliable indicators of Panel effectiveness for these years, some light is shed by work stoppage statistics which compare AEC contractors with "all industry" for the calendar years 1956 through 1963:

Comparison of Work Stoppage Experience of AEC Contractors and All Industry—Per Cent of Work Time Lost—By Years

	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
AEC Operations	0.19	0.35	0.14	0.20	0.15	*	0.26	0.48
BLS All-Industries	0.29	0.14	0.22	0.61	0.17	0.14	0.16	0.15

* Less than .05 per cent

If taken at face value these figures would show that the Panel has been less effective in the last two years than in former periods. However, like

* The report is being prepared by David Johnson of the University of Wisconsin.

all statistics, these need analysis and interpretation. At the beginning of the period, strikes in AEC were less tolerable than at its end, for the atomic energy industry is now less important to national security than it was in the 1950's. As there is no way to measure the impact of this change in the industry's importance on the Panel's operations, we can only record the fact that there has been such a change, and speculate on what might have happened if there had been no Panel.

We certainly should consider the effect of the changes in the defense and security aspects of the Commission's programs upon unions which have, for 15 years, been under the strongest kind of pressure to refrain from striking. We can also note that in these years the AEC itself began to exercise a critical judgment as to the substance of settlements, thus complicating bargaining in some locations by appearing as a ghost at the table, with responsibility for decisions but not for achieving them.

The 1963 strike figures are strongly affected by AEC's new activism. Twenty-eight per cent of all AEC lost time resulted from labor unrest at Las Vegas, and much of this can be attributed to AEC efforts to "roll back" conditions already provided for in construction contracts covering units specifically exempt from Panel jurisdiction.

Much more of the Las Vegas situation can be attributed to an extremely tangled and complicated structure of organizations, contractors, contracts and agencies with divergent and often competing interests. This statement suggests only one dimension of the complexity that has produced the Las Vegas situation. In any case, nobody can say with assurance that Panel intervention in 1963 would have prevented any of the lost-time disputes which occurred at the Test Site.

A second test of Panel effectiveness lies in examination of its economic impact. Anybody can settle strikes—for a price. A settlement mechanism can be said to be truly effective only if strikes have been settled without excessive costs.

The recent review of Panel operations included a study of their economic impact. About 30 settlements based on Panel recommendations from 1956 to 1963 were compared either with median settlements reported for the same period, or with the CEA guidelines. Recommendations in 12 of these cases were within the guidelines or the national wage median for the year. Three cases were mediated or settled without recommendations; three were settled in conformity with a construction industry settlement pattern also reported; three were arbitration cases in which the parties agreed in advance to a binding award by the Panel; one recommendation was identical with the last contractor offer; and one case tied wages of plant fire fighters with fire fighter wages in a number of western cities. In this last case, at Las Vegas, the recommendation was well below limits which could be justified by criteria which the Commission had judged appropriate.

In short, of the cases studied only seven showed increases which exceeded industry norms or the guidelines, and in each such case the Panel based its recommendation upon a conclusion that the employees in question had been subject to a specific inequity which needed correction.

The Nevada Test and Space Site Construction Labor Board was established in 1962 as a result of Commission fears that unless something were done to control certain labor costs and uneconomical practices at its Nevada Test Site a major scandal would result.

The conditions which led the Commission, the Labor Department and the Mediation Service to create the Board can only be understood in the light of background facts about the Test Site. Until the moratorium of 1958, AEC and Defense Department nuclear test programs alternated between Eniwetok and Las Vegas. This feast or famine economy required AEC to supply its intermittent Nevada needs from the only industry capable of assembling a transient work force on short notice—the construction industry. The industry's capacity to assemble large numbers of skilled employees quickly, as well as the needs of the job itself, made the Test Site a large construction job. This decision, complicated by the swings in international politics which made all jobs "rush and hang the expense," meant that construction patterns were completely embedded at the Test Site, even though they frequently led to extravagance and waste.

While construction contracts borrowed from the California market might be acceptable at a location that ran full-scale only on alternate years, they caused trouble when applied to a full-time, year-round operation. The trouble was compounded by a decision to place a NASA research and development project at Las Vegas, for this introduced large scale maintenance operations that became very costly when done by construction unions working with traditional construction conditions.

In short, AEC found that it had undertaken to run a large and continuing project with construction contractors and construction unions. The union-management power structure which it knew in the production plants was completely reversed. At Las Vegas AEC dealt with weak employers and strong unions. Finally, the Las Vegas contractors were not subject to the competitive pressures which led its

industrial contractors to hold the line on labor costs at their atomic energy operations.

I have referred to these complications earlier. They can hardly be emphasized enough—and it is difficult to see how they could have been avoided. Perhaps if the AEC had followed the practice it had established when its production plants were under construction, and had insisted on the negotiation of a project agreement, a more ordered and controllable situation might have resulted.

It may be that the feast or famine aspect of Las Vegas' early years made this impossible. The intimate relationship between our test program and international events beyond the Commission's control may have made insistence on a project agreement unrealistic. Whatever the reasons were, that decision was not made, and the foundations for serious labor troubles were firmly established by 1961.

Just when all of this was coming to a head, the McClellan Committee began to publicize its investigations into the missile base construction program. We can all remember the daily unveiling of alleged new horribles, charges of pyramided overtime, excessive high time, jurisdictional disputes, and many other practices and abuses which inflated costs and slowed progress at some of the missile bases, particularly Cape Canaveral. The Administration's answer to public pressures created by these charges was the Missile Sites Labor Commission.

Armed with a no-strike pledge, and composed of a veritable powerhouse of top level people, including then-Secretary Goldberg, Bill Simkin, George Meany, Walter Reuther, David Cole, John Dunlop, David Stowe, William Dunn of AGC, Edgar Kaiser and others of like stature, the Commission was very effective. A large part of its

effectiveness can be credited to the local tri-partite committees which dealt with many problems before they became too large to be handled locally.

However, the Commission did more than adjust disputes. It also undertook a subjective evaluation of conditions at the sites. Existing contracts, particularly those at Cape Canaveral, were reviewed to eliminate provisions which discriminated against the government by producing higher costs than those incurred by local contractors engaged in similar construction under private auspices. It also reviewed at Canaveral and other bases alleged uneconomic practices involving such things as travel and subsistence pay, high time and mole time, reporting pay, and overtime for work which could be handled more cheaply by adoption of continuous shift schedules.

In some cases the Commission corrected uneconomical practices which it had reviewed, and these accomplishments had a salutory effect at bases at which such problems had not become major. Finally, the Commission imported the "project agreement" concept into the missile base program, thus preventing development of the tangled, conflicting and inconsistent relationships which had already developed at Las Vegas.

With the example of the Missile Sites Commission before it, the Atomic Energy Commission, in partnership with the Labor Department and the Mediation Service, sought to accomplish the same result. During the summer of 1962 the Nevada Test and Space Site Construction Labor Board was established by a joint memorandum of the three agencies. Assistant Secretary of Labor Reynolds was chairman. and its other members were William E. Simkin, John Dunlop, C. J. Haggerty of the Building Trades

and Donald Grant, of Guy F. Atkinson Company in San Francisco.

The Board held hearings in Las Vegas late in the summer of 1962. From the beginning it was apparent that the group was handicapped by lack of accurate information as to the nature of the alleged abuses and discriminatory practices thought to exist at the site. One of the first pieces of business, therefore, was to collect and analyze existing contracts and alleged uneconomical practices. The Board then tried to remedy evils which it had found by inducing the parties to renegotiate existing contracts.

The various unions and contractors whose agreements contained discriminatory or uneconomical practices were asked to participate in negotiation of a project agreement which would standardize, so far as possible, working conditions and practices at the site. The second major line of attack was an effort to induce the unions and the site operating contractor to negotiate a maintenance agreement under which the most serious of the overtime abuses could be eliminated from those operations which were run on a continuous 24-hour, seven-day week basis. Finally, efforts were made to negotiate a separate agreement covering all drilling at the site in order to eliminate abuses on drilling operations which, like some of the maintenance work, had to be performed on a continuous basis.

From the very outset the efforts to renegotiate existing contracts were hampered by the complete autonomy of the construction unions. It was obvious that these unions were not subject to the same controls, or the same pressures from their internationals or from the public, that had enabled the Missile Sites Commission to induce other construction locals to accept modification and renegotiation of existing contracts. Negotiation ses-

sions had a quicksilver quality. Agreements in principle, which were easily reached, could never be reduced to final form before one or another of the locals slipped away. After months of effort, the Board's only solid accomplishment was a drilling agreement which largely corrected the problems that had been found in these operations. At one point it seemed that a maintenance agreement was about to be reached. However, developments entirely unrelated to the work of the Board made it impossible to risk the disturbances which might have resulted from a final application of pressures necessary to bring a few dissenters into the agreement, and it slipped away.

Finally, the Club prepared a report to the Atomic Energy Commission in which it condemned a number of the practices it found to be uneconomic, and recommended that charges based on these practices no longer be reimbursed.

This report suggested a fundamental change in established Commission policies. It rejected the view that all conditions of work and compensation incorporated in collective agreements or fixed by established practice necessarily constituted economical practices which should always be reimbursed. Accordingly, it advised the Commission to refuse to reimburse for payment of overtime rates for shift work which could be compensated for by shift premiums, for payment of hazard pay for more than hours of actual exposure, or to employees other than those actually exposed to the hazard, for payment of overtime rates which included pyramided hazard pay premiums, or for payment of travel pay where camps could reasonably be established.

Before the Commission could act on the recommendations, the unions instituted court action in a Nevada court where they procured an injunction restraining the several employers at the site from unilaterally changing conditions of employment created by existing bargaining agreements or established practices.

Conclusions

This review of Panel and Board activities can form the basis for several conclusions about labor problems in the atomic energy industry. It also gives rise to several troublesome questions which will have to be faced sooner or later.

Comparison of Panel and Board activities in the light of their tangible accomplishments seems, at first glance, to show the following: the Panel has successfully performed its mission of adjusting competing public and private interests in a milieu in which the traditional forces of free collective bargaining have been impeded by a supervening public interest; the Board failed to perform its mission of eliminating uneconomical and discriminatory practices and conditions at the Nevada Test Site. But we cannot stop here.

The Panel has had to apply broad well-accepted criteria to particular contract negotiations which have given rise to disputes. In all of these situations, the Panel has found parties who have been well prepared through the negotiation process for results which are pretty close to those which the Panel has recommended. The negotiation process not only marks out the limits of the possible through offer and demand, but it usually subdues any extravagant expectations of contractors, union leadership, or rank-and-file employees.

The Board was asked to do something entirely different. It was asked to roll back accepted practices and contract provisions simply because the government found them to be discriminatory, or because they resulted

in excessive costs. The Board's format was based upon a successful experiment in the missile base industry, but several of the essential tools which meant the difference between success and failure for the Missile Sites Commission were left out.

The Commission was created in a hard glare of publicity. Nobody was taken by surprise when the Commission attacked the uneconomical practices which had been publicized by Senator McClellan. Union leadership, their rank-and-file, and the contractors were prepared by the publicity and by the demonstration of interest by top level government, labor and management officials to accept changes and reductions in their working conditions.

A totally different situation existed in Nevada. The conditions which were under attack had been sanctioned for years. There was no preliminary public identification of particular practices or contract provisions which could no longer be tolerated, there was no public discussion of their unreasonableness or unsoundness, and the Board had no support from community pressure similar to that which was so important in the missile base industry. For this reason, neither the local union leadership nor the rank-and-file was ready to accept a roll-back.

The Board lacked several other essential weapons, the most important being the no-strike pledge. It should not be overlooked, however, that the lack of public discussion and public preparation at Las Vegas also made it impossible for the Board to create local committees like those that have functioned so well at the missile sites.

Despite these things, the Board had several solid accomplishments. The drilling agreement eliminated a major area of abuse, and there is every reason

to hope that a maintenance agreement will eventually be negotiated.

The Board's largest accomplishment was that it stimulated local discussion, thereby conditioning the rank-and-file, their union leaders, management and the community for changes and corrections of abuses. When these changes are made, they will stand on a foundation prepared by the Board.

The questions raised by this review concern future government policies for contractor-operated facilities.

At its production and manufacturing plants, AEC has been able to follow a laissez faire principle with respect to the substance of negotiated settlements. At the beginning, the Panel was created because of the public's fear of strikes in the industry. The Panel served as a balance in a situation where labor's traditional economic weapons could not be used because of our defense needs. In these circumstances it did not matter that the strike weapon was ineffective for another reason — government reimbursement policies that protected its contractors from all economic loss in a labor dispute.

Now the defense implications are nearly gone, and we are faced with a moral issue: should the government change its policies on reimbursement to recreate at its government-owned, contractor-operated plants a true facsimile of the outside world? Unless it does so, the conventional arguments against government intervention will not apply to the atomic energy industry.

At Las Vegas we have seen the other side of the coin: strong unions living high off the government hog because of weak contractor management. The Commission simply does its duty when it intervenes to assure that public funds are spent wisely. But by doing this duty, it has raised other serious issues of policy.

The government is now the real employer party in interest in Las Vegas; yet the AEC does not sit at the bargaining table. If we really believe in our national collective bargaining policies, we should insist that union negotiators be brought face-to-face with management representatives having authority to make a deal. This does not happen in Las Vegas, yet the Commission must continue its efforts; I do not know how this can be done. Certainly there must be strong and responsible management, working within a general framework of policy fixed by the Com-mission. There must also be much more public discussion of these policies, and all parties must be prepared for the changes that are to be made. In all of this, however, the government must take the lead—but by doing so, it will certainly play an active role which is inconsistent with our present notions of free collective bargaining.

If the Commission follows this approach, I suggest that there will continue to be a need for a disputes settling mechanism which will, to an increasing degree, be a "keeper of the King's conscience."   [The End]

Special Government Dispute Settlement Procedure

By PAUL L. STYLES

Director, Office of Labor Relations, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama

BACK IN 1934—a year in which I led the first Labor Day parade in Huntsville, Alabama — Franklin D. Roosevelt had a program for dealing with a special labor problem. His program was centered around the old Textile Labor Relations Board.

In those days the "Lint Heads," God bless them, called it "the stretch out." But it was only automation by another name. The Israelites under Moses had even another name for it and the Luddites in England had another when they smashed the labor-saving textile machinery in the early 1800s.

Automation certainly was a problem in those days just as it is now. But it is not something new, nor even something special. It began, as I see it, in the twilight of the earth's awakening when a grizzled prehistoric man learned to make use of the fact that a wheel will roll.

Today, after these thousands of years, should we suddenly get excited because our chores are being eased and our job pictures being changed by technology? Should we call it a tremendous new problem and cry out for crash solutions which might not be best in the long run? I think not.

"Special" Problems Have Familiar Ring

I was asked to talk today on "Special Government Dispute Settlement Procedure." What a can of worms! I don't know where, but somehow in these past 30 years I've gotten the idea that all labor disputes are "special." How-

ever, we live and learn . . . and those exciting days of the 1930s and 1940s with their "special" problems fade back to routine and dull history. But, you know, somehow our new "special" problems always have a familiar ring and the new "special" procedures seem only to be variations of old songs.

A recent magazine article[1] quotes William Simkin, Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, to the effect that the service is setting up a program to give its mediators more knowledge of automation problems. Education is wonderful. Nobody will dispute that fact but the idea is not new. There has only been a change in the scenery and the names of the actors. The Textile Labor Relations Board faced it with the "Lint Heads" and labor organizations and boards will continue to do so. Machines and new technological concepts are replacing men, having been doing so for countless years, and will do so in the future.

It follows logically therefore that most of our "special" area attention is not a matter of attacking a new problem with a crash program. It is rather a matter of keeping up with an age-old problem; of calmly presenting ideas and approaches; of working together always—labor, industry, government—because the prosperity of one spells the prosperity of the other.

I am sorry to report that what I have to say will be nothing new. It has been said before. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has had, and continues to have, some unique production and research development situations which are quite naturally followed by unique labor situations. NASA, of course, is a separate agency from the Defense Department, but it does business with many of the same industrial firms. It has faced gigantic new tech-

nical problems and concepts and through it all has performed under the sobering realization that man will ride the huge rockets being fabricated, and his life must be protected. The nation's prestige is also at stake.

The rocket industry is a mushrooming labor procurement area and the Marshall Space Flight Center at Huntsville relies heavily on private industry, but equally important is the in-house capability it has built up over the years. Marshall Director Dr. Wernher von Braun calls this a "bench-oriented" philosophy. Our Marshall Center engineers operate like medical doctors. If you take the doctor away from his patients, he soon forgets how to practice medicine and starts writing books or publishing magazines about it.

Appointment of Nystrom Committee

One of the first government actions in the NASA space age was appointment of the Nystrom Committee. I'm sure you are familiar with its recommendations—one of which was the hiring of a Labor Relations Director by NASA, which resulted in my appointment to the post in January 1961.

Going beyond normal procedure, the Nystrom Committee also recommended that NASA bargain with building trades unions as to how much work NASA would do with civil service and industrial contractor personnel and how much would be done under contract with building trades contractors.

It becomes clear that certain work, even including ground equipment installations, must be carefully done as a part of the research and development of space flight—especially when an astronaut's life may be at stake. NASA is trying to do something that has never been done before, so naturally there are few precedents.

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[1] *Business Week*, February 22, 1964.

Arrival at Workable Solutions

But there is a point when laboratory experimentation ends, and production begins. We constantly watch this area and, through sincere efforts on the part of unions, contractors, and NASA, have been able to arrive at workable solutions—especially in the field of jurisdictional disputes.

In 1962, NASA again went beyond normal Defense Department policy, the one of not taking action in any dispute between labor and private management. Because of a strike, all construction work on Redstone Arsenal stopped, including work on a test stand important in the space race with Russia. NASA filed NLRB charges and was granted an injunction, ending the strike. As a result, President Neil Haggerty of the AFL-CIO Building and Construction Trades Department remarked: "Labor must have a place to go with its problems if it is to abide by the no-strike pledge." I certainly agree, and subsequently will offer my own recommendation for a solution.

Another offspring of the space age, the Missile Sites Labor Commission, has performed as a useful and vital tool in this expanding national effort. It recorded impressive advances in decreasing the number of man days lost due to labor disputes. And at Cape Kennedy—where labor relations were notoriously instable—set a record a couple of years back of only one man day lost for every 3,300 worked.

RECOMMENDATIONS

But, personally, I have before and still recommend a special board — something like the old War Labor Board of World War II to handle unresolved space labor disputes. The MSLC lacks authority to make a final and binding decision. It depends on mediation efforts and the prestige of a presidential commission to do its work. I think by Executive Order of the President, all contracts let by federal agencies for construction or manufacture at these sites could contain a provision that the company must agree that there would be no strikes or lockouts and that all questions which cannot be settled by sincere collective bargaining be referred to the proposed board.

I have outlined my thoughts on this in detail in previous presentations, specifically before the Southwestern Legal Foundation, October 19, 1962.

I believe with all my heart in collective bargaining, as everybody here should be aware.

I do not believe that such a board would injure true collective bargaining in that it will give unions a place to go when they are bound by no-strike pledges at missile and space sites. Neither would the board be intended to mark the end of the Missile Sites Labor Commission. The board would complement it, receiving only those disputes seemingly hemmed in boxed canyons without an escape route. I have been a field examiner, a regional director and a member of the NLRB. I have not lost one iota of dedication that collective bargaining is the democratic way in labor relations, and I never will.

At the Marshall Center we are building the Saturn rockets which will extend man's reach to the moon and past it toward the planets and perhaps the stars. Our work is new, fascinating and diversified. We will not rest until it has been accomplished.

Through all its complexity, we must be fair to labor and industry and to all Americans who depend upon us to keep the United States the greatest nation on earth and in space. President Johnson has said that to be first on earth, we must be first in space.

Our procedure in special disputes is simple: Look ahead and prevent, rather than wait and attempt to cure; treat all problems as special ones; hold fairness and sincerity in collective bargaining above all else; and always consider the fate of our nation.

At the Marshall Center we take great pride in the government-industry-labor teamwork which has produced five consecutive successful Saturn rocket launches. All our public affairs outlets continually stress the point that our successes were, and are, accomplished through cooperation and team work. Without labor, without private industry, the dream of exploring space just could not come true.

Conclusion

Let me assure you, in summation, that the routes of communication with labor and industry will remain clear and open. All new NASA programs are reviewed for their potential impact on labor relations, and foreseeable problems are intercepted before they develop. When the new space technology gives birth to relatively new and unexpected labor situations, they will be treated, as always, through open talks across the bargaining table—the American way.

There are familiar faces here today in this beautiful Tennessee town. Some of them I connect with a long relationship in the bargaining game. But, no matter how many meetings I attend, each of them gives me a feeling that our meeting is in itself the master switch. Don't get me wrong! Solutions just aren't that simple. But this meeting—and all which are convened to discuss or analyze labor difficulties—are master links in the communications channels. So long as we can meet and exchange ideas, all labor problems, including special dispute settlement procedures, are relatively minor

details. Don't think that I have given up on the problem, or that I have a jaundiced approach. I might be called a "tired old practitioner"—but I am one who will always have faith in America and Americans. We have been solving "special" disputes for decades across the bargaining table. Space technology now allows man to communicate via satellites across oceans and continents. But, if we keep our ideas fresh and our approaches attuned with advancing technology, we can pound the same old bargaining table our forefathers pounded, and find solutions just as they did.

So long as we can discuss labor problems, we are all right, because we shall always have problems as long as laborers are individuals. The day we can no longer discuss these problems, we will have lost the master switch we hold now at this meeting, because all decisions will then be made for us by a totalitarian government.

NASA's manned space flight mission is being accomplished with only a small core of federal employees and with over 90 per cent of the budget going to private industry and research channels. With so much of the work being accomplished by industry and members of the great unions, it should be obvious that our nation's dream of reaching the stars rides heavily on their shoulders. In the area of special disputes—and in all situations—this fact will be recognized and our fairness to labor and industry will be influenced by it. Together, we will keep our nation first on earth, and first in the new horizon of space flight.

In closing, may I say that in typical hillbilly fashion (and, being a native of these very hills, I am that) I have always consulted "The Book" when I am in need of advice. Along with President Lyndon B. Johnson I would commend to you Isaiah 1:18, "Come now, and let us reason together." **[The End]**

Special Government Dispute Panel

By T. E. LANE

Superintendent of Industrial Relations, Union Carbide Corporation, Nuclear Division

I INTEND to take the position in this discussion, based on 14 years of experience with a Special Government Disputes-Settlement Panel—The Atomic Energy Labor-Management Relations Panel—that we would have better company-union relations, more effective collective bargaining, and fewer work stoppages if the normal economic consequences of collective bargaining were left to the parties.

Union Carbide is operating four government-owned atomic energy installations; three in Oak Ridge and one in Paducah, Kentucky. We have been a contractor for the government for over 20 years. All of the manual employees in the four installations are organized and certified in production and maintenance units; and none of the salaried technical, administrative, or clerical employees is unionized. We have had a disputes-settlement panel available since 1949, when the first Atomic Energy Labor-Management Relations Panel was appointed under the chairmanship of Mr. William H. Davis. The present Panel is under the chairmanship of Mr. Cyrus S. Ching. The Panel is composed of outstanding individuals in the field of labor relations who are dedicated to industrial peace.

Oak Ridge came into existence in 1943 when the United States government acquired approximately 60,000 acres of land for the buildings in which the materials for an atomic bomb would be produced. The project has been called the best kept secret of World War II. In the latter part of 1944 there were approximately 80,000 construction and operational employees in Oak Ridge, drawn from an area of about 60 miles from the project site and supplemented by a national recruiting program. Both the community and the installations were enclosed within a completely fenced military area, with military police patrolling the fence lines and guarding the gates.

An agreement had been reached between the major labor unions and the Secretary of War that, in the interests of secrecy, no attempt would be made to organize the workers in Oak Ridge.

Following the bomb drops at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which ended World War II, and the public announcement of the work at Oak Ridge, the unions were released from their wartime pledges. After aggressive union organization campaigns, two of the Oak Ridge plants were organized by the AFL, and one Oak Ridge plant and the Paducah Plant were organized by the CIO. Some of the animosity between the union groups, which developed as a result of this aggressive organization effort, is still evident after 18 years and in spite of the AFL-CIO merger.

First Dispute Under Taft-Hartley

In the union contract negotiations of 1948, a dispute developed with the union which threatened a work stoppage at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This became the first dispute handled under the emergency disputes procedure of the then-new Taft-Hartley Act. After the customary hearings, the parties were enjoined from strike and lockout; and on the 78th day of the 80-day cooling-off period, with both parties under severe public pressure, an agreement was reached. This experience and the resulting public con-

troversy caused the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to call for hearings to develop a procedure to avoid work stoppages in the atomic energy industry. The outcome of this hearing was the appointment of a commission which became the first Atomic Energy Panel.

The new disputes-settlement panel was not long in being put to work. A settlement with the CIO group had been completed in Oak Ridge, and the same rates of pay were offered to the AFL group. Basically this dispute was over the application of a wage increase, not the amount. The company was seeking an industrial type of wage structure, while the union was seeking a modified construction type. The Panel found middle ground, as usual, and a settlement which was neither an industrial nor a construction type was accepted by the parties. This settlement resulted in discontent with the CIO group, and another Panel case developed. Since the Panel was established in 1949, 17 contract disputes and one non-contract dispute have been referred to them. In addition to the disagreements which resulted in Panel cases, there were four legal strikes and two illegal strikes during this 15-year period.

We have a good frame of reference upon which to make comparisons of this dispute and strike record. In the privately owned plants of Union Carbide, in the United States and Canada, there are approximately 36,000 manual workers; and approximately 20,000 are represented by unions in collective bargaining. The same industrial relations practices, bargaining methods and procedures, and methods of wage determination are in effect in both the private plants and the government-owned plants. In the past four years (1960 through 1963), the number of man-days lost in the unionized privately owned plants, with no disputes-settlement panel, was 690,000, or .14 per cent; while the number of man-days lost in the atomic

energy installations was 874,000, or .67 per cent. Thus, it has been our experience in UCC that work stoppages are more prevalent where a disputes panel is available than in a situation where it is not available.

One of the claims for third-party intervention in collective bargaining is the failure of the parties to give consideration to the national interest. In the situation of an AEC contractor, with government reimbursement of payrolls, the national interest is wholly controlling on the company negotiators. The contractor on a fixed-fee basis does not benefit and is not harmed by the settlement reached with a union. While the contractor has the objective of negotiating fair and reasonable terms, the objective of a third party in negotiations is solely to get an agreement, regardless of the cost or the consequences.

Shadow on Bargaining Table

The availability of a disputes-settlement panel is like an ever-present shadow over the bargaining table. It allows the parties to avoid the difficult decision-making process, which is necessary in meaningful negotiations. It creates a tendency for each side to hope that they can get a better deal from the Panel than they can get from their adversary in collective bargaining. A union requesting improvements in a contract can "milk" a contractor for as much as possible and then try for additional concessions from the Panel. It creates the tendency to "hold back" in the bargaining and trading process. Neither side knows for certain whether the other side is bargaining or merely preparing a background for a future Panel presentation. There is always a question of the ability of even the most respected Panel members to arrive at a better solution than those who are familiar with the particular work problems. It creates bargaining at arm's length instead of

getting down to the level of considering the real elements of a dispute.

During the last 25 years, industrial relations practitioners have been striving diligently for procedures which will make their plants strike-proof. The obvious choices available are free collective bargaining, with the resulting hazard of work stoppages, or compulsory and binding arbitration. Industrial peace is a worthwhile objective. If an industry such as utilities, transportation, atomic energy, or missiles cannot risk work stoppages, and if we want to preserve the rights of employees in these indus-tries to be represented by unions in collective bargaining, compulsory arbitration of contract disputes is inevitable.

It is my position that government dispute-settlement panels have been a deterrent to effective and meaningful collective bargaining and that, except in the very rare instance, the responsibility for arriving at equitable solutions to collective bargaining problems should be left to the parties. Industrial peace is a worthwhile goal but is a practical impossibility if the advantages of collective bargaining are to be preserved.

[The End]

Special Government Dispute Settlement Panels

By P. L. SIEMILLER

General Vice President, International Association of Machinists

IN THIS ABSTRACT of my views on "Special Government Dispute Settlement Panels," I shall discuss the principles which are supposed to guide the panels. Problems, in terms of such specifics as negotiations, grievances, disputes, etc., that are part of the regular work of the panels will be amply discussed in the oral remarks on this program.

Of course, putting "principles" and "problems" in "written" and "oral" categories does not mean they are or should be in different categories, or that they are not related to each other. On the contrary.

As a matter of fact, it is my opinion, that some of the problems stem from or are aggravated by deficient understanding and incomplete acceptance of the principles that are supposed to guide the panels.

Just as the New Testament's golden rule is simply stated and easy to under-stand, so are this nation's principles governing employer-employee relations. But just as the golden rule seems to be more honored in the breach than in the observance, so does it seem with industrial relations.

The Principles

Here are the principles to which I refer: First, it is the declared policy of the United States (namely, in the Labor-Management Relations Act, as amended) to encourage "the practice and procedure of collective bargaining." The late Senator Taft, who was the principal author and exponent of the act, said of it, "It is based on the theory that solution of the labor problem in the United States is free collective bargaining."

A second principle to which I refer is this: Collective bargaining requires good faith by both parties. Indeed, bargaining without good faith is a sham and a mockery.

I had thought until recently that this simple proposition had become commonly accepted, at least, as far as lip-

service acceptance was concerned. But a month ago, I read that the Committee for Economic Development had recommended, among other things, that the Taft-Hartley provision requiring parties to bargain in "good faith" be repealed. The CED termed the "good faith" bargaining provision unnecessary and "detrimental to free collective bargaining."

Good Faith Is Absent

It is no secret to anyone who has participated in or studied industrial relations that, despite the law, good faith is conspicuously absent in countless instances where, nevertheless, pretensions to bargaining are made. And sometimes it is possible in unfair practice charges to the NLRB to expose the pretensions for what they are and to compel bargaining on an honest basis. But to eliminate the good faith requirement would only mean that a number of employers would flatly refuse to bargain at all.

You are, of course, familiar with the position taken by the CED, which was published in a policy statement "Union Powers and Union Functions," and you know that statement contained ten anti-union recommendations, including substantial support to right-to-work laws. The Chairman of the Committee which wrote the report—a gentleman who is also Chairman of the Finance Committee of Ford Motor Co.—said the report was released "in the hope that it will contribute to the improvement of collective bargaining for all those affected by it—workers, both union and *non-union* (my emphasis), management and the general public."

It should suffice for me to say that the position taken by the CED—an organization that was started as the voice of enlightened management and for a time respected as such—has made it clear that constant reaffirmation and

defense of the principles of free, good-faith collective bargaining are required from those of us who believe in said principles.

And it should be reaffirmed that the principles intended to apply to industry in general are also intended to apply to the industries operated by prime contractors for the government. Also, it ought to be impressed upon all the government dispute settlement agencies that if they adhered to these principles they could cut out some of the quackery that has attended their activities.

There has been sufficient enunciation of principles for the government agencies. Only adherence and execution of the principles has been inadequate.

Policy Statement

For the atomic energy industry, for example, here are some of the declarations from the "General Policy Statement of the Atomic Energy Commission Relative to Contractor Personnel Management and Labor Relations" as enunciated in August, 1958. The statement began, "It is the intent of the AEC that personnel and labor relations policies throughout the atomic energy program should reflect the best experience of American industry in aiming to achieve the type of stable, democratic labor-management relationships which the Commission considers are essential to the proper development of the atomic energy program in the national interest."

The statement said the commission believes that the contractors and their employees should "conduct their employment relationships with maximum freedom from interference by the government."

The statement continued with "an enunciation of basic principles" to guide the contractors and the unions in Collective Bargaining; Security; Employment Standards; Wages, Salaries and Employee Benefits; and other appropri-

ate subjects. Theme phrases in these principles were "mutual agreement," "peaceful processes of negotiation," and "voluntary procedures," also, "maximum possible freedom from government interference."

Simple Definition

In a dictionary in my office, I found listed the term "collective bargaining" with this definition: "Negotiation for the settlement of hours, wages, etc., between an employer and an organized body of workers." That was the whole definition. It is a simple definition of what we might call simple bargaining. It is a basic definition of basic bargaining. It is, also, a definition of ideal bargaining.

The definition is simple, basic and ideal because it takes in only two parties, the employer and the union. This is the kind of bargaining most of us feel is right and proper and best. And, if a great deal of bargaining in this vast, complex society of ours is nowadays not so simple and basic, and is often enmeshed with such considerations as "public interest" and "national security," and increasingly seems to be joined by mediators, arbitrators, panels and boards and other categories of third parties, still we say we believe in letting the first two parties work things out between themselves.

The ideal is good. It is sound. Our belief in it is sincere. In some respects we are making progress towards reaching it . . . in other respects, we are not.

An example of progress was reported two weeks ago in *Editor & Publisher* in an article headlined, "Third Party Out of Talks with Unions." The report was that a new series of joint sessions between newspaper publishers and printing union executives was started without outside sponsorship or assistance and the sessions were proceeding "successfully." Two previous meetings held following the end of the New York newspaper strike in March of last year had been attended by such third party mediators as Clark Kerr, President of the University of California, and Attorney Theodore Kheel of New York. Both management and labor in the daily newspaper business, agreed that the two parties could and should handle their problems themselves.

An example of nonprogress in collective bargaining was something that has been loudly and widely acclaimed as a triumph of free collective bargaining. That was the recent settlement of the dispute between the railroads and the operating unions. No doubt from the standpoint of the national economy, it was good that a settlement was reached. But in a dispute which has seen certain compulsory arbitration imposed by special legislation of Congress and has seen final settlement agreed to under the most severe pressures imaginable in the White House, it is not exactly accurate to call that free collective bargaining!

Government Panels

To get back to the government panels, even if there were far better acceptance generally of the principles of collective bargaining, it would stand to reason that we would still have problems peculiar to industries controlled and directed by the government, such as atomic energy and aerospace. Collective bargaining in such industries cannot be the same as in those in which the government does not have a direct vital interest. Try as we will to make bargaining the business of two parties, the company and the union, and, as such, free from interference of the government, we cannot do it. The circumstances are different from those in bargaining between the parties in private enterprise.

Let's take note, also, that the principles of collective bargaining do not apply with the same meaning and force

to such different agencies as the AEC panel, the Missile Labor Sites Commission, and the President's boards in the aerospace industry.

The atomic energy industry is completely controlled by the government through the Atomic Energy Commission. Private contractors perform work for the government on contract by the AEC, usually on government-owned facilities. Relations between the contractors and the unions whose members work in the industry are influenced by the Atomic Energy Labor-Management Relations Panel.

The AEC panel has wide latitude. It can agree or refuse to enter a dispute upon petition of either party to the dispute. Or, it can enter the dispute on its own motion. When negotiations become deadlocked, the panel is usually requested to take jurisdiction before a strike is called. There have been occasions when the panel has not assumed jurisdiction and there have been instances when the unions refused to seek its services. But the possibility exists during every negotiation that the panel will intercede. Thus, the influence of a third party is always present—a third party which I call the Ghost at the Bargaining Table.

Ghost at Bargaining Table

Now as a matter of record, the Ghost has not been as active and troublesome in atomic energy labor-management contract negotiations in the last year or two, as he has been in aerospace. But we still have criticisms of certain practices in atomic energy. One persistent criticism voiced and resolved at every annual IAM atomic energy conference, is the AEC's policy of reimbursing contractors' costs in arbitration cases. The contractor is always ready to take grievance cases all the way to arbitration. He hires high-priced lawyers and it doesn't cost him anything. The AEC

lets him write the expenses off—but not the union.

Thus arbitration becomes very costly to the union, while it is free for the contractor. The simplest way to correct this one-sided practice would be for the government to pay for *all* the costs of arbitration.

The Missile Sites Labor Commission was set up to assure no strikes or lockouts on missile sites and to assure efficient and economical completion of missile programs. The commission does not concern itself with contract negotiations *per se* but it has formulated some "guidelines" known as the Construction and Industrial Labor Policies which provide review by the commission and by the parties of agreements for the purpose of eliminating provisions discriminatory to the missile sites, and otherwise protecting the interests of the government.

The commission has been mainly occupied with settling jurisdictional disputes and has been quite successful in accomplishing this through voluntary agreement between the parties involved at the site where the dispute occurred. The commission is doing the job it was charged with doing, a job that must be done, and doing it in the best way it can be done, in my opinion.

But the Ghost hovers over the parties in the employer-employee relationship.

Aerospace Industry

Having pointed out the Ghost at the Bargaining Table, I must add that his influence has been most disruptive to collective bargaining in the aerospace industry.

In the disputes in aerospace which were not finally settled until early last year, we of labor felt that the intervention of the government was proper because the security of the nation was involved. But how that intervention worked out was not proper and ex-

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tremely unfair to the unions—to the IAM and the UAW.

The IAM dispute with Boeing most graphically highlights my point. At the request of government mediators and out of consideration for the national interest, the union gave ground repeatedly, extending the strike deadline again and again. The company gave up nothing whatsoever.

Then when the company's refusal to budge an inch caused negotiations to collapse completely and the union was about to exercise its legal right to strike, the Taft-Hartley Act was invoked to prohibit the union from striking for 80 days. In this phase of government intervention, the full force of punishment is directed against only one party to the dispute, the union, which proved its concern for the national interest. No penalty at all was levied against the company which made no effort to reach a fair settlement of the dispute. Intervention by the government by application of the Taft-Hartley law in the Boeing dispute meant punishment of the innocent and acquittal of the guilty.

The least we have a right to expect in cases of this kind is that if labor is to be deprived of its only economic weapon, the strike, then there ought to be compensating penalties levied against the employer, such as economic penalties worked out in renegotiated or cancelled government contracts.

I stated above that adherence and execution of the principles of bargaining have been inadequate in the government agencies. This is chiefly due, I believe, to the Ghost at the Bargaining Table. His shadowy presence has caused bargaining to be done in an aura of hypocrisy. Now, we can't eliminate the government from business which is primarily the government's and the public's. But we can eliminate the hypocrisy in collective bargaining in such business. We can do this by changing a few conditions to jibe with the facts of life. I propose we change the procedures to replace the Ghost by flesh-and-blood representation. When the government is directly concerned—as it is in the industries we are discussing—let's end the masquerade of bargaining in the traditional way, two parties negotiating freely without interference, and, instead, let the government come forth from the beginning of the proceedings and lay its cards on the table, and stay in the room, and listen to the negotiations, so that the government may know and understand from first-hand hearing, the positions of the parties. I firmly believe that such replacement of the Ghost at the Bargaining Table will lead to improvement in the settling of disputes in the industries in which the government is directly concerned. **[The End]**

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed into law by President Johnson on July 2, 1964. The Act does two major things:

(1) It prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin by employers, unions and employment agencies;

(2) It prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin in hotels, restaurants, gasoline stations and places of amusement.

In addition, it beefs up the protection afforded minority groups in voting, in using public facilities, in attending public schools, and in seeking employment on projects involving federal funds.

Retraining in the South

Factors Affecting Retraining in West Virginia

By HAROLD A. GIBBARD

West Virginia University

THE SUCCESS OF RETRAINING rests on whether it helps the unemployed to get jobs. West Virginia is a stringent testing ground for retraining for at least two reasons: the state has had persistently high rates of unemployment throughout nearly all of its territory; and it has been firmly committed to retraining. The first training under ARA was in Huntington, West Virginia in late 1961 and early 1962. This effort, though, was anteceded by a wholly state-sponsored program that began experimentally in McDowell County, deep in the southern coal fields in 1959, and became state-wide when the 1960 legislature passed the Area Vocational Education Training Program.

Close to 10,000 unemployed men and women have enrolled in retraining in West Virginia under either the state program or ARA or MDTA. Far the largest number of these were under the state (AVP) program which has operated in at least 38 of a total of 55 counties. Retraining under ARA has been offered in about one-fourth of the counties, with accumulative enrollments now (Spring 1964) approaching 2,000. MDTA courses in a few communities have enrolled about 200. More than half of those who completed their courses under these different auspices are known by.the Department of Employment Security to have gained training-related jobs.

At the same time, the level of unemployment in West Virginia has continued above the national average. Unemployment figures for the month of June were 74,200, or 10.9 per cent of the civilian labor force in 1960; 77,600, or 11.7 per cent in 1961; 63,500, or 10.2 per cent in 1962; and 50,100, or 8.3 per cent in 1963. The small drop in 1961-1962 and the larger one in 1962-1963 were in each case accompanied by a still larger decline in the size of the labor force. Thus, while retraining has placed men and women in jobs, there has been no sustained gain in total employment.

This paper outlines three sets of factors which affect the scope and outcomes of retraining in West Virginia. They are respectively the social and economic conditions which characterize the state,

local factors which contribute to county-by-county variations in retraining, and factors inhering in the retraining programs themselves.

General Conditions

West Virginia lies wholly within the Appalachians. It is nearly all hilly or mountainous, and most of it is rural nonfarm. The western half of it is underlaid with coal, and some sections of it have built their economies around this resource. The population decline in the 1950's, amounting to 7 per cent, has continued since 1960, though probably at a slowing rate. Only the Ohio and Kanawha River counties and the eastern panhandle grew during the last census decade. While the state does have areas of economic vitality, particularly in the major river valleys, only four of the state's 55 counties did not qualify as ARA Redevelopment Areas. West Virginia thus presents a special challenge to retraining.

Three sets of conditions which are general to the state, or at least widespread, have consequences for retraining. They have to do with the state of the labor market, the characteristics of the labor force, and attitudes toward retraining.

Since retraining is meaningful only if it helps to put men and women into jobs, the state of the labor market is of obvious importance. Retraining for local jobs can succeed only if, in the midst of unemployment, jobs are vacant because the requisite skills are not held by the available workers, or if new jobs are being created. The following affect the structure of the labor market and have bearing on the task confronting retraining:

(1) The persistently high rate of unemployment in West Virginia in the past several years, coupled with a secular decline in the number of people in jobs, strongly suggests that no large number of jobs has stood unfilled for long.

(2) West Virginia is among the most rural states in the nation (62 per cent rural in 1960), being outranked only by Alaska, Mississippi, and North Dakota. In the country as a whole, economic growth is concentrated in the metropolitan areas. Of the four Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the state, the largest has barely over 250,000 people, and three lie partly outside the state. A majority of all the population of West Virginia resides in places smaller than a thousand. These people are overwhelmingly nonfarm. Many live a long way from any growing city. The highest rates of unemployment in West Virginia have persistently been in highly rural counties where the range of new job possibilities is quite limited.

(3) Some sections of the state have a one-industry economic base. It is perhaps most appropriate to illustrate from the coal fields, though other examples could be drawn. In 1960, four adjoining counties in southern West Virginia each had over 40 per cent of the gainfully employed in coal mining, this after a decade of shrinking employment in the industry. The ancillary services—retail trade, education, other government services, etc.—account for much of the rest of employment in these coal counties. When the dominant occupation is a declining one, as coal mining has been until recently—it made some recovery in 1963, incidentally—the only occupational shortages are likely to be the highly technical ones, such as mechanics for the continuous mining machines.

In the long run, at least, the composition of the labor force tends to adjust to the employment opportunities of the area. Retraining is intended to aid in the adjustment. The men and women selected for training must have the ability to learn the new skills and must be acceptable to prospective employers at the completion of their training. Thus retraining may help certain classes of workers to get jobs, but be beyond the

reach of others. The following characteristics of the West Virginia labor force are relevant to retraining. One or two of them are almost as appropriately viewed as traits of the labor market.

(1) West Virginia and the whole of the Southern Appalachians have a relatively low participation of women in the labor force. Not quite a fourth of the females 14 and over were in the labor force in West Virginia in 1960. The national fraction is over one-third. The difference between the proportion of the labor force which is female in West Virginia and in the United States is a little narrower, but still pronounced. These differences do not grow out of the values which surround the wife-mother role, but follow from the lack of job opportunities. Many more women would be in jobs if jobs were available. While disproportionately many of the new jobs in the United States in the past several years have been women's jobs, women's employment is more heavily concentrated in cities than is men's employment. There has been some effective retraining for women, let it be noted.

(2) The educational requirement for new hires is commonly higher during a period of manpower surplus than at other times. A series of West Virginia Department of Employment Security studies released in 1960-62 confirms that the duration of unemployment—that is, the difficulty in getting jobs—varies inversely with years of school completed. The median years of school completed for the West Virginia population aged 25 and over was 8.8 in 1960. Whereas 41.0 per cent of the United States population of this age had four years of high school or more, only 30.6 per cent of West Virginians had.

(3) A notable characteristic of any labor force is the degree of its rootedness in one locality. While only a careful attitude survey could document adequately that the West Virginia population as a whole is relatively highly mobile, much scattered evidence supports this hypothesis. There are some high school graduating classes wherein every boy expects to move from his present community after the end of the school year. In McDowell County, deep in the southern coal fields, there was shrinkage of more than 70 per cent between the population aged 10-14 in 1950 and that aged 20-24 in 1960. A readiness to move is of obvious benefit to the job seeker. While ARA-sponsored retraining has been geared in the main to local employment opportunities, the state program has not been so limited. The combination of a population ready to move and retraining geared to employment elsewhere has produced a favorable outcome to retraining in some West Virginia localities.

(4) The attitudes of the workers toward changing jobs is a crucial variable. In a five-county field survey of retrained workers and two control groups in 1962, 96 per cent of 1,397 respondents answered affirmatively to the question: "Do you think that after a man has been out of a job for six months he should take some other kind of work if he can get it?" The question is too general to be of much use, and it probably invites an affirmative reply. Yet the fact that it turned up so few ambivalent or qualified replies may be significant. Two pertinent questions must stand unanswered here. First, are workers who have had only one occupation and have done well at it as ready to change jobs after a stretch of unemployment as are workers with more varied work experience? And second, is the willingness to learn the skills needed for a new job any different in the Appalachians than it is elsewhere?

A third category of influences affecting retraining is the attitude of the people toward it. The general attitude toward it appears to be favorable. The state set up its own retraining program in 1960, ahead of ARA and MDTA, and

has continued its own program while establishing those under federal sponsorship. The legislative appropriation for the state AVP program was $400,000 in 1960 and $500,000 each year thereafter. There has been no open controversy over this item in the legislature. In the executive branch, the officials charged with administering the retraining programs in both the Department of Employment Security and the Division of Vocational Education are intelligent and dedicated. At the state level, at least, there is good support for retraining.

Virtually all the retrained workers who were field-interviewed indicated that their families approved of their retraining. Ninety-two per cent of the trainees said that, if they had to start all over again, they would take a retraining course. Allowing for some response bias, we may conclude that in general the retrained men and women themselves feel all right about retraining.

Among the members of a control group of nonapplicants for retraining, the serious problem is not so much a negative attitude toward the training programs as a lack of information about them. Of about 450 nonapplicants interviewed, as many as 200 did not know about retraining. The consequences of this unawareness are not clear. Most courses had a full quota of enrollees assigned to them, and perhaps the only effect of more widespread knowledge would be a more rigorous selection of trainees. Tentatively, then, the discernible attitude toward retraining in West Virginia is positive, though a part of the population knows relatively little about it.

Unequal Participation in Retraining

The various sections of the state have not participated equally in retraining. Some counties have offered a variety of courses and have repeated some of them several times. A fourth of them

have offered no retraining at all. Among the reasons for the local variation, legal qualification is not significant. The AVP program, like MDTA, is not limited to areas of any specified level of depression, and all but four counties are listed as either 5a or 5b Redevelopment Areas under ARA. The variations may be traced to local needs and resources and to local initiative.

With few exceptions, retraining courses have been established as a result of local efforts to participate in the state or federal programs. Local promotion may be the most important variable in determining the scope of an area's retraining effort. The source of initiative may be the public officers most directly involved, the Employment Security manager and the Trade and Industrial Education coordinator. It may be the officers or paid executive of the Chamber of Commerce, or other business leaders. The men who wield disproportionate community power—nearly every community has them—must at least tacitly accept retraining, and it is tremendously helpful if they endorse it.

The first need then is local leadership. It may remain personal and unorganized, or it may be embodied in a Retraining Committee. (Such a committee is not mandatory under either AVP or ARA, but is specified as a condition for MDTA training.) A corollary is that retraining needs the strong support and cooperation of the Employment Security manager and the school officers charged with administering retraining. In the case of the school officials especially, the administering of retraining is too often an added assignment on top of an already burdensome set of responsibilities. It is perhaps to be expected that both the promotion and the administration of retraining would vary from county to county, and it does.

A second variable is the prospect for local employment. All retraining courses

must be justified in terms of a reasonable expectation that the training will lead to a job. While neither the AVP nor MDTA program is limited to training for local jobs, ARA retraining is widely held to be so limited, though this was probably not its framers' intention. Let it be noted at once that some vigorous and successful retraining efforts in West Virginia, for example, in McDowell County, have been geared at least in part to the training of workers for jobs to which they would have to migrate. Local job opportunities, though, appear to be the stronger aid to retraining.

The local jobs to which retraining has been geared appear to be of three classes. First, are certain women's occupations in which there is a high turnover and frequent recruiting, such as that of waitress or nurse aide. Second, are skilled occupations for which the demand has outrun the supply, as automatic transmission mechanics. Characteristically, the first of these calls for a relatively low level of skill, and the second for an occasional catching up with demand. The third consists of jobs in new establishments. Training for in-state industrial employment has been geared largely to staffing new plants, including some established with federal assistance. Thus, workers have been trained for jobs in aircraft assembly, the manufacture of military vehicles, woodworking, glass, apparel, and others. In several of these, a series of courses has been given to keep pace with the expanding staff needs. Specific training courses have also been conducted to meet the nonprofessional staff needs of hospitals.

Here and there, a local condition exists which bars the use of public retraining as a source of new workers. One example is a large plant whose union contract specifies that all new hiring is to be at the lowest skill level and all openings at higher grades are to be filled by internal promotion. Another is a large hospital that conducts its own nurse aide training program so as to be sure of a sufficient pool of workers.

A third variable affecting local variations in retraining is the availability of physical facilities for retraining. Some equipment can be bought with retraining funds, but unless it will be used repeatedly, expensive installations cannot be justified. A number of counties have a valuable asset in a well-equipped vocational school and much of their retraining has been conducted there. In some of the more sparsely populated counties, though, retraining facilities do not exist, and would not serve very many people if they were provided.

Factors Affecting Scope and Effectiveness

A number of factors inside the training programs themselves affect their scope and effectiveness. Naturally, the programs are governed by laws and administrative rules which regulate them consistently with the goals for retraining and the need to allocate retraining funds.

Under all programs, retraining courses are authorized only if there is a reasonable expectation of employment for those who complete their course. Further, all courses have admission standards, including suitable General Aptitude Test Battery scores. The screening of applicants is calculated to select for retraining only those workers who have the ability to complete the course and, in some instances, meet the hiring norms of specific employers. Thus the number of courses which may be offered, their maximum enrollments, and the kinds of people who may be admitted to them are all limited. A principal effect is that the best qualified unemployed are selected, while the classes of individuals who make up the bulk of the hardcore unemployed—the very youngest members of the labor force, the older workers, the most poorly educated, and Negroes—are under-represented among

the trainees, while the workers who have the best chance of getting jobs by themselves are over-represented.

The West Virginia findings on this score are much like those reported elsewhere. Of 442 workers in a five-county sample who had completed their training by the summer of 1962, the middle half fell between 23.4 and 40.6 years of age. The median was 31.9. Among 127 rejected applicants for retraining, the middle half fell between 27.0 and 49.1; the median was 39.7. Of 453 nonapplicants for retraining the middle-half limits were 26.8 and 48.0 years, and the median was 37.8. The retrained were thus both a younger population and, save for extreme cases, have a narrower age spread.

Racial data show a similar pattern. Within the sample of those who had completed training, 6.1 per cent were Negro. But 11.1 per cent of the sample of men and women rejected for training were Negro, as was 10.4 per cent of the nonapplicant sample.

The story is the same on education. More than half of those in the sample who had completed retraining had finished the 12th grade. The top half of both the sample of rejected applicants and of nonapplicants included some whose schooling ended with the ninth grade.

Virtually all persons in the three samples were unemployed at the time the training courses were being set up, though a few persons were grossly under-employed. At a date one month before the beginning of retraining, 40.6 per cent of the trainees who were then in the labor force had been unemployed for six months or more, and 23.1 per cent had been unemployed for a year or more. The comparable percentages among the rejects were 45.9 and 39.4.

In contrast to all the above, no meaningful differences could be found among the three groups with respect to "regular" occupation before retraining or at an equivalent time among the retrainees.

With respect to age, race, education, and percentage of long-term unemployed, then, the trainees are a favorably selected population. Retraining is aiding the best equipped of the unemployed. This raises a policy issue. Critics of retraining are caught in the dilemma of asking both that the maximum number of retrained workers obtain jobs at the end of their retraining and that the most disadvantaged workers be given an opportunity to advance their skills. Since these are mutually exclusive, the choice has to be made. The MDTA experimental projects for the training of handicapped groups such as the low-literates and the older workers are indeed praiseworthy. To date, no such demonstration project has been undertaken in West Virginia. It is this author's judgment that the state's widespread and persistent unemployment justifies concentrating on the retraining of those men and women who stand the best chance of getting jobs afterwards.

Since, in many parts of West Virginia, at least some of the workers have a better chance for a job if they will relocate, the place of the job for which they may get training is important. In practice, ARA retraining has been limited almost altogether to the equipping of men and women for local jobs. A large fraction of all training under these auspices has been tied to the staffing of new establishments. Neither the state program nor MDTA has been so limited in policy, and the December 1960 amendments to the latter provide for some experimenting with relocation allowances. MDTA training in West Virginia has been tied to prospective in-state employment, though not all of it in the trainee's home locality. Some AVP retraining has been oriented to out-of-state jobs.

While our data on the outmigration of trainees from the five sample areas are not highly reliable, it appears that at least a third of all McDowell County trainees had left the area by the summer of 1962, while not more than a tenth of the trainees in any of the other areas had moved out. McDowell County has kept to AVP retraining. A number of its trainees have gone to the Norfolk-Newport News area for shipyard jobs.

Whenever the size of the labor force exceeds by much the total number of jobs, a two-pronged effort to expand work opportunities and to adjust the labor force to the promise of the economy should be attempted. Retraining may have a part to play in both of these. Its potential is grossly limited if it cannot give men and women in areas of current manpower surplus the chance to learn skills with which to compete for jobs in distant communities.

Conclusions

While retraining was conducted through much of West Virginia, and with considerable vigor in some localities, modest gains in employment were occurring, though the chief source of a reduction in unemployment has been a shrinkage of the labor force. Retrain-ing is carried on in fewer localities today than it was at its peak period, yet it continues in some places and is being reinstated in others. On the whole, the program is viable. The retraining of 10,000 workers over three years is a sizable achievement. The Department of Employment Security of West Virginia reports* that fiscal year 1962-63 a majority of trainees completing their courses are known to have gotten train-ing-related jobs.

The post-training rate of employment of the men and women in our samples was better than that of both the rejected applicants and the nonapplicants in the summer of 1962 and again at the time of a follow-up in the spring and summer of 1963, even when the groups are controlled (separately) for age and education.

In an early part of this paper, conditions were noted which present a difficult challenge to the goal of providing employment through retraining. If retraining is judged, not by the levels of unemployment remaining, but by the help it has given several thousand men and women in getting jobs, it has succeeded in West Virginia in the face of real difficulties.   [The End]

The Appalachian Development Program

By JOHN D. WHISMAN

Executive Secretary, President's Appalachian Regional Commission

IN APRIL, 1963, at a meeting of the Conference of Appalachian Governors and key Cabinet Officers and heads of agencies, the late President John F. Kennedy established a federal-state commission to develop a plan of action for the Appalachian region.

The President's Appalachian Regional Commission (PARC), with the assistance of more than 400 people in both public and private life, has been engaged in the many tasks necessary to the development of such an action plan. The Commission first established a small staff to coordinate the drafting of specific subject area reports. Teams were appointed to prepare such reports; their

membership represented government at all levels and experts from private fields of activity.

In selecting the subjects to be given priority, PARC was guided by two major considerations. First, it was apparent that a complete and comprehensive study could not be made if the President's deadline for submission of a report, December 31, 1963, was to be met. Second, the views presented by state leaders to PARC, during a June tour of the region, seemed to indicate a general concensus on what the most urgent problems were confronting Appalachia.

These problems seemed to be, in brief:

(1) The lack of access both to and within the region.

(2) A present technological inability to fully use the region's natural resources — coal, timber and arable land.

(3) A lack of facilities to both control and exploit the abundant rainfall of Appalachia.

(4) Inadequate resources to train and retrain both the youth of the region and those whose jobs were displaced by changing technology.

With these priorities before it, PARC established teams on transportation, human resources, physical resources and water.

During the tour in June, one other major problem was discussed in almost every state and in almost similar terms— the need for some sort of continuing institution charged only with the task of developing, and assisting in the execution of, a comprehensive program for the region. In order to present a proposal that mirrored that concern, PARC established a team on organization.

The five teams were requested to submit their recommendations on September 17th. Following that date, the staff of PARC reviewed each report and selected from each those elements which it thought appropriate for inclusion in a series of staff recommendations.

Inadequate Highway System

The lack of an adequate highway network within the Appalachian region impedes both travel to and from the region and travel within the region itself. The critical deficiency of highways in this mountainous region is a far greater frustration to development than is the case in most regions. The natural inaccessibility created by Appalachian ranges accentuates the need for highways. Present highways, underdeveloped in the past history of raw resource extraction, do not permit reasonable commerce and the tourist travel. Developmental activities, essential to the future growth of the region, cannot take place unless its cities and towns, its areas of natural wealth, of recreation and industrial potential are welded together by a transportation network which provides access to and from the rest of the nation and within the region itself.

The "backbone" for such a network must be the interstate system. However, much of the region is beyond a 25-mile distance from the interstate system and cannot be directly served by it. Five large areas are not served by interstate highways:

(1) A tri-state area of Georgia, Tennessee and North Carolina;

(2) A four-state area of southeastern Kentucky, southwestern Virginia, and West Virginia, and northeast Tennessee;

(3) West Virginia and the tri-state corner of West Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania;

(4) Ohio, south and southeast counties adjacent to Ohio River;

(5) Central Pennsylvania.

Corridors selected by the highway subteam in cooperation with the highway departments of the Appalachian states

remedy these deficiencies. Upgrading the roads within these corridors—constructing new sections when necessary—will, when combined with the interstate routes, yield a regional system of highways designed to induce economic growth.

General economic development can also be encouraged by the construction of parkways and scenic highways which will generate tourist traffic, tourist-based commerce, and ultimately more broadly-based industry, as well as add to the recreational opportunities of the region's residents.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) Accelerate the construction of the present interstate system in Appalachia.

(2) Authorize a system of developmental highways comprising:

(A) 2,150 miles of long distance or intercity routes to improve accessibility into and through the area by upgrading existing roads and by construction of new sections where necessary;

(B) 500 miles of short access routes to specific facilities such as recreation, industry and water resources.

(3) Coordinate this highway development program with the present ABC and interstate highway programs and with all other phases of over-all regional development.

(4) Implement this highway development program by more fully utilizing the established procedures of the federal-aid highway program.

(5) Extend immediately those sections of the Blue Ridge Parkway and the Allegheny Parkway which will provide recreation links with the developmental highway system.

Utilization of Natural Resources

The physical resources of Appalachia—coal, timber and agriculture—will, when properly managed and developed, greatly improve the economy of the Appalachian region. The development of only one or two of these resources, however, will not provide the proper stimulation to the region's economy. Appalachia has relied too heavily on the extraction and harvesting of its natural resources as the primary source of both income and employment. When these industries declined, because of either automation or lessened consumer demand, employment levels declined even more dramatically.

A more prosperous Appalachian economy, then, must be based upon a total and economically sophisticated utilization of all its natural resources. Ways can and must be found to generate greater amounts of capital and higher levels of employment in the region through production activities based on these local resources.

Coal Industry

Coal is still the region's number one physical resource. The region supplies 67 per cent of the bituminous coal and 100 per cent of the anthracite coal mined in the United States. The general decline in the demand for and value of coal over the past two decades has been responsible for many of Appalachia's economic difficulties today

Although the demand for coal will undoubtedly increase from now until 1980, there is substantial debate as to whether or not that increased demand will be able to overcome the effects of automation and create many more mining jobs than exist today. Stabilization of the coal industry, which will necessarily require an increase in the sale of Appalachian coal, must therefore be one of the guidelines for an Appalachian coal program.

However, Appalachian coal can mean more to the region than simply a product to be exported for use elsewhere. The development of coal byproducts would permit the creation of local and regional coal-based industries to complement the region's extractive activity.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) Encourage and support industry and government actions to expand United coal exports.

(2) Sponsor, conduct and accelerate coal demonstration and coal research activities, including those designed to find new uses for coal, to reduce the formation and discharge of acid from strip and underground mining operations, to rehabilitate strip-mined areas, and to prevent and control surface residue due to underground mining.

Timber Industry

Ranking second in economic importance among the natural resource industries within the region, the timber industry reaps an annual timber harvest in Appalachia worth almost $86,000,000 on the stump.

Large portions of Appalachia's timber resources are of inferior quality, the original virgin timber having been entirely cut and removed in the last century and most of the second growth timber having gone unmanaged and undeveloped. These trends have created so many large acreages of low potential that the entire region is declining as a significant timber procurement area. The thousands of small private timber holdings in Appalachia and the numerous large forest acreages can again contribute fully to the region if sound management practices are implemented. Any such program, however, must be regional in scope for the commercial potential of these acreages cannot be realized by isolated stands.

In addition to improving the timber resources itself, any timber program for Appalachia must recognize that the value added to the annual yield in harvesting, transporting, manufacturing and merchandising is 25 times the value of timber on the stump. Each year a raw material worth $86,000,000 will be converted into finished products worth over two billion dollars: Appalachia should participate to a greater extent in this conversion process.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) Aid the formation of timber manufacturing complexes by private interests through provision of technical assistance.

(2) Encourage the development of commercial forests and the conservation of this natural resource through district development units, timberlands development corporations, cooperatives, soil conservation districts or arrangements with individuals, by participating (up to 50 per cent) in the equity of such undertakings, if necessary, in order to initiate such development.

(3) Institute a program of accelerated reforestation and of timber stand improvement, including access road building, for depleted woodlands whose condition deters other development efforts because it causes erosion and similar problems.

(4) Seek to enlarge the national and state forest reserves by the acquisition of lands which, if not placed under such ownership, would continue to deteriorate.

Livestock Industry

Appalachia's topography has prevented the development of large-size, highly-capitalized and mechanized farm operations that can compete successfully with agricultural products raised in other farming regions of the United States. Much of the existing cropland is made up of narrow valleys and on steep hillsides which, in many situations, cannot feasibly be combined into efficient units of cropland.

Drastic decreases in the number of farm families, farm population, and farm employees during the period from 1950 to 1960 reflect the steady declines in crop production over the same period. As a result of topography, Appalachia's agriculture is based primarily on live-

stock enterprises, with the value of livestock products sold increasing from $559.6 million in 1950 to $934.7 million in 1960. During this period, beef cow numbers increased by 135 per cent, the largest increase in any aspect of the region's agricultural production.

The opportunity to further increase the production of calves is an important one for Appalachia. Indeed, Appalachia offers one of the few remaining sources of relatively cheap pasturage available in this country to enable it to meet the nation's rising demand for beef. Sufficient potential pasture land is available to sustain a substantial and profitable expansion of the cow-calf industry throughout the region.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) An accelerated regional pasture improvement program involving 9.5 million acres should be implemented over a five-year period. This program would be financed through cost-sharing for a maximum of 25 acres per farm, with the federal share fixed at 80 per cent, on the pattern of the existing agricultural conservation program. Short-term, moderate interest loans would be available through the Department of Agriculture to convert or improve the remaining acreage above 25 acres. This program, if carried out effectively, should return to the farmers in the region an additional gross income of approximately $690 million dollars over the five-year period, and a continuing gross income of approximately $230 million annually.

(2) A plant materials center should be established to select and test plants best suited for pasture development and soil conservation in the region.

Water Resources

With regard to water resources, adequate supplies of controlled water are essential to economic growth. Impounded water can supply industrial and domestic needs and lakes for recreation and tourism. But uncontrolled water can devastate towns and industry; erosion damages valuable resources; and water polluted by mine acid drainage destroys many chances for beneficial use.

Appalachia has experienced the blessings of abundant water only where man has intervened, for Appalachia enjoyed relatively few natural impoundments. Elsewhere abundant water is an affliction, not a blessing. This was most recently evidenced by the 1963 spring floods occurring in the mountain area of West Virginia, southeastern Kentucky, and adjoining portions of Virginia, Tennessee and Alabama, which caused an estimated 40 million dollars of damage.

A comprehensive attack upon the problems and potential of Appalachian water can end such waste and, if coordinated with other public and private development programs, contribute substantially to economic growth. Programs to achieve these ends have long been underway in Appalachia under direction of the Corps of Engineers, TVA, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. But this acceleration is essential.

(1) The Soil Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture, in addition to maintaining project activity in the 44 watershed protection projects in operation, could initiate 19 new projects. This is nine more than would be anticipated under the present rate of project activity.

(2) The Corps of Engineers could continue and accelerate work of three studies, advance engineering and design on four projects, and construction on 18 major projects. The Corps could initiate seven studies, advance engineering and design on 16 projects, and construction on 13 major projects. In addition, work could be initiated and completed on 20 small projects.

No Poverty of Spirit

Each of the programs that has been offered in the fields of transportation, physical resources and water can only be justified by the hope each will offer to this region's only real resource—its people.

The poverty of Appalachia is solely economic—and it can be measured by both slide rule and the human eye. Fortunately, however, this economic poverty is not accompanied by any poverty of the spirit. The traditional rugged independence of the Appalachian people, although eroded in some areas, is still the base upon which any recovery program will be developed.

If their elemental needs in health, housing, basic education and training can be met, these people will take whatever additional action is necessary to a full participation in the nation's expanding economic drive. The recommendations to follow are intended primarily to provide these elemental needs.

(1) Supplemental grants will be requested to provide the region with more funds to expand vocational, adult and literacy education. These funds will be used to develop special instructional materials, and teacher training programs in these fields, and for the construction of area training centers.

(2) Even more basic to sound public welfare, the states should be provided the assistance necessary to take full advantage of the community work and training program for unemployed persons and the aid to families with dependent children program

(3) Model area-wide health programs should be initiated in multicounty demonstration areas selected both with reference to need and promise. Such demonstrations should include the construction and operation of regional and mobile medical facilities, the hiring and training of personnel, the treatment of water and sewage, and pest control.

(4) Additional funds for the repair, improvement and construction of housing should be provided. Further use should be made of grant programs which are available to persons who could not otherwise afford repairs and limited improvements such as a pure water supply or decent roofing.

Essential Contributions

In organizing for economic development, the nature, the magnitude and the complexity of Appalachia's economic problems, and the national interest in making the effort a success—require that Appalachian development programs be focused on critical problems in a manner which can only be achieved through special state-federal organization. The new organization should engage in over-all economic development programming. Its special—and essential—contribution would be

(1) To analyze the economy of the region and its sub-areas and to recommend policies, programs and plans designed to enhance the region's capability to sustain its own productivity and growth, thereby providing for more jobs and increasing incomes.

(2) To provide a source of funds, for loans or grants, to supplement and accelerate existing programs to meet the unusually severe problems faced here, and to develop needed new programs through research and demonstration projects.

(3) To encourage the formation of multicounty development districts designed to aid the small, technically inadequate local jurisdiction to overcome its problems.

(4) To encourage the development of private investment in industrial, commercial, recreational and similar projects.

State-Federal Responsibility and Control

The broad characteristics of such an organization must include a strong state-

federal sharing of responsibilities and control, and the requisite resources, powers and functions to make a significant contribution to Appalachian development.

The state-federal nature of the proposed regional organization can best be achieved through the formation of a federally chartered corporation whose shares would be subscribed to by the federal government and by the states which lie in whole or in part within the Appalachian region. The Board of Directors of the corporation should consist of a representative—the Governor or an alternate—of each of the participating states and a representative of each of the federal departments with substantial interests in the Appalachian region. In addition, the President should appoint a member to serve as chairman and co-ordinating officer of the federal members. The state representatives should elect one of their members to serve, along with the member appointed by the President, as co-chairman, and he should be aided by a full-time technical assistant. At such times as voting is considered necessary, the voting would be only by the federal co-chairman acting on behalf of the federal members and the state co-chairman upon instructions from the state members.

The Board would employ a chief executive officer and delegate to him, subject to the Board's instructions, the executive responsibilities of the corporation.

The organization would coordinate the programs I have outlined, operating, to the maximum extent possible, through existing state and federal agencies— neither usurping nor impeding their operation.

The Appalachian bill which is being considered by Congress now is the first of what may be several pieces of legislation designed to cope with regional economic problems. It is proof that we

have begun to isolate those sectors of the American economy which drain away so much of our strength and contribute so greatly to human misery. The Appalachian bill is drawn from the recommendations of the report made by the President's Appalachian Regional Commission. The report itself is more a story of things that didn't happen in Appalachia's historic economic development, rather than a recounting of the economic and social causes that produced the conditions we find there today. Those of us who devote some time to an analysis of economic growth agree, I think, on the pattern which most developing economies in the West have followed to achieve that growth. Simply stated, the exploitation of natural resources encourages and creates the need for an infrastructure to sustain and make easier the process of primary production. In time, raw materials production may become less important and the processing of that raw material or others which are directly or indirectly related to it moves the economy into what we describe as a developed condition.

Appalachia achieved the first stage of development—that is, coal and timber were extracted at a pace which paralleled the growth of the American economy—but no supportive structure was built as a corollary. No roads, no schools, no factories, no service industries—nothing. Looking back, the Appalachian region offers the best example to be found in this country of an economic region which lived off its capital assets.

If this was true in the past, it is also true today. The wealth of Appalachia now is based on the exploitation of the last of her resources, her people. The value of man as a factor of production in the economy is lost. The best qualified of her people move out of the region to find employment and the weak, the aged, and the very young remain behind. They do not disappear nor can they be used up as was the timber. They re-

main and their misery multiplies while the cost in terms of lost gross national product becomes incalculable.

This, then, is the real problem which the Appalachian program aims to get at. Appalachia is not the first region in this country to suffer the waste of its resources, but it is the largest area of our country in which the majority of people endure grinding poverty year in and year out. In a larger sense, the human needs in Appalachia are no different from the human needs of the poor wherever you find them in this country. This is reason enough not to attempt an entirely separate human achievements program in the Appalachian bill.

Some critics of the Appalachian bill are saying that the requests made by it are inadequate to do the job that is necessary and that it contains too little for human resources. In a larger sense, these critics are right for there is not enough to cure all of Appalachia's woes quickly, and some recommendations made by the Commission are in pieces of additional legislation, such as the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 rather than the Appalachian bill. The job corps, the work-training program, work study and family unity goals of the OEO will operate in Appalachia. To alleviate the drop-out problem, federal assistance to education, when it comes, will help with the problem of lack of basic education. More vocational schools are needed than in other sectors of the country because of the rugged terrain and inadequate transportation routes. This will come through supplementation of the Vocational Education Act.

These pieces of legislation together will, over the next few years, begin to solve the problems of Appalachia.

[The End]

The Effects of Culture on Retraining in the South

By J. EARL WILLIAMS

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IT IS POSSIBLE to use the word culture collectively to include all behavior patterns socially acquired and socially transmitted. Or, as Ruth Benedict in her classic, *Patterns of Culture,* put it, "What really binds men together is their culture—the ideas and the standards they have in common."[1] From the standpoint of tracing common ideas and standards that might affect retraining, it is best to choose what is commonly described as the Southeast.[2]

Surprisingly, as shown in Table I (at page 442), a majority of southeastern states have had a smaller percentage of unemployment since 1957 than the national average. Further, with only 17.6 per cent of the 1962 unemployment officially recorded in the Southeast, the section records 19.2 per cent of the trainees approved under ARA and 18 per cent of the trainees approved under MDTA through December 1963, and it was allotted 18.9 per cent of the MDTA funds for fiscal year 1963.[3] Nevertheless, before considering this surface

[1] Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (New York: The New American Library, 1952), p. 14.

[2] This includes all of the states of the Old Confederacy except Texas and adds the border state of Kentucky. Thus, the Southeast will include Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia.

[3] See Table II at page 443.

manifestation of retraining as proof that the South is doing a creditable job, a number of factors must be noted:

(1) The South has more of its counties designated as redevelopment areas under the Area Redevelopment Act than any other section.

(2) By almost any standard, the South has the largest percentage of underemployed in its labor force. Table III indicates this when an annual income of less than $1,200 is used as the standard.[4] For both the total labor force and the total rural labor force, every southern state except Florida has a larger percentage of underemployed than the national average, and many are several times the national average. Nonwhite underemployment is greater than white within the area and much greater than both white and nonwhite outside the area.[5]

(3) As Table III indicates, Negro underemployment is approximately double the rate for whites, not only in the South but nationally as well. Yet, all the southeastern states with the exception of Kentucky have a larger percentage of Negroes in their population than the national average, and half of them have considerably more.[6] Thus, it is not surprising that only 11.5 per cent of the national labor force is nonwhite compared to 24.4 per cent for the South.[7] Added to this the Negro concentration in occupations requiring little or no skill has further implications for retraining needs in the South.

(4) The educational level of the South is considerably below the rest of the nation.[8] Only Florida has a median educational level for those 25 years of age and older which surpasses the national average. Educational deficiencies also show up in the percentage of the population 25 and over with less than four years of high school; and Mississippi (70.2 per cent), Arkansas (71.1 per cent) and Kentucky (72.4 per cent) are the only states in the nation with more than 70 per cent. In addition, every southern state has a larger percentage of draftees who fail the mental entrance examination than the national average. Mississippi and South Carolina are more than double the national average. Finally, the unbelievably low percentage of accredited Negro high schools in six southern states (running as low as 2.6 per cent in Mississippi) further attests the educational and training needs in the South.

(5) Although much is said about the industrial development of the South since the 1930's, the fact remains that, in 1960, the South had 21.7 per cent of the population, only 20.4 per cent of the labor force and just 16.7 per cent of manufacturing workforce of the nation.[9]

(6) The South lags behind the nation by ten to 20 years in the distribution of employed persons among the different

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[4] Inasmuch as the Manpower Act assumes that workers in farm families with less than $1,200 annual income are unemployed, this lends some significance to the amount as a standard for underemployment. It is a conservative standard, however, and probably undertates the amount of underemployed in the South.

[5] For a full development of this theme leading to a concept of subemployment, in which the South exceeds the rest of the nation, see Frank T. Bachmura, "Underemployment in the South," unpublished paper, Southern Economics Association, November 1963.

[6] See Table IV at p. 445.

[7] See E. E. Liebhafsky, "Manpower Utilization in the South: Some Methodological Considerations," unpublished paper, Southern Economics Association, November 1963.

[8] See Table V at page 446. It must always be remembered that the United States average is always lower because it includes the South. Consequently, a better comparison is the South v. the non-South.

[9] National Planning Association, *Regional Projections to 1976: (Population, Labor Force, Employment, and Income)*, Technical Supplement No. 8, National Economic Projections Series, February 1962, p. vi.

occupational groups.[10] Relatively few of the employed persons in the South are in professional, technical and kindred occupations, but a relatively high percentage is in agriculture and private households. The high proportion of agricultural employment magnifies the South's problem, for this is the area of greatest displacement in recent years. Further, it is predicted that those who remain on southern farms will find capital requirements increased to $75,000 to $150,000 per farm. Thus, in addition to the training implications for those leaving the farm, a much more highly trained and better educated farm worker will be needed.[11]

(7) Although, based on an official over-all average, it appears that the South is engaging in retraining at a rate proportionate to its officially stated unemployment figures, some of the southern states with the most unemployment have done the least in retraining.

Thus, given the factors of the number of depressed areas, excessive underemployment, high percentage of Negroes in the labor force, low level of education, disproportionately low share of manufacturing employment and an excessive agricultural workforce, a gigantic retraining effort (greater than any other section) appears to be needed. Yet, at the end of 1963, only a little more than 3.7 per cent of the southern unemployment levels of 1962 had been approved for training under MDTA or ARA. Since there is a time lag from approval to actual training, the number which had actually received training by the end of 1963 was considerably below this. In fact, only .8 per cent of the unemployed

had received training in institutional projects under MDTA, and all the ARA trainees approved would add only another .8 per cent.[12] In addition, Negroes with disproportionately greater training needs have been trained disproportionately less, with the exception of Kentucky and Virginia, than their percentage of the southern workforce.[13] Finally, for all practical purposes, Mississippi and Louisiana have not participated in retraining, and the remaining southern states doubtless could have increased their efforts considerably without fear of national budget limitations.

Southeast Has Great Need of Retraining

Although there are variances among the states, it is clear that the Southeast as a whole has engaged in retraining to a far lesser extent than its needs indicate. Since the retraining programs are federal and assume an outlay based on need, why have the southern states not moved faster, and why indeed have two of them not moved at all? Explanations have been forthcoming for many years from historians, sociologists, political scientists, economists, etc. Perhaps their thoughts can best be summarized by W. J. Cash and Professor William Nicholls, of Vanderbilt University. In 1941, according to Mr. Cash:[14]

"The South, one might say, is a tree twisted by all the winds of the years, but with its root in the Old South. . . . The mind of the section, that is, is continous with the past. And its primary form is determined not nearly so much by industry as by the purely agricultural conditions of that past. So far from being modernized, in many ways it has

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[10] See C. E. Bishop and G. S. Tolley, "The South's Economic Future: A Challenge to Education," *Proceedings, Educational Needs for Economic Development of the South,* Agricultural Policy Institute, North Carolina State College, June 1962, p. 5.

[11] Bishop and Tolley, cited at footnote 10, at p. 8.

[12] Further, if the internal data in Table IV at page xxx is current, a much smaller percentage received training.

[13] See Table IV.

[14] W. J. Cash, *The Mind of the South* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., Vintage Book Addition, 1941).

actually always marched away, as to this day it continues to do, from the present toward the past."

Eighteen years later, Professor Nicholls introduces his book with the following:[15]

"The South has been poor for a century. Relative to the rest of the nation, it is still poor today. To be sure, the South has made considerable economic progress, but in doing so it has held with surprising tenacity to traditional values. In some degree, the South has been traditional because it was poor. At the same time, it has also remained poor in part because it was traditional."

It is my contention that the culture (or tradition or mind of the South) not only has a direct effect on current retraining efforts, but that through its shaping of economics also has an indirect effect. This can best be shown by tracing historically the patterns of southern culture. To do so, one must, as always, return to the period of the Civil War.

The southern plantation as it existed prior to the Civil War was an importation of a feudal order to the New World. Among its chief values were the relation of man to the soil and an hierarchical order of inequality. The landed gentry had a real antipathy toward business and industrial interests; this led to a disproportionate share of the South's capital being directed into agriculture. This love of the land and outdoor life slowed mobility and created a belief that Southerners were unsuited for the discipline of factory life. It made a tradition of leisure for the wealthy class and even gave sanction to laziness and lassitude on the part of poor whites and Negroes. The domination of political life by the landed gentry was made possible by such factors as property

qualifications for voting, lack of education of nonplantation white and difficulty of communication. Thus, it is clear that, even before the Civil War, the South had developed social, economic and political institutions which were barriers to real economic progress.[16]

The chaotic conditions of the immediate post-Civil War period included the newly freed slaves, thousands of unemployed, impoverished white workers, a decline in the value of agricultural products, and a plantation hierarchy shaken but determined not to lose its hold on southern society.

For the remainder of the century, the big planter was to fight a continuing battle for the *status quo* by opposing industrialization and urbanization. Nevertheless, there was the immediate problem of unemployment and the feeling of many nonplanters that industrialization was necessary. Thus, industries such as textiles and tobacco, which had developed prior to the war, began to expand. In order to assure a steady supply of low-cost labor, unions were resisted. Thus, both the planter and the newly expanding industry contributed to the development of a social structure consistent with their objectives.

The system was made possible by proclaiming publicly what had been commonly accepted during the days of slavery, that is, the myth that the white is inherently superior to the Negro. This meant that the planter could retain Negro labor, for the myth resulted in even the textile industry's remaining segregated until the end of the century. However, less desirable jobs, such as were found in the tobacco industry, were considered the natural home for Negroes. The myth was also a great barrier to union organization; for, de-

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[15] William H. Nicholls, *Southern Tradition and Regional Progress* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), p. 1.

[16] For a full treatment of southern agrarianism, see Nicholls, cited at footnote 15, Chapter II.

spite the fact that most unions in the South excluded Negroes from membership, they were used as strikebreakers, and there was always the fear that unionization meant integration of the work place. The disproportionate number of low-income whites resulting from such a system was made tolerable by the perpetuation of this claim of superiority over the Negro race. Finally, the continuation of the dominant class view that public schools were for paupers kept both the low-class white and the Negro in relative ignorance regarding their plight. The perpetuation of the social system was assured when the slavery question and a Republican plan to enfranchise the Negro froze the pattern of politics in the South. The two-party system came to an end, and "the issues of the past rather than those of the present became the subject matter of political action."[17]

The southern percentage of United States wage earners in manufacturing rose from 6.5 per cent in 1870 to 10.2 per cent in 1899.[18]

County-Seat Government

The plantation-controlled social structure was replaced by county-seat government. County-seat government was, and has continued to be, a coalition of banker-merchant-lawyer-doctor-big farmer members. It has opposed social change and intellectualism and promoted conformity of thought. For the most part, it has been anti-big-city and anti-big-factory but has been industrial and commerce-minded to the extent that it has felt the need to build or attract small plants. Managers of local low-wage industries and other members of the dominant class allowed their self interest

in perpetuating a cheap labor supply to override any feeling of social responsibility, thereby contributing to the belief that the South's low-income citizens are poor because they are lazy or inferior. This disdain for the working man reaches the level of hatred when organized labor is involved, and it is here that the white supremacy myth has been used continuously to frustrate union organization attempts.

Even religion has played a major role in maintaining this cultural pattern, for the southern city church is likely to be the last outpost of the old agrarian culture.[19]

In order to prevent a coalition of white workers, hill farmers and Negroes, which might have led to a two-party system in the 1890's, the Democratic party in southern states established the primary system, which later became a white primary. Voting requirements were established such as literacy tests, grandfather clauses, the system of whites vouching for Negroes, property ownership and the poll tax. Although these were made palatable to the poor white voter in the form of a reassertion of white supremacy, it was the poor white who was really disenfranchised by the poll tax. Further, the failure of state legislative bodies to reapportion through the years has given a disproportionate voice to black-belt rural areas, which has impeded the growth of urbanism and industrialism and perpetuated political control by a coalition of economic conservatives and racial extremists who continue to mouth the platitudes of "states rights" to cover their use of racial antagonism as a means of maintaining the *status quo*.

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[17] Jasper B. Shannon, *Toward a New Politics in the South* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1949), p. 9.

[18] This was a jump of almost 3 per cent in the 1890's but still left the South with a smaller percentage than it had in 1850. See United States Department of Labor, *Labor in the South,* Bulletin No. 898, 1947, Table II, p. 7.

[19] Samuel Hill and Robert G. Torbett, *Baptists—North and South,* forthcoming book (Judson Press, 1964). See also Liston Pope, *Millhands and Preachers* (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 91.

TABLE I

Percentage of Labor Force Unemployed, 1957-63, and Number Unemployed,
1962, United States and Southeastern States

	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	Total Number 1962
United States	4.3	6.8	5.5	5.6	6.7	5.6	5.7	4,007,000
Alabama	8.1	6.4	6.3	6.3	7.2	5.7	5.0	66,400
Arkansas	5.7	7.5	5.9	6.1	7.1	5.9	5.2	36,700
Florida	3.5	5.5	4.5	5.2	6.6	5.7	5.2	112,000
Georgia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	5.3	6.3	4.7	4.2	69,800
Kentucky	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	8.0	6.0	5.1	62,800
Louisiana	n.a.	n.a.	6.0	6.5	7.3	6.3	5.6	72,500
Mississippi	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	5.4	6.6	5.1	4.9	38,900
North Carolina	4.3	5.6	3.9	4.5	5.3	4.3	4.4	79,700
South Carolina	4.7	5.5	4.2	4.4	5.3	4.2	4.3	39,600
Tennessee	7.1	9.4	6.4	6.3	7.6	5.9	n.a.	76,600
Virginia	3.5	5.2	4.2	4.1	4.5	3.5	3.2	51,500

Source: Compiled from data forwarded from the State Bureaus of Employment Security and *Manpower Report of the President*, 1964, p. 234.

TABLE II

MDTA and ARA Areas and Trainees Approved, Number and Percentage, from Beginning of Programs through December 1963; Percentage of MDTA Funds, Fiscal 1963 United States and Southeastern States

	MDTA, August 1962—December 1963			ARA, November 1961—December 1963			
	Trainees Approved	Percentage of Total	Percentage of Funds Fiscal 1963	Areas Approved	Percentage of Total	Trainees Approved	Percentage of Total
United States	119,248	100.0	100.0	233	100.0	26,895	100.0
Alabama	1,439	1.2	1.7	6	2.5	758	2.8
Arkansas	845	.7	1.1	17	7.3	1,063	3.9
Florida	1,950	1.6	2.3	2	.8	107	.4
Georgia	798	.67	2.0	3	1.3	318	1.2
Kentucky	5,327	4.5	2.0	15	6.8	1,378	5.0
Louisiana	19	—	1.7	—	—	—	—
Mississippi	360	.3	1.2	—	—	—	—
North Carolina	1,781	1.5	2.4	5	2.1	816	3.0
South Carolina	5,476	4.6	1.1	3	1.3	57	.2
Tennessee	2,000	1.7	2.0	4	1.7	641	2.4
Virginia	1,449	1.2	1.4	1	.4	96	.3

Source: *Manpower Report of the President,* 1964, pp. 252-3, and *Manpower Research and Training Under the Manpower Development and Training Act,* A Report by the Secretary of Labor, March 1964, pp. 155-7; 163-4.

TABLE III

Workforce Underemployment for Total, Rural and Color
by State, Non-South and United States, 1959
(per cent)

	Total Labor Force	Total Rural Labor Force	Total White Labor Force	Total Non-White Labor Force	Total Rural White Labor Force	Total Rural Non-White Labor Force
Alabama	8.9	21.9	7.5	12.7	17.8	34.5
Arkansas	13.8	27.1	11.9	22.7	22.8	48.6
Florida	3.4	13.8	2.9	5.4	11.5	24.7
Georgia	7.5	18.0	6.1	11.6	14.1	31.1
Kentucky	10.8	21.6	11.0	8.1	21.3	28.0
Louisiana	6.7	21.7	5.3	10.2	17.2	32.6
Mississippi	18.5	32.8	12.1	29.6	22.3	49.1
North Carolina	8.2	14.4	5.2	19.1	9.0	35.7
South Carolina	16.3	29.1	14.5	20.7	26.9	34.1
Tennessee	9.7	21.9	9.7	9.4	20.3	39.4
Virginia	6.1	15.4	5.5	8.9	13.9	21.5
Non-South	2.3	10.1	2.4	2.2	9.9	23.3
United States	3.8	14.0	3.4	7.2	12.2	32.7

Source: Frank T. Bachmura, "Underemployment in the South," Southern Economic Association paper, November 1963, Tables 2-5; *U. S. Census of Population,* 1960, Table 52.

TABLE IV

MDTA Trainees Approved and Enrolled through December 1963; Percentage
Population Negro, 1960; and Negro Trainees and Projects to November
1963, United States and Southeastern States

	Number Trainees Approved	Number Trainees Enrolled	Percentage Population Negro 1960	Percentage Trainees Negroes	Number Projects	Number Integrated Projects	Projects with 30 Per Cent or More Negro	
							Number	Number Integrated
United States	112,510	n.a.	10.5	22.6[a]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Alabama	1,224	697	30.1	15.0	25	4	4	0
Arkansas	576	493	21.9	8.0	23	6	1	0
Florida	925	706	17.9	16.0	24	17	3	2
Georgia	415	327	28.6	16.0	16	4	1	0
Kentucky	1,692	1,386	7.2	10.0	61	32	5	5
Louisiana	0	0	32.1	0.0	0	0	0	0
Mississippi	75[b]	n.a.	42.3	n.a.	2	0	1	0
North Carolina	1,081	704	25.4	11.5	35	26	3	3
South Carolina	456	312	34.9	23.0	16	1	4	0
Tennessee	1,051	885	16.5	9.0	36	22	2	2
Virginia	1,140	826	22.2	39.0	27	20	9	4

Source: *Manpower Research and Training Under the Manpower Development and Training Act,* 1964, pp. 155-6; Internal data from U. S. Office of Manpower, Automation and Training. *The Economic Situation of Negroes in the United States,* U. S. Dept. of Labor Bulletin S-3, 1962, p. 1.

[a] Includes all non-white, but mostly Negro.

[b] For calendar year 1963.

TABLE V

Educational Qualifications by Median School Year; Percentage with Less
Than Four Years High School; Accredited Schools; and Percentage of Army
Inductees Failing Mental Tests, United States and Southeastern States

	Median School Year Completed for Those 25+ 1960	Percentage Population 25+ with Less than 4 Years High School 1960	Accreditation Status, 1959		Percentage Army Inductees Failing Mental Tests, 1962
			Per Cent White	Per Cent* Negro	
United States	10.6	59.0	n.a.	n.a.	21.5
Alabama	9.1	69.6	36.9	17.0	33.9
Arkansas	8.9	71.1	n.a.	n.a.	27.7
Florida	10.9	57.5	84.1	53.9	29.7
Georgia	9.0	68.0	63.5	28.7	31.4
Kentucky	8.7	72.4	n.a.	n.a.	25.9
Louisiana	8.8	67.6	77.3	22.7	40.1
Mississippi	8.9	70.2	52.4	2.6	44.6
North Carolina	8.9	67.8	n.a.	n.a.	30.2
South Carolina	8.7	69.6	38.8	13.8	46.8
Tennessee	8.8	69.5	n.a.	n.a.	27.1
Virginia	9.9	62.2	n.a.	n.a.	25.2

Source: *Manpower Report of the President,* 1964, p. 99; *The President's Taskforce on Manpower Conservation,* January 1, 1964, Table 2, p. A-6; *Statistical Abstracts of the United States,* 1963, p. 121; *Manpower Research,* Bulletin Number 4, November 1963, U. S. Department of Labor, Table 7, p. 43.

* Includes some schools which are not members of the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, and therefore not formally accredited by the association.

Thus, it is not surprising that Professor Shannon concludes a chapter related to party and tradition by stating:[20]

"The Democratic party has become a symbol of a way of life, fundamentally undemocratic socially, politically, and economically. The Democratic party is an order into which one is born; it is a tradition which symbolizes a long-since outgrown past whose perpetuation is a part of a creed of loyalty to one's forebears, a species of ancestor worship without meaning in contemporary political action.

"In similar fashion the Republican party in the South is a regional opposition to the dominant Democratic party. In no small measure, southern republicanism preserves a pioneer small hill farmer resentment to lowland plantation agriculture. It preserves the memory of the Civil War, the loyalty to the Union and opposition to either big agriculture or urbanism. Both political parties in the South are anachronisms with their eyes fixed on the past, not on the future. Both are embalmed traditions rather than vital, functioning organisms which give expression to the dynamic forces of modern industrial life."

Given this historical pattern culture, it is appropriate to relate it to the South today. How does it operate, and what effect does it have on the southern economy?

When by custom the Negro is relegated to low-income employment and disproportionate emphasis is placed on agrarianism as compared to industrialism, these factors alone will vitally affect income. Thus, by any standard, the South is poor today. Although it has moved from 52 per cent of the national average of per capita income in 1929 to approximately 71 per cent in 1962, most of this gain took place during World War II. It is an axiom that when the nation's rate of economic growth is good, the South's is better. But, if the nation's growth is slow, the South's is slower. Thus, relatively speaking, the South has made no progress since 1957 and little since World War II.[21]

Surplus of Farmers and Farm Employees

Since the South has historically received a larger percentage of its income from agriculture than is true nationally, the technological revolution has been especially significant for the South. It has resulted in a surplus of farmers and farm employees, so that even these excessively low incomes disappear. In the 1950's, more than four million persons were forced to leave the rural South. Two and one-half million of these (60 per cent of them Negro) went to northern industrial cities, so that these added to others migrating resulted in a net out migration of every southern state except Florida. Thus, despite the fact that the South has the highest birth rate in the nation, most southern states gained less population during the 1950's than the national average, while Arkansas and Mississippi actually lost in total population. It must also be remembered that the one and one-half million who migrated to southern cities were largely untrained and had low educational levels. This merely accentuates the unemployment and training problems faced by the South. Further, what of the vast numbers left on the land faced with the prospect of eventually being driven off? Over four and one-half million people remain on the land in Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina alone; sharecropping is still widespread and more

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[20] Shannon, cited at footnote 17, at pp. 14-15.
[21] It should be noted that the South's per capita income is only 64 per cent of the non-South. Income statistics computed from data furnished the writer by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; and Howard G. Schaller, "Economic Growth in the South," *Georgia Business,* October 1959.

than 50 per cent of the sharecroppers are Negro.[22]

With the problems enumerated thus far, it is not surprising to find the South sadly deficient in social legislation and services. Doubtless the greatest social deficiency is in public education. Due to its high birth rate, the South has a larger percentage of school-age population than the non-South. But, due to the income problem, southern states generally spend a larger percentage of their income on education than the national average, yet each one still spends less per child than the national average. Thus, it is not surprising to note that, in 1950, 75 per cent of all rural counties in the South had an educational level for all citizens 25 years of age or more of eighth grade or less. The same is true on a statewide basis for 50 per cent of the adult citizens of most southern states.[23]

Given the quality and level of education, the need for vocational education in the South would appear to be greater than is true nationally. However, the national deficiency in trade-industry and technical courses and concentration in agriculture and home economics are well known. A higher concentration in agriculture and home economics exists in the South, and a smaller percentage is found in trade-industry and technical courses.[24]

Finally, it is a cultural paradox when the South can ill-afford one public school system to saddle itself with a dual school system. The quality of Negro high schools, already noted, is a major result. It follows that even the greatly deficient vocational courses are not readily available to Negroes. Generally, when they are, they cover those occupations to which Negroes have been assigned by custom.[25]

In addition to the cost of clinging to nineteenth century tradition enumerated thus far, the Southerner must pay an additional tax premium. In 1962, for example, the tax per $1,000 for the Southerner was $109.45, compared to $92.29 for the non-Southerner. Nevertheless, tax revenues in the South were only $157.35 per capita, compared to $240.70 for the non-South.[26] Little wonder, then, that the South is so dependent on the federal government for revenue, and it is a matter of record that most southern states get twice as many dollars back from the federal government as they have paid in taxes. As the *Birmingham News* editorialized recently, "One may wish we were not so reliant on a federal expenditure; yet the truth is we are!"[27]

Industrialize the South

The grand solution to the problem created by southern culture has been discussed and tried since the latter part of the nineteenth century. This is to attract new industry, to industrialize. Some good industries have come to be close

[22] Data for migration and agricultural section taken from Selz C. Mayo, "What's Happening to the Southern Population?" *Proceedings of Southern Agriculture: Its Problems and Policy Alternatives,* North Carolina State College, January 1961; and *The South's Revolution: Challenge to the Nation* and *From the Mississippi Delta Comes a Challenge to All Americans,* undated publications of the National Sharecroppers Fund.

[23] Lee R. Martin, "How Do Southern Incomes Compare?" *Southern Agriculture: Its Problems and Alternatives,* North Carolina State College, 1961.

[24] See United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, *Annual Reports of State Boards for Vocational Education,* year ended June 1962, p. 21.

[25] For example, see Vivian W. Henderson, *The Economic Status of Negroes: In the Nation and in the South,* Southern Regional Council, undated, pp. 19-21; and *The Negro and Employment Opportunities in the South,* A Report Based on a Survey of Employment Studies in Southern Cities, Southern Regional Council, Atlanta, February 1962.

[26] Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, cited at footnote 21.

[27] *The Birmingham News,* April 20, 1964.

to raw materials or cheap power, or were defense industries established by the federal government. They did not need the southern bait. When the southern community cast its line into the industrial waters fishing for industry, it did so from an environment of low wages, untrained workers, low educational levels, inadequate vocational schools, high tax rates and deficient social services. The bait taken from its cultural heritage includes Negroes who must have menial jobs, if any, and low wages for others. The plant can be, and in most cases should be, nonunion. Free land, rent, building or taxes are promised. For good measure, the possibility of racial conflict is added. That means closed schools and political interference with the state universities that are already seeing an exodus of their best professors. What kind of an industry does this kind of bait attract? Just exactly what one would expect—the exploitation-minded, marginal, low-wage, perhaps fly-by-night plant which will drain the community and then leave if the pickings do not continue. This was recognized by no less an authority than the Southern Governors' Conference at its 1961 meeting. A conference report indicated that the per capita income of the southern manufacturing workers was $800 below that of the non-South because of "our past reliance on industries in which the wages are at the bottom of the list," so a resolution asked the states to "cease shooting with a shotgun to bag any and all enterprises, but rather to use the rifle approach in order to interest industries paying high wages."[28] Apparently, then, the Southern governors want twentieth century industrialism. But the question is, do they want it badly enough to give up the nineteenth century traditions to which they desperately cling?

The traditions that go along with twentieth century industrialism are good school systems (including first-class universities), skilled workers, adequate public services, high-income markets for their products, equitable tax structures (for this kind of plant pays its share), unions, social legislation and stable government. So, perhaps the best place for the Southern Governors to start is with an assessment of their governments and those who fill political offices.

In recent years, a number of southern state governments have taken a relatively sane approach to such cultural trouble spots as labor and race relations. However, there remain far too many demagogic types whose main preoccupation is to attack their arch enemy—the federal government. Rather than lessening, there has in some states been an intensity of the coalition of economic conservatism and racial extremism, which results in a myriad of effects detrimental to industrial development and retraining. In addition, some states tax their citizens for the privilege of continued economic subjugation.[29]

Perhaps the most traditional of all are the southern members of the United States Congress. Through their control of committees and their votes, they have often blocked or else substantially

[28] *Business Week,* "In Regions," October 7, 1961.

[29] For example, 35 per cent of the University of Mississippi's professional force resigned shortly after the Oxford incident. Even Florida spent $360,000 to create a Negro law school in 1950. It now has 16 students who cost $60,000 annually in teachers' salaries. At the same time, a top executive in Sperry-Rand claims there is an acute shortage of electronics training in the state and what exists is about ten to 15 years behind modern electronics. In regard to cost, the State of Alabama has a combined fund of $50,000 to attract industry and fight civil rights, while Mississippi appropriated $200,000 to the anti-civil rights lobby in Washington. *New York Times,* May 17, 1963, p. 17; "Southern Schooling," *New Republic,* September 28, 1963; *The Mississippi Free Press,* February 22, 1964, p. 1.

opposed bills largely designed to help in the solution of problems which exist in their states.

There are a number of progressive communities in the South, but there are far too many left who seek the marginal firm, refuse union firms or those who hire many Negroes, and perpetuate tradition to the detriment of the city.[30]

The labor movement in the South, particularly its top leaders, has done much to establish a climate of stability. Yet, there are far too many members and full-time officers who have joined The White Citizens Council and follow the racial extremist, seeing absolutely no relationship between their struggle and civil rights.

Negro Doing Much to Change South

Perhaps the Negro is doing most to change the face of the South. Generally speaking, Negro leaders are wary of the traps of tradition and warn their followers against being used as pawns in labor relations. Yet, although it is more understandable, there are far too many Negroes who think that civil rights is something related only to the Negro struggle and see no relationship between stable labor relations and their attainment of their rights.

All of this adds up to a vicious cycle of culture which vitally affects the possibility of successful retraining in the South. First, there is a shortage of plants with positions calling for retrained workers. Second, if they were needed, there is the problem of deficient schools, particularly of vocational training and top-flight universities. Third, it is clear that better schools will not be forthcoming unless there is a basic change in the philosophy of state government and Congressional voting records. Fourth, if training could be achieved, and largely in order to attract plants needing skilled workers, tradition may make attraction impossible. Finally, if the other problems are solved, the myth of white supremacy may prevent the establishment of retraining programs or restrict the group which needs it the most from participation in such projects.

In view of all this, it is not surprising that Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia show more progress in retraining to date, and that Mississippi and Louisiana have not really started. Finally, South Carolina is a case in point, for its massive plans were apparently stopped during 1963 until such time as cultural adjustments could be made. In early 1964, it was reported that the state had accepted $5.5 million of federal money, and, with an integrated program, was hoping to move toward the top in retraining success.[31]

After leading the South in the War which has been largely responsible for a culture detrimental to our economic well-being, Robert E. Lee said: "The thorough education of all classes of (southern) people" was necessary and that the aim of every Southerner should be to unite in "the allayment of passion, the dissipation of prejudice, and the restoration of reason." "Abandon all these local animosities and make your sons Americans," said he.[32] Surely 100 years is not too short a period for us to ready ourselves to rejoin America and, in fact, to join the twentieth century. Culturally speaking, until this is done, retraining will not be meaningful in the South.   [The End]

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[30] For example, Birmingham's better industry is shrinking. There have been cutbacks in steel, pipe, mining and aircraft. At the end of 1963, there were 18,000 fewer jobs than existed in 1957. A city can ill-afford the loss of such industry, such jobs and the income attached to it. *Business Week*, "Birmingham: The Fuse Gets Shorter," September 28, 1963, pp. 32-33.

[31] *Washington Post*, January 12, 1964.

[32] Nicholls, cited at footnote 15, Lee as quoted in Mims, *The Advancing South* (New York: 1926), pp. 4-5.

Unionization in the South

The Organizational Campaign in the Social and Cultural Context of the South

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A FEW YEARS AGO, at the invitation of a union organizer, I poked my inquisitive nose into the dramatic interaction of an ongoing organizing campaign, and, in one sniff, became intrigued with the campaign as a subject of sociological investigation. For several years thereafter, as a guest of the Textile Workers Union of America, I kept up sporadic observation in the field, employing what time I could spare from my teaching duties to watch developments. I use the word "developments" in this instance as euphemism for "failure." Of the four campaigns and one strike in which I became studiously involved, not one was successful from the union point of view. During this period no reports of TWUA success elsewhere in the South came to my ever-eager attention. Although research time was limited, interest was unflagging, and cerebral excitement stirred up by the limited empirical peek seems not to diminish, I have become irredeemably ensnared, intellectually speaking, in a rank growth of question, ideas and ruminations that have sprung from that relatively quick look at the organizing process. I feel eminently qualified, not by sound knowledge, but by spirited imagination, to discuss the question: Why have labor unions had such a difficult time of it in their attempts to organize the Southern industrial workers? What is there about the South to slow the labor movement to a glacial pace? Is there something peculiarly refractory about the Southern workman? Are there distinctive features of the cultural or social patterns of the South that provide especially strong resistances to the endeavors of the organizers?

Of course, there have been successful organizing compaigns in the South. In 1953, according to a study published in 1957 by the National Bureau of Economic Research,[1] the South had a total union membership of 2.3 million. About 17 per cent of its nonfarm labor force was organized. However, for the nation as a whole, nearly 33 per cent of nonfarm employees belonged to unions. The State of

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[1] Leo Troy, *Distribution of Union Membership Among the States, 1939 and 1953* (New York; National Bureau of Economic Research, 1957). This total takes in three Census Bureau areas; South Atlantic, East South Central and West South Central.

Washington led the nation with 53.3 per cent and North Carolina had the lowest percentage, 8.3. In the words of Robert Cooney, in 1961: "The South today remains a 'new frontier' for organized labor, even though 80 years have passed since the first organizing campaign in the region."[2] Recently, suggests Cooney, business has been picking up for the Southern organizer. He quotes an AFL-CIO regional director as saying, "We're starting to see some fresh interest for the first time in years. There seems to be a different feeling growing up—more willingness to talk union in most of the industries. Most, that is, except textiles. It's the same old rough fight there."[3]

My field observations have been confined to campaigns in the textile industry, where this "same old rough fight" is in progress. I do know, from reading the newspapers and my monthly copy of *Textile Labor*, a TWUA publication, that there have been a few campaign victories in Southern textiles since 1961. But membership added through these scattered successes seems but "a drop in the bucket." I am wondering how the "fresh interest" mentioned by Cooney's informant, the regional director, has been translated into campaign victory and membership rolls.

In addition to this inspirational reading about labor's 80-year-old new frontier, I have been poring over—by eerie candlelight in the basement of an old castle—the lugubrious writings of one Solomon Barkin, who tells us about the general decline of the American labor movement, with reasons therefor.[4] Re-

cently, in preparation for this paper, I have added a companion volume to my midnight reading—one prepared by Ray Marshall entitled, "Some Factors Influencing the Growth of Unions in the South."[5] Marshall means the checking of union growth. He and Barkin agree almost point for point in explaining organizing failure. Marshall, as the title of his paper indicates, restricts his depiction of labor's dismal prospects to the Southern states. The reduction in geography does not, of course, mean a loss in cheerlessness. By adding to these two works an earlier disquisition on *The Organizability of Labor,* by William Weyforth,[6] and also W. J. Cash's *Mind of the South,*[7] one might not only develop a sense of Southern union stunting in better perspective, but also claim a fine start in building up a library of selected miserabilia for the over-optimistic young labor organizer.

Barkin presents an impressive listing of "impediments" to the growth of the labor movement in the United States, and singles out the South for special mention as an area of organizing frustration. The various hindrances are categorized in three groupings: "outside impediments," "internal impediments," and "obstacles to growth from nonunion workers." Discussion of the "internal" impediments is mainly concerned with inadequacies or organizing procedure. Techniques are not maximally effective under the otherwise discouraging conditions. The "outside" impediments are provided by the employers of the workers that unions wish to organize. By courtesy of management come (a) .hu-

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[2] Robert B. Cooney, "The Modern South: Organized Labor's New Frontier," *The American Federationist,* Vol. 68, No. 5 (May, 1961), pp. 15-19.

[3] Cited at footnote 2, at p. 15.

[4] Solomon Barkin, *The Decline of the Labor Movement* (Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1961).

[5] Ray Marshall, "Some Factors Influencing the Growth of Unions in the South," *Industrial Relations Research Association: Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting,* 1960, pp. 166-182.

[6] William O. Weyforth, *The Organizability of Labor* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1917).

[7] W. J. Cash, *The Mind of the South* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941).

man relations programs, designed to cultivate employee good will toward the bossmen, and (b) "outright antiunion appeals," designed to induce employee ill will toward the unions. "Outside" obstacles also lie in national and state labor laws, in National Labor Relations Board orientations, and in the post-war prosperity of industrial workers. The third category, "obstacles from nonunion workers," features "apathy toward unions," and points to certain kinds of workers as especially hard to organize: women, Negroes, low wage service workers and white collar workers. The Southern textile workers, in particular, are subject to a host of pressures that tend to discourage their union affiliation. In addition to mill management, those who exercise negative influence include town merchants, ministers, other professionals and local newspaper editors. Even the police have at times been involved. Also, the mill hand lacks a clear image of unionism; he has had very little experience as a participant in formal social organizations as preparation for his own independent action; and he gets little or no support from a "liberal, intellectual middle class." Should he suffer severance of his payroll connections for daring to engage in "union activity," he has great difficulty in finding alternative employment. And what remains of his self-determination is complicated by the color issue.

Marshall, who published a year earlier, offers a four-field classification of his list of factors affecting the growth of unions in the South. The list, like Barkin's, is long, and the over-all vectorial thrust is overwhelmingly negative. The general categories include 1) employer resistance, 2) union-related factors, 3) characteristics of the Southern workers, and 4) environmental forces. In Marshall's analysis the relevant environment is made up, in the main, of national labor legislation and community opposition to unions. Barkin has managed to reduce his categories by shoving management out into the environment to join labor law in the "external impediment" class. It is interesting to note in passing that a third explanation for labor's failure on the Southern scene, that offered by Glenn Gilman in his *Human Relations in the Industrial Southeast*,[8] seems to relegate unions to the environment. In the Southern "folk society," which Gilman sees and describes, employer and employee are inside, chumming it up by the fire, so to speak, while the union, if not an outer ring of environment, is at least out in the cold. However, amid these classification choices and confusions, one point seems crystal clear: there are many formidable obstacles to the organizing of Southern workmen.

I have noted also, with a great deal of interest, that the Barkin and Marshall depiction of obstacles are in general agreement with my own limited observation of organizing activity in the textile industry of the Upper South. Their maps fit my terrain. And since there is this consensus, what is to be my contribution to the discussion, other than a reshuffling of factors, a reclassification, a relocation of environment? I hasten to answer that question by saying that I do think that I have a contribution to make, and that it is an important one. In fact, I have several contributions to offer, or perhaps they are but different aspects of the same presentation.

First, my opportunity to make relatively microscopic observations at the campaign level, when combined with other industrial study and reflection, has induced certain intuitions, hunches, and

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[8] Glenn Gilman, *Human Relations in the Industrial Southeast* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956).

hypotheses in regard to the *weighting* of the various impediments listed by Barkin and Marshall. It is a matter of emphasis. While finding myself in general agreement when A, B, C and D are pointed out as obstacles to campaign success, my set of sorting meshes relegates A, B, and C to a pile of relatively minor or subsidiary influences and retains D for intensive inspection as a key or critical factor. This weighting, while admittedly provisional, I consider not only central to judgmental processes in disinterested research, but also of great practical significance to the labor or management protagonist who finds himself up to his ears, and pocketbook, in the campaign struggle. To fail to distinguish the little influences from the big ones is to deflect time, money and effort to side skirmishes, away from a possible payoff thrust. One may forge ahead on points in five or six rounds of pillow fighting only to be decisively downed by a crack over the head with a beer bottle.

Second, I urge additional discriminative attentions, again in the interest of practical action programs as well as detached understanding, that replace our customary stereotype of "The South," as a unified social and cultural system, with detailed specifications of conditions according to time and place. I would urge abandonment of a spectral "South" as a working concept in social research, just as I would urge abandonment of a spectral "society" as a linguistic tool in inquiry. Instead of thinking of and talking about the South as a sort of distinctive, peculiar, deviant normative entity, we would follow William James in his challenge to the philosophers of the Absolute and their "block universe" by raising the block-busting question, "How One?" Just *where* is the cultural consensus and social unity? Where is

the dissensus and disunity? Where are the connections and where are the gaps, and of *what kind*? Discrimination should cut to the level of locatable groups and groupings and their observable interactions. At least until we become firmly habituated to reporting in terms of the specific and observable, the word "South" should be dropped from polite scientific conversation. Its use can only sidetrack us, divert us in our analysis of the organizing campaign, from close attention to the influences involved. Likewise, we should quit thinking and talking of the "Southern" industrial worker, or of the "Southern textile mill-hand" as a type. We need a closer approximation to actual human behavior than a "lumpenproletariat" lumping can give us. In our earliest provisional mappings we should attempt to distinguish subgroups, segmentations, differences. Also, in this recommended decomposition of a research-obstructing blanket term, I point out that not all the previously listed impediments or obstacles to the growth of unions in the South can be located within such geographic bounds. Indeed, the web of influence including what I would regard as salient or critical influence, stretches well over the Mason-Dixon line. Barkin and Marshall see this boundary-jumping in their noting of national labor law and policies of national administrative agencies as relevant factors. And there are other linkages with the non-South that appear to be bound up with the fortunes of the labor movement in the South. We may have to range far and wide in our mapping, providing a telescopic field for our microscopic discriminations.

My third contribution may lie in an attempt to recast the linguistic tools of sociological observation and description, an endeavor that has proved especially intriguing to me of late. I have been try-

[*] William James, *Pragmatism* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1946) p. 132.

ing to develop a conceptual scheme to which the miscellany of influences may be ordered and possibly controlled for the dynamic analysis of organizing campaigns.[10] A mere listing of factors in the form of a syllabus does not suffice. Even with attention to the discrimination of *who, when* and *where,* taxonomic categorization of the *what* can provide, at the most, a dead morphology incapable of describing adequately the living process, the guided action within the evolving setting. I seek a linguistic construction for the depiction and weighing of influences in fuctional systems; and, if influences are to be examined in their functional interrelatedness, a requisite modicum of linguistic coherence would call for development of functional concepts. Arthur Bentley has pointed out that visibility and language are "the conditions of science,—they are its substance," and that the two are inextricably entwined.[11] We see *through* our language. The social sciences have been severely handicapped in their development by low visibility and its twin, poor terminology. Replacement of our conventional language, called "the language of myth" and "the language of substance" by Ernst Cassirer,[12] with the language of science, "the language of function," is a first order of business. The attempts of sociologists to "go scientific" with their so-called "quantitative methods," is a sad thing to watch. The refined, coherent symbolism of mathematics is applied in an impossible graft on our disjunctive myth language, the structure of which was developed long, long ago, somewhere in the tree-

tops. We are in a hustle and bustle to ape the physical sciences in their use of mathematics without the linguistic preparation prerequisite to such use.[13]

I shall make reference to this third possible contribution very brief and then discuss, in a reverse order, a few of my ideas in regard to my first two claimed contributions: decomposition of "the South" and the weighting of influences. I would not mention my conceptual scheme at all but for the fact that I am linguistically too far gone in orientation to turn back, and would be very frustrated not to present my observations and reflections in a form at least crudely adumbrative of the envisioned scheme. To be sure, a crude form of reference is all that I have achieved thus far, but I cannot turn back.

I

To be as brief as possible, I present my dream of a developing systemic presentation as featuring these desiderata:

1. The discriminated parts of the system will not be "thing parts," not static "factors," but "activities," selected as relevant from the moving stream of human doings and goings-on.

2. The selected activities will be group activities, taking "group" in the broad sense of population segment, varying from cohesive social organization to minimally cohesive aggregates.[14]

3. Such groups and groupings will not be taken substantively, but will be posited as "points" in the field of influence, and "mapped" as such.

[10] Some ideas in regard to conceptualization of the organizing campaign have been expounded in an unpublished paper, "The Labor Union Organizing Campaign: Toward Functional Analysis of Structure and Process in Intergroup Relations."

[11] Arthur F. Bentley, *Inquiry into Inquiries,* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1954), p. 28.

[12] Ernst Cassirer, *Substance and Function* (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company,

1923). See also by the same author *Language and Myth* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946).

[13] Arthur F. Bentley, *Linguistic Analysis of Mathematics* (Bloomington: The Principia Press, 1932).

[14] Kenneth E. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 105-106.

4. The group activities selected for inclusion in the system will be those involved in intergroup relations. The focus of observation, conceptualization, and explanation will be on interaction—intergroup interaction.

5. Intergroup interaction will be differentiated into "elements," or "dimensions." Separate strands will be pulled from the complex tissues of intergroup relations for separate examination, labeling, and provisional inclusion as "constants" to represent each intergroup connection of the functional system.

6. The discriminated dimensions of interaction will be given serial construction as metric manifolds in linguistic preparation for mathematical operations.[15] With the metricization of constants, degrees of interaction may be measured, and varying values of each interactional connection may be determined. Situational changes may be described in terms of shifting dimensional values; they will be metric statements of change, productive of dynamic analysis. With "yardsticks" for measuring the elementary lines of interaction, the field of influence of the organizing campaign may be conceived as a vector field. Such measuring rod concepts, constructed for description of the unique case,[16] may, in their developing refinement, lend themselves to the expressing of functional relationships in equational form and thus lead to eventual framing and testing of "laws of intergroup interaction."

For preliminary consideration as dimensions of intergroup interaction I have chosen the following: consensus, association, participation, service, dependence and affection. Their metric construction may be suggested by pairing each with its polar opposite to represent the extremes of a scale. I illustrate:

(1) Consensus-dissensus: Representing degrees of agreement, or cultural distance between groups.

(2) Association-dissociation: Representing social distance, or degree of nearness and farness of human association, ranging from the sharing of intimate communication, through the impersonal communication of mere functionaries in a division of labor, to complete lack of communication.

(3) Participation-domination: Representing degrees of sharing of power, or power-distance, ranging from joint participation in decision-making to the dictatorial dominance of one group over another.

(4) Service-disservice: Representing degree of support in action, ranging from a positive extreme of augmentation to a negative degree of reduction, presumably annihilation.

(5) Dependence-independence: Representing degree of economic dependence of one group on another, presumably varying according to supply and demand, or market fluctuations.

These dimensions are suggested as a "first approximation." It would remain for developing inquiry to determine just which dimensions would be useful in analysis of the organizing campaign. Also resting for the nonce in the lap of future inquiry would be the "operationalizing" of the selected dimensions. I shall omit in this discussion any further working out, or analytic reflection, concerning this dimensional frame of reference. Suffice it for now to say that I hope for a coherent linguistic system of interactional elements, few in number, but flexible, extensive in application, capable of a wide expansion of inference in

[15] Ernst Cassirer, cited at footnote 12, at p. 148.

[16] Kurt Lewin, *A Dynamic Theory of Personality* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1935), pp. 13-15.

sociological inquiry. Such dimensions, as I have suggested, would give us lines of guidance through social space-time. In the words of Bentley, "The search for precision in their analysis and use is the sociological space problem."[17]

II

By visualizing these conceptual guidelines, one may see the organizing campaign as a struggle between management groups and labor union groups over interactional structures. The battlefield is a field of social distances, including under that general concept dimensional distinctions of cultural, political, economic and psychological, as well as more narrowly social distances. The fight centers on the affiliation of the worker group or groups; its process involves affiliation and re-affiliation, acculturation and re-acculturation, socialization and re-socialization, and, most strikingly, possible shifts in power configurations. In the organizing campaign both sides organize, and both sides disorganize. They try to build or strengthen their own bonds with the workers, and try to maintain or reduce social distances, at the same time that they try to weaken or destroy worker bonds with the opposition. Union and management fight for the same social territory, and for help in the battle they try to enlist the support of other groups: churches, merchants, town professionals, other unions, lawmakers. The two main protagonists struggle for control of dimensional levers[18] in the manipulation of contingencies to achieve a favorable balance of votes in the NLRB "election" that terminates the campaign. At any given time during the course of a campaign dimensional measures would describe the organizing situations. Over the time span from beginning to end of the campaign, changes in dimensional measures would describe the campaign process.

Initiation of the campaign process in a specific situation may be seen as attempted interference by a compelling agent, the union, with ongoing evolutionary change. Along the axis of history changes have been taking place within a relevant web of intergroup relations. Now, neither union nor management can be content to let Nature continue to take its course, and the two groups struggle for control of situational levers at strategic points of intervention.

Evolutionary changes in worker-management relations in the Southern textile industry, for instance, seem to have led to interactional circumstances favorable to the aspirations of textile unions. A widening gulf of social distance between millhands and mill management would seem to provide alert union officials with tempting invitations to move in for the resocialization-reacculturation kill.

The Yankee City story, as reported by Warner and Low,[19] is one of management's movement "up and out" of factory and community, followed by unionization of the interactionally abandoned shoe workers. The spreading social distance that reputedly provided the roomy "Arc de Triomphe" for the victorious, parade-like entry of the union forces could be registered as shifting values along dimensional lines of the worker-management relationship. The increasing distance might feature changing measures of consensus, association, affection and service. A status dimension seems also involved in the Warner interpretation.

During the past few decades Southern textile management has been moving up

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[17] Arthur F. Bentley, cited at footnote 11, at p. 94.
[18] C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 131.

[19] W. Lloyd Warner and J. O. Low, *The Social System of A Modern Factory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947).

and out, too. The "Arc de Triomphe" seems in readiness in many communities, but parades have been unimpressive in their size and frequency. The alienation of workers from management doesn't imply affiliation with a campaigning union. A break in one relationship doesn't mean a bond in another. Explanation for union failure will require a closer look at the relevant web of intergroup relations and its various dimensions of interaction.

According to accounts that I have read, the textile mill and mill-village relationship between management and workers were carry-overs from the paternalistic system of the Southern plantation. Gilman has characterized this kind of relationship with the label "folk," combining two interactional dimensions in his use of the term "informal understanding"[20] to describe the tight social bond which, in his observation, still holds. In the "old days," at any rate, as Cash pointed out, there was a highly personalized relationship[21] remindful of Yankee City's Choate, Pierce, and Weatherby running around in their shirt sleeves and chatting with employees on a first-name basis. Along with this informality the interaction undoubtedly featured mutual adherence to custom, mutual affection and a mutual active concern for each other's needs. This early industrial situation is also remindful of the relationship between baron and peasant in still earlier times. Funck-Brentano, in his historical presentation of "The Old Regime in France," speaks of the ties between lord and vassal in feudal times:

"Lord and vassal were thus united to each other by close bonds; they felt themselves indispensable to each other. The seigneurie, the spirit beating within the stone-built donjon, became a

fatherland which was loved with a blind instinct and devotion. It was bound up with the lord and his family, and the people took a pride in him, and told stories of the heavy might of his sword; they greeted him with acclamations when his cavalcade passed by, its banner floating in the breeze."[22]

This old order—I refer now to the Southern mill-village phase of it, has been characterized, in a spirit of levity, by union officials as "The Mill by the Rill and Uncle Ben on the Hill." But these "Uncle Bens," I can testify from personal interviewing experience with elderly millhands, are recalled with visibly genuine affection. Reminiscences, out of earshot of union organizers, told of kind deeds in time past and expressed heartfelt gratitude undiminished, perhaps increased, by the passing years. In these particular instances, the eulogies received heightened impressiveness in invidious comparisons with the behavior of Uncle Ben's administrative descendants, the incumbent manager and his technical aides.

According to Case, the widening gulf came with a wave of absentee landlordism after World War I, induced, in the main, by a movement of Northern mills to the South. Says Case:

"In these absentee-owned mills . . . the highly personalized humanity of the old paternalistic pattern practically vanished. . . . To the mill owner, sitting comfortably in Boston or Providence, the mill worker in his Southern factory was not much more a concrete human personality than if he had been a peon or a coolie on some Cuban or East Indian plantation."[23]

Cash adds, by way of amplification of his point, that sometimes the Northern owners would send down Northern ad-

[20] Glenn Gilman, cited at footnote 8, at p. 300.
[21] W. J. Cash, cited at footnote 7, at pp. 212-213.

[22] Frantz Funck-Brentano, *The Old Regime in France* (New York: Longmens, Green and Company, 1929), pp. 76-77.
[23] W. J. Cash, cited at footnote 7, at p. 261.

ministrative personnel to manage the mills "on business-is-business lines; more often they hired Southern men as bosses, though not without saddling them with spies and 'efficiency experts.' "[24] In cases where the old Southern ownership and managership flowed on through succeeding generations, the inheriting sons and grandsons moved up and out, too. I can point to instances of the latter from my own observation; grandsons pick up efficiency values and techniques in universities, both Northern and Southern. In their own business-is-business orientations they employ and rely on staff experts in efficiency procedures. Says Cash:

"Many . . . had been trained in the tradition of the old close personal relationships between master and man, and, particularly in the smaller mills often sought to continue it; but they were commonly quite as much absorbed in the country club and speculation as their elders, and so in their turn had little time really to cultivate it. Too, the generally greater spread in their education and background made it more difficult for them to get close to the worker than it had been for their fathers . . . .

"These men of the new generation would ordinarily go on contributing to and supporting the mill churches and schools, might in many instances make a great show of knowing their workers by their names and occasionally foregathering with them over the soda-pop box in the company store . . .

. . . [T]he feeling which had lain at the heart of the old notion of paternalistic duty was fast dwindling, leaving only the shell—at the same time that the notion of paternalistic *privilege* was remaining as strongly entrenched as ever, and even perhaps being expanded . . . .

And some of the more hard-bitten among them were beginning to resort to overt use of that power to coerce which had been the baron's all along."[25]

To use a term borrowed from the writings of Hyman Levy, British philosopher of science, a phase change had taken place. In Levy's definition, "Two successive phases in time are recognized as such when they belong to the same wider isolate, and when the earlier one shows some qualities common to the latter one, and others that have been transformed to new qualities in the later one.

For designation of phase changes in intergroup relations, Sorokin has provided suggestions for provisional terminology. I have in mind his types of interaction, such as "familistic," "compulsory," "antagonistic," and "contractual."[27] "The method of setting out such processes along the axis of history," says Levy, "enables the successive phases to stand out sharply. It does not in any case offer an explanation why the transition occurs . . . . By examining a process historically, however, we can prepare the way for such a dynamic explanation, for it is a method of laying out the problem demanding explanation. In that sense, like all preliminary thinking, it corresponds to the static part of the analysis. It shows up the phases as static sections."[28]

In my own projected, hoped-for dynamic analysis of organizing campaign and other matters of intergroup relations, co-related shifts in dimensional values through the relevant social system will provide the explanations. The most useful phase designations and their operational definitions in terms of dimensional values are decisions that will emerge from future research.

[24] Cited at footnote 7, at p. 261.

[25] Cited at footnote 7, at pp. 269-270.

[26] Hyman Levy, *A Philosophy for A Modern Man* (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1938), p. 87.

[27] Pitirim Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (Boston: Peter Sargent, 1957), pp. 445-452.

[28] Hyman Levy, cited at footnote 26, at p. 93.

For present discussion of the phase change in Southern textile management-worker relations described by Cash, the term "benevolent paternalism," or just "paternalism" may be employed to refer to the old order of things. The terms "pseudo-paternalism" and "coercive relations" may be used to designate the two types of relationship that have developed with the waning of paternalism. Cash's description of the behavior of the descendants of the paternalistic barons, the sons and grandsons who go through some of the motions of paternalism, would approximate what I mean by pseudo-paternalism. Thus, would I also label the behavior of those managers who have come to rely on the modern streamlined, canned, or synthetic human relation or personnel management techniques that contribute to Barkin's list of external impediments to union growth and, incidentally, to Barkin's gloom. "Coercive relations" would refer to the kind of worker-management situation in which the shell of paternalism has been shucked off completely, in which the workers step to the bidding of the bossmen, to hold their jobs, without even a public relations pretense of the old associational bond. Pseudo-paternalism and coercion do not succeed paternalism in any necessary or characteristically historic order.

The "up and out" movement of Southern mill management has meant not only a shift in the quality of association, from a personal to an impersonal or business relationship; it has meant, also, growing dissensus. The rationalization of work processes, the institution of efficiency measures, have violated norms traditional to the work situation. The imposition of greater work loads is a case in point. Without a balancing compensation in the form of monetary, or other rewards, the "stretch-out" has tipped the "service"

scales, it may be assumed, decidedly in favor of management.

To delineate the aforementioned interactional phases, paternalism and its successors, in dimensional terms, one might define paternalism as representing a combination of high measures of consensus, association, affection and service, with power and dependency balances in favor of management. One might define coercive relations as characterized by low measures of mutual consensus, association and affection, with service as well as power and dependency balanced strongly in favor of management. Pseudo-paternalism might be distinguished from coercion by measures of worker *perception* of consensus, association, management affection and management service. In pseudo-paternalism management has changed, the relationship has changed, but the workers have not yet perceived the change. If management's "impression management," or "dramaturgy,"[29] is effective, the workers are "taken in."

In a coercive type of relationship there is no dramaturgical pretense; cultural, social, service, and power distances are openly recognized. Even the spy system is above board. Negative sanctions are applied by management upon discovery of worker disservices in the form of union activity, and that means firing. There are warnings and threats of such counter-disservices well in advance. Worker interest in joining unions is thus checked, not by positive sentiments, but by fear of unemployment in a job-market of higher labor surplus.

The interactional exodus, or "up and out" of management has, of course, represented establishment and strengthening of various outside connections that become part of the web of influence affecting local management-worker re-

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[29] Victor Thompson, *Modern Organization* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), pp. 138-151.

lations in general and union organizing campaigns in particular. These outside connections include political ties that can bring pressures to bear on national and state labor legislation and on the administrative agencies of government. The "up and out" may or may not mean retirement as a major influence in community power structure. I assume that, as Barkin suggests, management groups do ordinarily utilize other community groups and functionaries to check union advance, particularly at campaign time. However, in my own observations I have encountered campaign situations in which management apparently disdains to bother with enlisting the support of other community groups. Perhaps these represent situations designated by Dahrendorf as "institutional isolation."[30] I have in mind cases where management seems to rely mainly on "strategic firing" for victory over the union. I use the term in recollection of Gouldner's "strategic replacement" technique, used at the Oscar Center gypsum plant.[31] It means, I gather, "fire a few, and thereby scare hell out of the rest."

As suggested earlier, the alienation of workers from management doesn't mean that the union can count on a whirlwind courtship and reaffiliation at an NLRB ceremony, with a document to make it legal. Organizing the Southern workers can be difficult wooing, no matter how profound the state of disenchantment in the industrial household. Of course, union organizers don't try to discourage this alienation. They don't come to town as peacemakers. They want all the alienation they can get. They nourish it. On printed leaflets, by "house calls," and at mass meetings they expand on such subjects as injustice, insecurity, overwork, and low

pay, none of which is slanted toward effecting worker-management *rapprochement*. But increasing social distance between workers and management is not enough. The workers must also be brought closer to the union. This involves the establishment of bonds of consensus and association.

Worker-union consensus in certain matters is relatively easy to institute. It is already instituted. It requires just articulation. Organizers put themselves forthrightly on the side of higher pay, lighter work loads, more paid holidays, job security and better pensions, which is the side of the workers. In other matters, having to do with standards and moralities less directly related to union "business," some organizers may have to put forth a little effort to "key in," but achievement of a workable consensus is not too difficult. They can refrain from the social glass in public and brush up, if they are theologically rusty on the Bible. The problem is to establish a strong beachhead of moral consonance from which to launch an effort toward worker re-acculturation in regard to values central to the union movement. The problem is also to develop a consensus that can hold against managerial counter-attack, designed to put the union beyond the moral reach of employees by linking it with such subversive beliefs and practices as race-mixing, carpetbagging, atheism and communism. Management, like the union, combines solicitation with denigration. By means of "Ol' Buddy, where have you been?" speeches and letters, by means of forecasts, if not promises, of the good things in life to come, by token terminations for union activity and hints of more terminations to come, management highlights its own attractiveness, especially its payroll appeal.

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[30] Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society,* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 274.

[31] Alvin W. Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954).

With both sides making telling points, the workers may believe both, that is, the depreciations made by each. Such an outcome might find the union in enjoyment of the satisfaction that goes with tit for tat, but not very far along in the re-acculturation program, especially if the workers get the notion that the Devil is offering them protection from Beelzebub.

In the organizing campaign the union must resocialize as well as reacculturate. Indeed, the problem may be one of socializing, not resocializing; for management's movement "up and out" may leave workers of Southern industrial communities without the leadership essential to the formation of cohesive groups. Lack of worker participation in "functionally relevant" groups seems to be especially characteristic of communities where management has established coercive relations with its employees. Coercive administrators actively discourage the communication of workers with each other, and through fear of being fired for union activity, millhands become extremely cautious about sharing pro-union sentiments. There might be a spy in the group. In such situations organizers find workers unwilling to risk attending mass meetings and indisposed to proselyte for the union among their fellows. To withstand the various and sundry antiunion pressures that assail him during the course of the campaign, the mildly pro-union worker needs the strength that cohesive group membership can give. In this sense, union officials know that workers must be organized before they go to the polls, although technically speaking, election victory must precede the organizing of a union.

During one of my observational stints the organizer in immediate charge of union strategy noted the reluctance of pro-union workers to participate, as a group, in campaign activity. He decided

that lack of experience in working together toward common goals was at least partially the source of disinclination to "take the bull by the horns." In accordance with this hypothesis he instituted a side-effort of "community-boosting." A committee was formed to advocate community backing for a program to "attract new industry," and one of the committee tasks was to distribute to town merchants printed placards for window display. One town professional, who observed from his Main Street office a placard distributing group in its movements from store to store, commented sadly, "They moved up the street huddled together like a covey of frightened quail."

During the pulling and hauling of the organizing campaign, when management and the union battle to win adherents to their respective causes and to reduce the following of the opposition, variation in direction and degree of worker identification becomes apparent. Union organizers naturally show unflagging interest in how the "pro" and "anti" dichotomy is shaping up. They also indicate a keen sensitivity for appraising the quality of sentiment associated with each yes and no. Their appraisals are made in their own "house call" and office contacts and are also derived from the reports of union "activities." The problem is to win a sufficient proportion of "pros" whose adherence is of sufficient adhesion to "stick" at election time. The number of election petition, or "blue-card" signatures cannot be counted on as a reliable index of the vote to come. There have been elections with fewer union votes than petition signatures.

One closely calculating organizer worked out for me a seven-category classification of worker affiliation types that he considered helpful in conducting his campaign strategy. The seven categories he ordered to a continuum, the extremes of which were "active pro-

union" and "active pro-management." They are, as follows:

(1) The "actives" ("talk union and bring in signed petition cards").

(2) The "passive signers."

(3) Those who evince pro-union sentiments ("say that they intend to vote for the union in an election" but refuse to sign petition cards).

(4) The "indifferent" or "undecided."

(5) Those who show antiunion sentiments, but criticize the company. ("They have gripes, but the union is not acceptable as a 'way out.'")

(6) The "passive" pro-company people.

(7) The "active" antiunion people.

It is interesting to note that this organizer saw three subclassifications for categories 1 and 7:

Category 1: a) Those "actives" who are effective in their work for the union, b) those who achieve little in the way of results, and c) those whose efforts actually hurt the union drive.

Category 7: a) those "active antis" who are effective in their work against the union, b) those who achieve little in the way of results, and c) those whose efforts against the union actually help the organizing drive.

In their appraisals of the work force organizers have given the appellation "fence-rider" to those workers who are verbally pro-union, may have signed petition cards, but who are lukewarm in sentiment and fearful of engaging in even the milder forms of union activity. The "coming down to the wire" phase of the campaign brings these folk of doubtful conviction into special focus. Will their declaration of voting intention be carried to the polls? Will they make the necessary "X's" on E-Day? There appears to be many a slip "twixt cup and lip" for the organizers here, meaning that the promised "fence-rider"

vote can melt away between petition-card signing and election time.

During field observation of campaigns one gets reports of variation of interactional issues by departments and shifts within the mill, and these variations may be connected with distribution of worker types listed above. Organizers do make their vote-potential appraisals by department and shift, and in doing so show keen interest in reports of worker-supervisor relations. Such detailed appraising seems on the order of studying the battle terrain, sector by sector. For instance, the weave room on second shift may show a proportionately high pro-union sentiment, in the balance of "pros" and "antis," while the same weave room on first shift may show a balance in management's favor. It is interesting to note that there may be departmental "pockets" of close association, consensus and mutual service and affection in management-worker relations that seem to persist as vestiges of the old paternalistic order. Union organizers regard such pockets with exasperation and serious concern because they can be heavily productive of radiating antiunion influence as well as pro-management votes. The persistence of these tough-to-organize enclaves may be traced to interactional patterns developed and maintained by a subordinate "boss-man" who related to his employees in old-fashioned paternal fashion in contrast with the bureaucratic hustle and bustle going on elsewhere in the mill. In one such case that came to my attention, the "stretch-out" had swept past, or around, the department; union organizers said it hadn't "got there yet" and were waiting impatiently for its arrival, because members of this work unit showed nearly 100 per cent resistance to union facts and reasoning. It was related how the local bossman not only maintained an atmosphere marked by lack of work strain, but also joined

his subordinates, a group of women, in time-out for prayer meeting. In addition to fostering "prayer-breaks" he served as a sort of Dorothy Dix in an informal marriage counselling service. The organizing drive was called off before the "stretch-out" reached this department, if it ever did.

This variation of interactional patterns within the industrial organization, sometimes revealed by close examination, should check a too facile phase-labelling as pseudo-paternalistic or coercive. Patterns can change over time, during the course of a campaign, and the situation can show, at a given moment, marked "spatial" differentiation. When management behavior shows striking variation in regard to treatment of individuals, a first tentative explanation might point to a correlative variation in worker-union relations. One case in mind involved violations of a fairly standard rule against "sleeping on the job." One violator was a loom fixer who, after two decades of affiliation with the company, had shown pro-union sentiment during the course of an organizing campaign. The rules tightened on this man early one morning near the close of the graveyard shift when he took a smoke break. He sat in the smoking booth provided by the company, lit a cigarette, took a few puffs, and closed his eyes. He was immediately apprehended by an alert supervisor and was fired for sleeping on the job. Some weeks later, at a hearing conducted to decide the fixer's eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits, disposal of the case hinged on whether or not there had been even a momentary loss of consciousness when the smoker closed his eyes. At the same time, during the organizing campaign, another employee, who was impervious to union lures, would regularly stretch out each night on the mill floor to get his needed shut-eye. In doing so, he provided nightly amusement for the bossman, who, in the company of an appreciative audience of other workers, would arouse the sleeper with a loud wack of a board across the inviting soles of his feet. The fellow-workers would join the fun and games, on occasion, by dropping heavy objects on the floor beside the dozing worker.

III

The impediments to union growth in the South, as catalogued by Marshall and Barkin, add up to an impressive list of obstacles. It would appear that the cross reinforcement of these impediments would provide a weave strong enough to smother union hopes for winning organizing campaigns. It would seem, on paper, at least, that management has victory pretty well sewed up and that, while described conditions continue to persist, the campaign can be nothing more than an occasional ritual of defeat for the union. Yet campaigns have been won and continue to be won by labor unions, even textile unions, in the South. The sparring partner occasionally "hangs one" on the champ.

It is my belief—maybe I should call it an intuition, based on my own experience as an industrial worker as well as on my bit of campaign observation—that the many and various union handicaps discussed by Marshall and Barkin do not carry equal influence. That is an understatement. I think they carry great inequality of influence. And in this disparity of weight, the influences that I would call key, or critical, are the potentially manipulative ones. They provide perhaps rusty but oilable "pump handles," or "levers," to operate at "strategic points of intervention." I see as lesser influences those that the union can do little about.

In a nutshell, dimensionally speaking, the management-worker bond rests on power and the disservices that overwhelming power can distribute, rather than on consensus, association, and af-

fection. I am considering, in making this appraisal, the larger bureaucratic organizations, those of far "up" and far "out" management; the organizational trend, in Southern textiles, as elsewhere, is in this direction. An increasing reliance on the power bond is closely linked with an increasingly low worker-management dependency ratio that reflects a growing labor surplus. The problem of the union, in its attempt to establish and reinforce a worker-union bond sufficiently strong to secure campaign victory, lies primarily not in consensus, but in association. In view of the seven-category discrimination of worker groupings previously presented, this judgment calls for some amplification.

In the organizing campaign the union is truly faced with the task of organizing, of "socializing," a constituency large enough to win an NLRB election. Worker-union consensus on many matters connected with managerial injustices, with wages, work loads, job security, etc., can be established with a minimum of communication, in the distribution of leaflets at mill gates, for instance. But establishing ties of social interaction, or association, is a bird of another feather. Workers may fear the possible consequences of punishment for union activity, of communicating pro-union sentiments. They may fear to meet with each other, in any but the most trusted small groupings, to discuss the pros and cons of the forming of a local union. They may not dare to apply informal pressures on each other in the interests of instituting such a local union. And, in order to withstand antiunion pressure during the campaign, those who start with pro-union attitudes or who are susceptible to pro-union pressures, must find strength in each other through communication. Worker cohesion under indigenous leadership would have to

be developed, under present conditions of campaign stress, if the union is to win on election day. The scattered, unsocialized mass, though seemingly a pro-union bloc in the counting of petition cards, can melt away under ever-heightening antiunion pressures.

Each campaign that I have observed, or heard about, had its group of pro-union "actives." Each campaign also had its large "middle group" of "fence-riders," workers who vary in their attitudes toward the union from a cautious card-signing "pro" to "indifference." The middle group forms a large body of the disaffected, in relations with management, but also a large body of the scared. Can the pro-union actives organize and hold them, or will they finally respond to pressures from the other direction? Who will dare to communicate with whom, to tip the balance which way? According to Seidman, London and Karsh, "Often the decision to join a union is not based on logical reasoning in which self-interest figures to a great degree, but upon expediency —a reaction to the pressures of the moment."[32]

I am inclined to give a heavy weighting to Barkin's "internal" impediment in the union's organizing techniques. Since coercive management, by firing workers for union activity, blocks associational processes, the union, to come up with the necessary majority on election day must (a) find a way to develop worker cohesion under conditions of fear, or ,b) to find a way to reduce the conditions that produce fear in the first place. Attention to the latter might involve application of co-ordinated union political pressure on a national scale to secure adequate enforcement, possibly redefinition, of codes of "unfair labor practice."

I have encountered these fear situations in my attempts at house-to-house

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[32] Joel Seidman, Jack London, and Bernard Karsh, "Why Workers Join Unions," *The*

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1951, p. 84.

interviewing of textile workers when organizing campaigns were in progress. In some situations, I would label it "crawling fear," with worker communication remindful of what I have read about European "undergrounds." One of my research efforts was designed as a sort of Katz and Lazarsfeld "impact analysis."[33] With my respondents refusing to indicate their union orientations and molding influences thereof, the only "impact" I could show for my pains was that of fear upon my study. I found, in contrast to the experience of another sociologist, who reported an easy time of it at interviewing American Indians, that in organizing campaign studies it isn't just a matter of knocking on the teepees and presenting a questionnaire.

During one campaign I was introduced to workers house-to-house by an organizer who gave assurance that I was "really from Duke" and was "just making a study." When I called a second time at the home of one worker, who had spoken frankly of pro-union sentiments a few weeks before, I was greeted with the remark, "I shook for three days after you left. The thought struck me that maybe you had the organizer fooled."

The main organizing obstacle in the South, from the union point of view, is worker fear. Organizers are going to have to counter this fear, because they are going to continue to meet with it. Under the pressure of the organizing campaign "pseudo-paternalism" shifts into "coercive relations," because the former becomes ineffective. The "human relations" programs of the manipulative variety so common to modern bureaucracy can and do boomerang. Coercion turns out to be the last line of defense. For one thing, not enough workers of the blue collar variety, including Southern millworkers, believe in the sincerity

of these programs. Personnel managers, I have found, don't fare much better than "efficiency experts" in worker evaluation. From my own experience I know that unwitting slips in nonverbal and action communication wipe out the verbal gains, if any, and that the discovered discrepancy between word and deed breeds strong resentment. The only sure way for management to hold off unions is by application of the "Real McCoy," either in the form of genuine paternalism of the Uncle Ben type, or in the form of some genuinely participative system, say on the order of a Scanlon Plan,[34] where workers share in the decisions and the take. I don't think that Uncle Ben is on his way back, nor is there much more likelihood of any near-future institution of democratic social processes in the main body of our industrial organizations.

Those impediments to organizing success for the union that I would classify as "lesser" would include the influence of such management aides as the church, business and professional groups mentioned by Barkin. The union's attempts to encourage the development of favorable attitudes within these middle class components of community life seem to stick on the horns of a worrisome dilemma: What loss in worker support would result from a weakening of practical and eschatological appeal in order to win a nod of acceptance from, at least to neutralize, a segment of the community's influential and "respectable?" Such attempts at campaign time to bridge the "we and they" line that bisects our industrial communities seems not only not vitally necessary, but also futile. They can be, however, when one is in a pensive mood, somewhat touching. It is as if it were the union officialdom that yearns for

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[33] Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955).

[34] Frederick G. Lesieur (Ed.), *The Scanlon Plan* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958).

acceptance in middle class circles. Only when they become organized, and then enter into participation in community affairs as a group, led by their own leaders, can industrial workers gain the serious attention of other components of the community social structure. Even then, this gaining of attention will not be integration in the sense of social acceptance; it will be a matter of civil rights, of citizenship, or impersonal participation in community power.

In regard to two other impediments listed by Barkin, a) the "sullied image of the union, resulting from exposure of corruption, and b) withdrawal of support from "a liberal, intellectual middle class," these obstacles may be of importance through their influence on labor legislation and on national administrative agencies that deal with labor matters. And labor law and NLRB policy do affect campaign outcome through their bearing on union and management tactics having to do with diminution or augmentation of worker fears. At the community level, however, sullied union image and lack of support from intellectuals seem to be much closer in their relationship with each other than with worker attitude toward unions. As far as union image is concerned, it is strength or weakness that counts most with workers. To my surprise, my Bible Belt respondents took an insouciant view of the reputed peculations of Teamster Union officials. And as for the intellectuals in Southern communities, afflicted with the disease that Floyd Hunter calls "professional schizophrenia,"[35] they seem to be in need of help themselves.

The union image is, of course, of perennial interest to management and other groups on the Southern scene who try to build a bogey about as photogenic as evil-eyed Balor and his fellow deep-sea demons of Gaelic mythology.[36] If these campfire stories take the intended effect, it would seem that worker-union consensus over wages and work load would be pretty well neutralized. While I would not go so far as to claim that the "formula," as Meisel would term it,[37] is becoming dated, that faith in its principles is getting shaky, I would relegate race, religion, political heresy and out-group infiltration to my category of lesser influence. Myths, ghosts, phantom reference groups, pictures in our heads, and other esoterica of slippery denotability and uncertain location may be still very much with us, but they fall far short of accounting for management's high batting average in Southern organizing campaigns. Many Southern millhands of my acquaintance aren't at all jumpy about carpet-baggers; they take their religion on Sunday, and don't believe that the middle classes have much of it, if any; they can compartmentalize their racial and economic views just as British workers can distinguish their economic from their political identifications and affiliations, according to Shanks.[38] They can vote for Pitchfork George on Tuesday and vote for CIO local on Wednesday. Unions have their myths, too, of course.

It is true that the union movement has experienced impressive growth during periods of great labor surplus. I am thinking of our massive unemployment of the 1930s. However, union growth

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[35] Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953), p. 237.

[36] For an interesting description of the Fomors, monsters of the sea and darkness, see Charles Squire, *Celtic Myth and Legend* (London: The Gresham Publishing Company), pp. 48-49.

[37] James M. Meisel, *The Myth of the Ruling Class* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 196), p. 384.

[38] Michael Shanks, *The Stagnant Society* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961).

during the depression took place under especially favorable political circumstances, and I shall have to give the labor market factor heavy weighting as an influence on the outcome of Southern organizing campaigns. I have already commented on the close connection between labor surplus and worker fear of being fired for union activity. With various predictions as to the coming impact of automation on the labor market in mind,[39] I shall conclude this discussion with the judgment that time is running against the unions in their attempt to organize the South. If they don't win worker affiliation within the immediate future, an organized South may turn out to be just an interesting blueprint for storage in the archives of history.

[The End]

The Process of Unionization in the South

By TONY ZIVALICH

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IN HIS BRILLIANT TALK yesterday Professor Williams gave us an accurate and comprehensive view of the region known as "the South." His remarks about the reasons for plants moving South—accessibility to new markets, reduction of transportation costs, cheaper labor, lower taxes, evasion of collective bargaining obligations—are true.

In addition, our studies indicate that the South is an area where many Northern companies are experimenting with their latest automated equipment. There are several advantages to this approach. Most areas in the South are anxious to have an industry move in. If an automated plant lives up to its expectations, the company has another lever when bargaining with the union representing the employees in its home plant; and also, it eliminates, for practical purposes, the possibility of some snoopy reporter doing a series of articles about how company A, with its new highly automated plant will soon lay off X number of people who have become unnecessary in its new operation. In the distribution field, it is not unusual for a company to build a huge warehouse, with tow lines, electronic tabulating, king-size tow motors, palletizers, and employ only 10 men, whereas in older warehouses 150 men might handle the same amount of goods.

My remarks today are based upon five years' practical experience of organizing in the State of Georgia for Teamsters Local Union 728. Local 728 is headed by R. C. Cook who has been President for some 12 years. Its main office is in Atlanta, with a sub-office in Macon, Georgia, and another in Savannah, Georgia. Our jurisdiction encompasses the entire state.

Atlanta is an expanding, booming town. In one sense, it is not typical of the South as a whole, but it certainly is an indicator of the possibilities and potentialities inherent in this section of America. Anyone who lives in Atlanta for a period of time sounds like a Chamber of Commerce

[39] See, for example, Gerard Piel, *Consumers of Abundance* (Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1961).

commercial when talking to anyone else. As a Teamster Organizer this can be a serious set-back; but, seriously, it has a wonderful climate and the people there have a fine spirit of doing things.

Increase in Construction and Service Industries

In addition to private industry, the advent of space installations throughout the South created many jobs and relocated many workers. This, in turn, resulted in a marked increase in the various construction and service industries.

At nearly every labor convention, a delegate from Iowa or Michigan makes a committee report to the convention over the loss of membership in various local unions because of the Southern exodus and how this has sapped their bargaining power, etc. The delegates are indignant, motions are made to back up resolutions, and the convention report has several pages of the new old theme "we are going to organize the South immediately." X number of dollars are allocated for this purpose.

But, very little happens. The South is still unorganized. The situation gets worse. Numerically, the unions have less of a percentage of the entire work force organized. Even though the Teamsters are the most successful in organizing, including the South, not enough, in my opinion, is being done.

Can the South Be Organized?

Can the South be organized? Professor Roy certainly is right—the South can be organized. He seems a bit pessimistic from his experience, and believes it can be organized if someone finds the right key. I don't share his view that this is all that is needed as there isn't any panacea, but I believe it can be done.

Will the South be organized? Probably not to the degree that is desired.

Can it be organized? Yes! First of all, there's a real need. In Georgia, 13.7 per cent of eligible workers are in unions. The need to have a voice in your affairs is a universal need. Paternalism has to go. Even in primitive countries people are tired of being *told* when to go to work, when to go to bed, what to do. Suppose President Johnson announced in his speech tomorrow night at Knoxville that there will be no more elections in America, and that he would appoint all representatives, governors, city officials, henceforth. What would happen? My guess is that even the high caliber people present at this meeting would go home, resurrect their souvenirs from World War II, oil their shotguns and a march to Washington would be the order of the day. The supposition seems out of order, and a real affront to a civilized democratic society. Yet, every day, Monday through Friday, and sometimes on Saturday and Sunday, the majority of workers go to work and haven't a damn thing to say about their wages, hours or working conditions. This has to chafe against a person's dignity, and it does. It is a psychological necessity to have a voice in your economic life.

Secondly, there is an economic need. When a man leaves the farm and moves to the factory, his earnings seem like big money. His wife takes a job. They get a place to rent. His wife gets pregnant. Soon two or three children have to be fed, clothed and sheltered. The wife no longer works. Soon the illusion vanishes. Fifty or sixty dollars a week isn't enough to raise a family decently. The BLS puts out all kinds of facts and figures about Atlanta being number four in the country in the cost-of-living in-

dex. When the first garnishment hits him, he becomes aware of his economic needs. Although these needs are present, the unions haven't been able to convince the majority of workers of the solution to these needs.

Definition of Union Organizing

Union organizing is nothing but the selling of intangibles. If you ask a union organizer what he is selling, he can't tell you; that's how intangible it is.

Seriously, in organizing you must be able to communicate to a worker the idea that he, collectively with his fellow workers, can better his economic life if they assume the responsibility of exercising their right to organize. This is basically what unions are about.

The notion that an organizer can go into a campaign and tell the workers, "I can get you 28¢ an hour, and we can do this, and we can do that if you vote the union in," is utter nonsense. An organizer with this approach will fall flat on his face in a short period of time.

If an organizer promised 28¢ an hour, and was successful in getting a 26¢ an hour increase, the people, particularly in the South, would go to their graves believing that the organizer received 1¢ of the difference, the employer 1¢, and that they were shortchanged.

In addition, there is sufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that the South can be organized. As examples, the IUD with their saturation campaign in South Carolina have done a very good job. They have organized some plants that three years ago people thought couldn't be organized. Unfortunately, or fortunately, depending on your point of view, they've expended a great deal of money and energy concentrating on one particular textile chain, the J. P. Stevens Company. A hearing set for May 11 which, from all reports, should get the campaign into high gear. This will be a tremendous success. Mike Bothello and the textile organizers have organized some mills in northern Georgia which were considered impossible. John Marler and the Lithographers have doubled their membership in Atlanta in the last four years. The Retail Clerks and the Meatcutters have considerable increases in their membership the last three years.

And to be subjective, 12 years ago my own Local had 1500 members. Five years ago it had 5,000 members. Today it has over 9,000 members. In the last five years, the largest group organized had slightly less than 300 people. If 50 people are in a shop which we organize, it is considered a fair-sized plant. Most times the unit will be 15 to 20 workers.

Basing a conclusion on these facts, it is plain that the South can be organized.

Methods of Organizing

I have been asked by Eric Polisar, the Chairman, to explain from practical experience our methods of organizing, including meeting resistance from various groups, reasons for our success, competitive unionism, and an opinion as to what needs to be done to finish the task of organizing the South.

Our organizing is now a booming business. We haven't made a house call in three years. Not that we don't believe in house calls, but there isn't the time for individual organizing. If people are desirous of organization, they call us. We arrange for a meeting, usually at the hall. (Actually we have an edge over other unions. Our drivers go in and out of every plant. They are our best salesmen. Most drivers are the best paid working people in the community.

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People approach the drivers and the drivers refer them to us.)

When the group comes to the hall, we check the company, number of workers eligible, type of work, etc. We always ask "Why pick the Teamsters?" What Professor Roy says is unfortunately true, that the first reason given is the strength of the Teamsters. Expecting "ideals" to be the motivating factor for attraction to any union would leave one disappointed. If at this meeting we find that this is a machine shop, and we feel the Machinists can do a better job, we refer them to the Machinists and make the connection. The same with Bakery Workers, Lithographers, Meatcutters, and other unions that we get along with, and we get along with most of them. Sometimes, the workers object to this because of an unpleasant experience in the past, or an unsuccessful campaign by another union, or because their minds are made up. If this is the case, we say "O. K. If we engage in a campaign and are successful and you care to switch allegiance later to another International, we'll arrange it." We mean this.

The Teamsters have enough organizing to do in our own theoretical jurisdiction. Those 58 warehouses that have been built in Atlanta in the last four years aren't all organized yet. (Our actual jurisdiction is anyone unorganized.)

Assuming that these workers wish to be organized by us, we then proceed to the business at hand. We evaluate, from questioning them, their enthusiasm and whether or not an election could be won if the campaign is undertaken. Having Professor Roy's evaluating system to help on this would be very helpful. Nevertheless, organizers are supposed to be like bloodhounds. From talking to just a few men, organizers are expected to have the complete picture of the plant, its employees, the physical layout and working conditions.

Once we determine an election can be won, we do some research. The ultimate criterion is to analyze whether or not we could win a strike against the particular company. Elections are much easier to win than strikes down South. We must be reasonably certain that once an election is won we have the economic leverage at our disposal to put us on an equal footing with the employer. In theory, once an election is won and the union becomes certified, the federal law compels the employer to "bargain in good faith." Our experience shows that most companies are advised by their attorneys that as long as they agree to meet in negotiations, this passes the minimum requirements of "bargaining in good faith." If our analysis indicates difficulty in our ability to force a fair settlement, we will so advise the men and explain the risks involved.

Our organization doesn't believe in going through with an election just to have an election. On occasion, if the boss has bought off some of the key men, we will withdraw our petition and tentatively arrange with the men to make another attempt in six months. In this manner, it becomes very expensive for an employer to have us looking down his throat twice a year.

Antiunionism in Georgia

The power structure and the reaction to the Teamsters varies throughout Georgia. In general, it is fair to say that the *Chambers of Commerce are anti-union.* The Georgia Chamber of Commerce was good enough to distribute to their membership a booklet titled "Preventive Unionitis." To illustrate the mendacity of this knowledgeable organization, on the one hand they issue statements recommending that their member companies, particularly restaurants, hotels and the like, shift gears with the times and integrate their establishments. On the other hand, they remind the companies to utilize the race question in

their booklet by advising their readers to be sure to point out to their unorganized employees that the unions are and have been supporters of Negro rights, especially in the recent controversial school issue.

It is safe to say that the establishments hate unions with a passion, the Teamsters with a purple passion, and probably Labor Board agents as representatives of the federal government with a triple purple passion.

For example, the Butchers held an election in Monroe, Georgia, which is a quiet town with elms, dogwood trees, very little industry and no unions. The day of the election every city policeman and county patrolman was on hand to greet the Board Agent and the union observers. The psychological impact on the workers was predictable enough—shades of the Gestapo. Usually in the smaller towns, organizing campaigns result in front page editorials of the local papers where the union is epitomized as an agent of the devil. It's common knowledge that various ministers will be recruited to warn the wives and members of the inherent evils that unions bring about. In numerous cases, the bankers counsel with the most active union-minded worker to remind him of the precariousness of his financial position and the choke-hold that could be utilized against him. Race-baiting is a part of nearly every campaign. Poor Jim Carey. I've seen a picture of him many times and always he is dancing with a hefty colored lady on a trip he made to Africa years ago. On occasion, the White Citizens Councils feel they have something at stake and attempt to intervene, but they are easily disposed of.

Our only weapon against this type of reaction is to forewarn the people of its inevitability and then ride it out. The same thing actually goes on in many rural areas of the North, only it's a little more sophisticated.

The reasons that the Teamsters are relatively successful in the South are easily stated. First, we have plenty of free advertising. No matter how deep in the hills you go, everyone knows Jim Hoffa and the Teamsters. I tell a story and it's true. A number of people were asked why they contacted us for organization. Some replied they never heard of any other unions. Others said they couldn't think of any other union, and some even said that they dialed information, asked the number of the union, and the operator (who probably belonged to the CWA) referred them to us.

Secondly, and although seemingly a paradox, it is quite true. Our union does not equivocate or pussyfoot on the race question. On the job and at the hall all members are union brothers. There are no ifs, ands or buts. We don't need and we don't want anyone in our organization who cannot see the necessity and the logic of our position. It would be lovely if I could state that none of our members has bigotry in their hearts, but it would be a lie. However, I can say that the leadership of the International and our Local tolerates no nonsense on this issue. It is our sincere hope, of course, that by working together on the job and at the union meetings, all workers will get to know each other as individuals. Our experience shows that this is paramount, or you really don't have a union. Many examples can be given to confirm this.

Thirdly, we work harder than most unions. Maybe it's a reaction to our notoriety or maybe it's because there is so much pressure on us that the weak sisters have fallen by the wayside, but the Teamsters hustle.

Conclusion

What is needed to do an effective job of organizing the South.

This is all in my personal opinion:

(1) Money.

(2) More trained organizers. (Not apprentices, porkchoppers, or political refugees.)

(3) Assignment to a particular area. (Workers want you to be a member of the community.)

(4) Development of "Native Clergy." Too many times potentially good organizers are not recruited by their respective Internationals. I believe there is plenty of talent in the ranks of labor's Southern membership. Men should be recruited, trained in other parts of the country with some old-timers, and assigned as organizers in their home areas. In addition, they should remain apolitical of local union politics and be paid the same wages as organizers in the North.

(5) More trained technicians, economists, public relations men, and a closer alliance with the academic world to keep abreast of the latest developments.

(6) Closer cooperation of all unions in any struggle with any employer by any union. Any other course is contrary to the principles of trade unionism.

(7) A definite push by all International Unions to compel, if necessary, their Southern locals to cooperate with organizations promoting civil liberties and civil rights. (I may mention that the City of Birmingham is largely a union town, but the leadership has been racist, as has the biggest company that dominates the area.)

(8) A divorce from the archaic practice of automatically endorsing any Democratic nominee for any political office. It's about time the unions weren't beholden to one party. This has minimized any bargaining power we have had to put pressure for legislation to meet social needs.

(9) Plain work—*hard* work.

Will it be done? I said probably not, but it's a wonderful challenge, and the climate is beautiful.

Possibly because of being in the Bible Belt for so long, I will close by saying "the harvest is ripe, the laborers are few." **[The End]**

IRRA MEETING SITES SELECTED

The IRRA's Annual Meeting on Monday and Tuesday, December 28 and 29, 1964, will be held at the Palmer House Hotel in Chicago, Illinois. Plans for the program now nearing completion are being arranged by Solomon Barkin, IRRA President. Four of the meetings at this conference will have industrial relations in 1975 as their theme. Local arrangements are being handled by members of the Chicago Chapter with Lee C. Shaw as chairman.

The 1965 Spring Meeting, scheduled for Monday and Tuesday, May 3 and 4, will be held in Buffalo, New York with President-elect planning the program and with Professors Joseph Shister and Alton Bartlett and other members of the university of Buffalo Chapter handling the local arrangements.

The Impact of Race Relations on Industrial Relations in the South

By JOHN H. WHEELER

President, Mechanics and Farmers Bank, Durham, North Carolina;
Member, President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity

PERHAPS WE CAN AGREE at the beginning of this discussion that any assessment, present or future, of the impact of race relations upon the rate of industrial expansion in the southern states, should seldom if ever be prefaced by the convenient and overworked technique of saying to ourselves that "all other things being equal" we may proceed to establish certain conclusions or predictions either with reference to the direction in which the South is moving or with reference to its rate of growth. The obvious reason for this arises from an almost universal recognition of the fact that in the South "things simply are not equal" to prevailing customs and practices in other regions of the United States.

In terms of massive shifts of population from rural to urban areas, separate educational facilities and curricula, trade union practices, state and federal hiring policies, declared public policy of the several states, the administration of state programs supported by federal grants-in-aid, and marked differences in the median family and individual incomes of whites and nonwhites, the South does indeed exhibit sharp differences in degree and purpose from other parts of the country. These differences exist, however in an equally unique setting in which the white South appears to have a remarkable capacity for accepting those changes from which there can be no escape through further delay or avoidance. Hopefully, this latter characteristic indicates that we may be on the verge of an entirely new and vigorous drive by Southerners to remove the thorns of conscience, the schizophrenia, and the fictions with which the Southern leadership, both Negro and white, has had to live in the past. At the same time, it should be recognized that instead of being the result of farsighted efforts to achieve an open society in the South, recent progress along racial lines has, for the most part, been achieved in direct response to each new wave of militant but nonviolent demonstrations. It should also be recognized that all too often the South has unwittingly become accustomed to measure progress in race relations in terms of the extent to which it has yielded to those pressures which could not be resisted without immediate and more serious harm to an established way of life.

Population Shifts in the South

To say that Southern leadership has waited much too long to begin the process of research and planning for the future development

of the region would not be in keeping with the well-known record of inquiry carried on by Southerners charged with the responsibility of strengthening the economic, moral and intellectual fabric of the South. Immediately after World War I, numerous studies were undertaken with a view toward making the most of technological advances spurred by the inventions and new processes developed under the pressure of war. In rapid succession, the collapse of cotton and tobacco prices and their accompanying systems of tenancy constituted a challenge which we attempted to meet with new techniques of cultivation and harvesting, and with research permitting more diversified farming and the development of markets designed to facilitate the manufacture of new products. This was especially true with respect to the manufacture of synthetic fibres and plastics from soy beans and peanuts.

It was not long, however, before roadblocks to effective planning began to appear. While recognizing in 1940 that within 10 years three of every four farm hands would not be needed in the farming process, the several planning conferences sponsored by the Committee for the South found themselves unable to bridge racial barriers as they sought to plan effective use of the manpower potential of large numbers of displaced Negro farm workers who would be moving into Southern urban areas. Planning for those left on the farm also constituted a problem because the training facilities for efficient farm management were for the most part concentrated in the all white universities and training centers at the secondary level.

Because of rigid racial segregation policies practiced by all the southern states and supported by a myriad of state and local statutes enforced with various degrees of harshness, it was at this point that the planners who foresaw

the development of a highly urban and industrialized South could do no better than dismiss the whole matter of preparing Negroes for an effective role in the South of the future with a blanket and poorly defined decision that their manpower role would be limited to employment as marginal unskilled and semi-skilled workers and as workers in the service categories of employment.

Vivien W. Henderson, Chairman of the Department of Economics at Fisk University, who is serving currently as a visiting professor at North Carolina State College of the University of North Carolina at Raleigh, cites figures compiled by the United States Department of Commerce which indicate that "there has not been a large penetration of Negroes in the growth sectors of employment" and "those industries and occupations where the Negro gained in employment (between 1950 and 1960) represent the slow growth areas of the economy and the labor market." In a recent study, Dr. Henderson also cites United States Census statistics indicating that 73.9 per cent of the entire labor force of Negroes in 17 southern states and the District of Columbia is concentrated in the semi-skilled and service categories of employment as follows:

	Per cent
Semi-skilled workers	16.8
Private household workers	18.3
Service workers	15.9
Farm laborers	8.8
Laborers	14.1
	73.9

Although the percentage of United States Negroes living in the South decreased from 77 per cent in 1940 to 51 per cent in 1960, the vast majority of those who remain have tended to move into the cities. By 1960 three-fourths of the Negro population of Florida were urban dwellers and the proportion in

Kentucky and Tennessee was almost as high. Between 1950 and 1960, the number of whites in central cities of the South increased only 26 per cent in comparison with a 37 per cent increase in the number of Negroes in the same cities. Today 72 per cent of the South's Negro population lives in urban areas. In like manner, it follows that the influx of large numbers of untrained and poorly equipped Negroes into the cities of other regions presents, for those cities, many problems which represent an overflow of the South's resistance to adequate planning.

Against such a background of indifference and resistance to social change, it is no wonder that the entire nation is faced with highly explosive problems of race stemming from long and cumulative resistance to change on the part of whites, and an equally long and frustrating effort by nonwhites to make themselves an integral part of the economic and political life of the nation. Without question, one of the major obstacles to progress in industrial relations in the South lies in the concentration of poverty and blight in our major cities, a condition which can be traced directly to the South's failure more than 40 years ago to cut across racial lines and local custom in its planning for future growth. It should be noted also that today's problems cannot be attributed to a sudden breakdown of social restraint. Instead, the seeds of today's revolt which were sown many years ago, have in fact never ceased to be cultivated and nurtured carefully by the gatekeepers of empty traditions of racial superiority over, and exploitation of, the South's Negro population.

Trade Union Practices

Prior to World War II, efforts of the Southern Negro to establish a foothold in Southern as well as some Northern based industries were met consistently by strong opposition from industrial management and the organized labor movement, the strongest union opposition having come from craft unions of the American Federation of Labor such as the International Machinists and the Boilermakers. Prior to 1944, their opposition was particularly effective in all parts of the country in excluding Negroes from their jurisdictions. In the South, however, their effort to exclude Negroes from membership, from skilled employment, and from training and apprenticeship programs was almost 100 per cent effective, the only exceptions being in those instances where the South's own resistance to the organized labor movement provided an opportunity for Negro artisans in the building and related trades to continue their work based upon family apprenticeships and the formal training provided by Hampton Institute in Virginia and Tuskegee Institute in Alabama.

Much credit is due the federal government for providing strong leadership in opposition to discriminatory policies of organized labor and industrial management. We note with some chagrin, however, that the federal government's first positive step toward elimination of racial discrimination in employment was taken in 1941 by Franklin D. Roosevelt who signed (Order No. 8802 creating the first Fair Employment Practice Commission) after the breakdown of long and bitter negotiations with Negro leaders, and under the pressure of a march on Washington by approximately 10,000 Negroes led by A. Phillip Randolph. Since that time approximately 30 states and 40 major cities have enacted statutes and ordinances designed to remove racial barriers to freedom of movement and full access to training and job opportunities, but up to now, no *Southern state* nor any Southern city (exemptions—El Paso, Kansas City) has enacted statutes or ordinances which seek to guarantee free access to public accommodations, the housing market or

the job market. By the same token, federal regulations having to do with elimination of racial barriers to employment, training facilities, the housing market, and certain facilities operated by the states themselves have, for the most part, met stern opposition and attempts at avoidance.

During the early 1940s the rise of industrial unionism established a new basis of job security for Negroes largely because increased union activity was centered in the blue collar, semiskilled, and unskilled categories of employment. On the plus side of the picture, it should be noted that acceptance of Negro workers in industry became less difficult because between 1940 and 1960 the rapid growth of our economy resulted in a net increase of approximately 19 million jobs in the country as a whole. Here again the South was unable to furnish adequate leadership with which to take advantage of another opportunity to make full use of the manpower potential of its large Negro population. On the negative side, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) before its merger with the American Federation of Labor lost much of its foothold in Southern textile plants because of its liberal racial policies established under the guidance of John L. Lewis and Walter Reuther. Correspondingly, the managements of many textile mills were, and still are accused of continuing efforts to excite Southern white workers to revolt against any union which follows nondiscriminatory racial policies with reference to membership, upgrading, rates of pay, apprenticeships and training programs.

It is noteworthy that the textile industry was successful in obtaining exemption from compliance with the hiring standards required by the Eisenhower Committee on government contracts and although not exempt from the requirements of Order No. 10925 issued

by President Kennedy, the industry still has little, if anything, to show in the matter of compliance with the hiring, recruiting and promotion policies prescribed in early 1961 by Order No. 10925.

In spite of formal agreements to eliminate racial discrimination in their own ranks and in spite of the fact that these agreements have been signed voluntarily with the President of the United States by almost all of the International Unions of AFL-CIO, organized labor in most of the South maintains much the same position as it has held in the past. The establishment of new policies on racial matters at the national level has not been honored by many local units because their members still have strong views of an entirely different nature. In some instances, this results in exclusion of Negro members from local unions. In others such as the tobacco industry, the white segregated locals (whose membership lists are overwhelmingly larger than those of the Negro locals) are moving to take over the Negro locals in order to prevent them from filing complaints with the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. Wherever this operation has been successfully engineered, the Negro members are outnumbered and are no longer in position to fight their cause because their treasuries and their bargaining rights have been taken over by the white locals, leaving them (Negro members) without representation as officers of the local or as members of the negotiating, grievance or shop committees.

In more than one instance, it has been charged that the International Union has exerted extreme pressure to eliminate (not merge) the Negro local while at the same time trying to shut off protests of discrimination by Negro workers. When one considers that in at least one large cigarette manufac-

turing center, several officers of the formerly all-white locals are at the same time said to be officers of the White Citizens Councils, we may have reason to fear that Negro workers will be eliminated rapidly from these plants and that their loss of seniority rights and exclusion from the skilled categories of employment will not be aggrieved through any affirmative action on the part of a union dominated by arch segregationists.

Unequal Educational Facilities and Curricula

To the trained observer much more than meets the eye lies behind the South's massive resistance to school integration. High on the list of "sacred" trusts embraced by Southern school boards and their administrative personnel is what they consider to be their "duty" to avoid giving Negro pupils the kind of education which will enable them to compete for jobs and positions in the higher paying categories. Dr. Vivien W. Henderson, Visiting Professor at North Carolina State College, states that "generally vocational training available to Negroes is limited mainly to those occupations in which they have traditionally found employment; . . . some of these (categories) are becoming obsolete and are in those areas where Negroes provide services to Negroes, such as barbering. Technical courses in electronics and tool design, the apprenticeable trades such as plumbing, steam fitting, sheet metal work, blue print reading, and welding are usually not available to Negroes."

"Contrasts between programs (designed) to develop white and Negro manpower can be seen by the course offerings of three Southern metropolitan school systems: Atlanta, Houston and Nashville." A detailed comparison of courses offered by the public schools of these cities is much too long to present in this paper, but it is sufficient to say here that the pattern established by them is typical, if not much more advantageous for Negro students than opportunities for training afforded Negroes in the typical Southern city or county system. It is in this respect that the South has allowed itself to become entrapped by adherence to what has turned out to be an extremely unsound educational theory when applied to the problems of the region, to wit: *jobs in the crafts and technical areas as well as in sales, clerical and other white collar positions are not generally open to Negroes, therefore training of this kind is to be avoided because it is costly and useless.*

Even the limited extent to which Southern industry finds itself prepared to employ qualified persons regardless of race has already created job opportunities far in excess of the available supply of competent young Negroes who have been able to survive an educational process which with deliberation has been designed to be inferior and noncompetitive with the quality of training provided in the white schools. Racial demonstrations, undeniably a strategy of last resort, have in recent months brought into sharp focus, the serious lack of statesmanship and vision which has characterized the South's educational leadership since the turn of the century and today's voices of so-called moderation give little hope that we have come to recognize the Frankenstein which our lethargy and indecision have created for us.

Little room remains for doubt that extraordinary and immediate measures are required if we are to avoid multiplication of the numerous barriers which already stand in the way of the kind of industrial and economic growth which the South deserves. Typical of our "head in the sand" enthusiasm is the spectacle of Atlanta's leadership bragging to the rest of the nation of the admission of 45 Negro pupils to formerly all-white schools in a system whose

enrollment is in excess of 40,000 students or the City of Charlotte in North Carolina gloating over the fact that its school problem has been solved because slightly more than 400 Negro pupils are now exposed to an integrated school experience, when as a matter of fact, approximately 400 of these (Negro) pupils are in a formerly white school which was abandoned by all but 9 of the white pupils.

State and Federal Hiring Policies

Since 1933, the federal government has compiled an enviable record of progress and constant upgrading of its concept of full utilization of the manpower talents of Negroes. Although Roosevelt's "Black Cabinet" of highly trained and energetic young Negro advisors on matters of race represented a departure from the prevailing custom, it was infinitesimal by comparison with the thousands of well-trained and competent Negroes who now hold responsible and authoritative policy-making positions in the present administration. It is also infinitesimal in comparison with the vast numbers of Negro personnel who are established in the higher grades of government employment under Civil Service.

In contrast, no Southern state has ventured to employ Negroes in important positions of authority except in those instances where their supervisory duties are limited to segregated Negro units or areas of employment.

Declared Public Policy of the State

So far as we have been able to determine, the declared public policy of every Southern state continues to be one of segregation of the races in the schools and in all places of public accommodations which are not covered by orders issued by federal courts to desegregate. Even where the Supreme Court of the

United States has handed down decisions rendering state segregation statutes and policies of operation invalid, the attorneys general of the several states have been silent in response to requests for rulings which would *have to* declare these statutes and/or policies to be in violation of the federal constitution. (Exception: local and state rulings—re: *State v. Avent,*[1] where decision regarding segregation of public accommodations or facilities, municipalities were advised to repeal all statutes requiring separate toilet facilities and separate eating facilities in the hope that convictions obtained against persons participating in racial demonstrations and found to be guilty under the states trespass laws may have a better chance of being upheld by the United States Supreme Court.)

Administration of State Programs Supported by Grants-in-Aid

For the sake of brevity, it should be sufficient for us to point out that agencies such as the Federal Employment Security Commissions operated by the several states under supervision of the United States Department of Labor and supported almost entirely by federal appropriations have played a major role in designing ingenious methods of restricting Negro employment opportunities to the service and common labor categories unless specifically requested to do otherwise by local industry. It is in this area that the greatest urgency exists for complete reversal of policy before significant progress can be made in the matter of discovery and placement of Negro workers in positions for which they have a potential. Up to now, the several Southern states have consistently taken the position that funds received for operation of these commissions are grants-in-aid over which the federal government has little more than

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[1] 373 U. S. 375 (1963).

advisory powers. If provisions of the pending Civil Rights Bill designed to give the federal government more power to regulate discriminatory practices of this nature are enacted by the Congress, adequate means will have been found to remove the barriers presented by present policies of operation of these agencies. If, however, these provisions are not approved by the Congress, a court test of the question of federal power to regulate certain facets of state programs supported by grants-in-aid looms as one of the first orders of business in any program designed to meet the serious challenge for rapid change in the employment policies pursued by local industry and the agencies of the several states.

With respect to vocational and industrial programs of education in public schools, administered by the states and financed in whole or in part with federal funds, the Southern states follow an equally rigid policy of restricting the output of Negroes equipped with special skills in the higher classifications of employment. In many instances, these programs are operated by old line craft union men who earned a union card during the period when to work with Negroes, or to teach them, or to advocate their admission to union membership would have meant the loss of their own union cards.

To perceptive observers of the South's stratagem and techniques of evasion there should be nothing new or startling in our conclusion that the white South has for years been at its nefarious best in devising means by which it makes effective use of the doctrine of interposition by substituting its own authority and programs for the original design and purpose of federal programs supported by grants-in-aid to the states.

Standing alone, the recent enactment of right-to-work laws by almost all of the Southern states indicates clearly that the South's climate of opinion and its concepts are far from the standards necessary for full and unhampered industrial growth.

Looking again at the positive forces at work in this area, we note that several extremely encouraging projects leading to wider opportunities for gainful employment of Negroes have begun to make an open and significant impact upon the climate of opinion and the need for making full use of the South's manpower potential. The North Carolina Good Neighbor Council and the recent order issued by Kentucky's governor represent the best known and most effective action to be undertaken recently by Southern governors. These projects, however, are at best only plumb lines which test the depth of resistance to change while at the same time giving those who desire to take bold new steps an opportunity to do so with the moral support of responsible and strong segments of society.

Differences in Incomes by Race

Statistics developed by the United States Department of Commerce showing differences in individual and median family incomes reflect to a marked degree the conditions which are discussed hereinabove. They also reveal other startling and seldom realized facts with reference to the extent of economic progress (if any) being made by the South's Negro population. Contrary to popular opinion, the Southern Negro has lost ground in his effort to close the dollars and cents gap between himself and Southern whites who are abandoning the lower income brackets (63 per cent since 1950) about twice as fast as Southern Negroes (33 per cent since 1950). In 1960, the individual income of Negroes in the South was only two fifths that of Southern whites when measured in terms of median family income, nonwhite families in the South

received only 46.4 per cent of the median income of white families in 1960, whereas nonwhite median family income was 48.9 per cent of the median income of white families in 1950 (2.5 per cent higher).

The rate of unemployment among Negroes remains twice as high as the over-all national figure: The average period of unemployment among Negroes in 1958 was 17.8 weeks (national figures) compared with 13.3 weeks for white workers. By September, 1962, the figure for Negroes rose to 18.0 but dropped for whites to 13.0 weeks. Negro families in 11 Southern states and who have annual incomes of $3,000 or less, constitute the following percentages of the total Negro families in those states:

Alabama	67.8	Mississippi	55.4
Arkansas	57.7	No. Carolina	82.9
Florida	77.0	So. Carolina	64.1
Georgia	79.5	Tennessee	67.7
Kentucky	65.8	Virginia	70.1
Louisiana	63.8		

Conclusion

In summary, it appears that there are certain conclusions which can be supported by our examination of the manner in which race relations have had an impact on the South's pattern of economic growth as follows:

(1) Since 1940, the prevailing climate of race relations in the South has been a negative force operating actively to weaken efforts to achieve full industrial growth and expansion.

(2) What may appear to be significant progress has not only been limited to changes at the periphery of the problem; these changes have, for the most part, also been in direct proportion to the impact of United States Supreme Court decisions, political gains made by the Negro on his own initiative and racial demonstrations.

(3) *Token progress* in education, employment and the unrestricted use of public accommodations *gives little promise of becoming an effective means of satisfying the urgent need for new techniques and concepts designed to undo, through crash programs directed toward numbers of poorly trained and disadvantaged Negro and white persons, the mistaken strategy of poor leadership in the past.*

(4) Because of its heavy involvement with conditions of poverty, the South needs urgently to embrace many of the techniques and policies adopted already by the United States government whose example of re-examination of its own employment, upgrading and recruiting policies as required by the Order No. 10925 has yet to be adopted by any of the Southern states except Kentucky. Instead, we of the South have all too often diverted our energies to the dubious task of trying to prove that the discrimination which everyone knows about, does not exist.   **[The End]**

FATE OF FULL-CREW LAW GOES ON CALIFORNIA BALLOT

An initiative petition which would declare the state public policy with respect to the manning of diesel-powered freight trains to be in accordance with the terms of the award of the Federal Arbitration Board (Award No. 282), and which, in effect, would repeal California's existing full-crew law has received the required number of signatures necessary to qualify the proposition for a place on the ballot for submission to the voters in the coming November election.

Labor Relations in Government Services

Collective Bargaining Strategies and Tactics in the Federal Civil Service

By MAX S. WORTMAN, JR.

University of Iowa

ONE OF THE NEWEST SEGMENTS of our labor force to adopt collective bargaining on a large scale is that of the Federal Civil Service. In the past, several major unions have pushed for legislation which would give government employees the right to bargain collectively with their employer—the government. Although several unions had negotiated contracts and administered grievances with various agencies and departments of the federal government, collective bargaining as a guaranteed right to each employee was not available until President Kennedy signed Executive Order 10988 on January 17, 1962.[1] Basically this executive order permitted federal employees to participate in the formulation and implementation of employment policies and procedures which affect them in their everyday work.[2] Underlying this concept was the assumption that through employee participation, a more effective federal service would result. This paper will examine the problems which have arisen under the executive order, and discuss some of the strategies and tactics that are being or will be used in the various aspects of collective bargaining in the federal service.[3]

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[1] United States Code of Federal Regulations, E. O. 10988, *Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service,* January 17, 1962. For other excellent sources on collective bargaining in the federal service, see, Wilson R. Hart, *Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service,* Harper and Brothers, 1961, New York, p. 302; and Kenneth O. Warner, ed., *Management Relations with Organized Public Employees,* Public Personnel Association, 1963, Chicago, p. 239.

For an excellent summary of E. O. 10988, rules and regulations established by the order, and some advisory arbitration decisions, see, Harold S. Roberts, ed., *A Manual for Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service,* Honolulu, Hawaii, Industrial Relations Center, University of Hawaii, 1964, p. 111.

[2] President's Task Force on Employee-Management Relations in the Federal Service, *A Policy for Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service,* Washington, D. C., United States Government Printing Office, November 30, 1961, p. 1.

[3] The information for this paper was obtained from personal interviews with personnel in the Veterans' Administration and the United States Army, and from letters obtained from unions directly involved in collective bargaining efforts in the government service.

Philosophy and Development
of the Executive Order

For over 75 years, certain organized groups of employees in the federal service have indicated a desire to participate in the determination of personnel policies and practices affecting them. In 1912, the Lloyd-LaFollette Act declared that postal employees would have the right to join a labor union or association as long as the employees did not strike against the government.[4] Over time, this principle was extended to other government agencies and departments. As part of the common law of federal personnel practice, the principle stated that the organization of which the employee is a member does not have the right to strike against the government or advocate the overthrow of the government.

In 1961, President Kennedy appointed a Task Force to investigate the role of employee organizations in the governmental structure and to recommend policy on this role. He noted that the government had advocated organization of employees in private employment, but that a similar policy had not been established in the public sector. Although this problem had been studied in previous administrations,[5] the basic structure of the committees (usually consisting of federal management personnel) and the referral of the proposed Presidential executive orders to the agencies affected usually killed the pro-

posed measures. Two major administrative differences were noted in the establishment of the Task Force: (1) the highest political appointees in the government were selected, even though they were not specialists or experts in the field of labor relations—in the past civil service personnel were appointed to similar study groups;[6] and (2) the Department of Labor through its Secretary assumed the leadership in the determination of internal personnel policy in the federal service for the first time.[7]

The studies of the Task Force indicated that of all federal employees, 33 per cent or 762,000 workers belong to employee organizations.[8] Although this figure matched that of the national proportion of organized employees engaged in non-agricultural enterprises, over one half of the government employees were employed by the Post Office Department which was 84 per cent organized. The studies showed that only 35 out of 57 departments and agencies tended not to have policies. However, 11 departments having a policy provided only the minimum requirement which stated that an employee has the right to join or not to join a labor organization. The Task Force concluded its work by stating that: (1) although labor organizations had received limited recognition, they had little influence on the formulation and implementation of employee relations policy; (2) employee organizations could contribute substantially to the effectiveness of operating the govern-

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[4] President's Task Force, cited at footnote 2, at p. 2.

[5] Hart, cited at footnote 1, at pp. 6-8. In 1954, a proposed Presidential executive order was circulated throughout the governmental agencies and died due to objections by the agencies. In 1958, Rocco Siciliano, Special Assistant to the President for Personnel Management, sent a letter to all department and agency heads noting the importance of good employee relations, and requesting evaluation of personnel activities in each agency including those of labor unions.

[6] The following persons were appointed: Chairman, Secretary of Labor; Secretary of Defense; Postmaster General; Director of the Bureau of the Budget; Chairman of the Civil Service Commission; and Special Counsel to the President.

[7] Wilson R. Hart, "The U. S. Civil Service Learns to Live with Executive Order 10988: An Interim Appraisal," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 17, No. 2, January 1964, pp. 206-208.

[8] President's Task Force, cited at footnote 2, at p. 1.

ment; and (3) an executive order should be issued embodying principles which would effect greater participation for employees in the determination of the terms and conditions of their employment.

Executive Order 10988 explicitly states the right of a federal employee to join a bona fide labor organization, or to refrain from doing so. Managerial employees are prohibited from joining a labor organization if it creates a conflict of interest or is incompatible with law or the duties of the particular position. For example, managerial personnel are not allowed to hold an official position within a union. Several types of union recognition are provided including: *informal*—which allows the union to be heard on matters affecting its members within the agency; *formal*—which permits unions representing 10 per cent of the employee work force to be consulted on establishing and activating personnel policies and practices which affect its members; and *exclusive*—which entitles unions representing a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit to negotiate a written agreement covering terms and conditions of employment in the unit.[9] The executive order also provides for advisory arbitration in grievances.[10] The policy denied both the union and closed shops in the

government service. Lastly, the order provided a continuing temporary committee to determine *standards of conduct and codes of fair practices* for the guidance of agency heads as to whether certain unions are so corrupt or so influenced by forces opposed to a democratic society that they should be denied recognition by the government.

Reactions to the Executive Order

Both management and union reactions to the executive order were mixed.[11] Since Congress had been on the verge of passing the Rhodes-Johnston Union Recognition Bill which heavily favored the organized worker and probably would have led to the widespread unionization of workers within the government, unions were not entirely happy with an executive order which gave them recognition, but also a far larger task of "organizing the unorganized" within the government service.

Management was unhappy that the executive order had been signed since it implied that: the government's personnel practices were far behind private industry; the government had perpetrated an injustice upon its own employees by not allowing them fair participation in establishing employee policies and practices; through its managerial employees the government had

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[9] As of the most recent data released by the government on September 1, 1963, considerably more units are being granted exclusive recognition than formal recognition. Fifty-six units had been granted formal recognition at the national level, while exclusive recognition had been granted to 22,892 Post Office units, 168 Internal Revenue Service units, and 281 units throughout the government. For further information, see, United States Civil Service Commission, Employee Relations Section, Program Planning Division, Bureau of Programs and Standards, *Formal Recognition at the National Level: Granted by Federal Agencies to Employee Organizations Under E. O. 10988*, Washington, D. C., September 1, 1963, p. 5 (Processed); and *Exclusive Recognition Granted by Federal Agencies to Employee Organizations Under*

E. O. 10988, Washington, D. C., September, 1963, p. 33 (Processed).

[10] This type of arbitration is significantly different from that occurring in the private segment. After an arbitrator has made his decision in the federal service, the decision is then subject to acceptance or rejection by the head of the agency or department. Under these circumstances, the arbitrator's decision is not final and binding.

[11] For examples of union and management reactions, see: Hart, cited at footnote 7, at pp. 204-206, 208-212; Arthur F. McGinn, Jr. "The Role of Employee Organizations in Government," *ILR Research.* Vol. IX, No. 2, 1963, pp. 4-5; and Donald H. Wollett, "The Public Employee at the Bargaining Table: Promise or Illusion?" 15 LABOR LAW JOURNAL 8 January 1964.

assumed a paternalistic attitude toward its operative employees; and the government could improve its effectiveness through active unions.[12] A good example of the paternalistic attitude in government service (which might well have come from a manager in the 1930s) was that of a general foreman at an army installation:

"Why did they have to sign the executive order? There's nothing wrong with our relations with our employees. Why, I know everyone in the shop by their first name. I just pat them on the back, give them a few words of encouragement and we are just one big happy family. I just don't know why they signed the executive order."

With respect to previous participation in employee policies and practices by employees, an illustration of the grievance procedure would suffice. The same foreman said:

"Before the executive order was signed, we had a grievance procedure for the employees. We would get maybe one or two grievances a year. Now, after the order was signed, we have hundreds of grievances out of nowhere. Where did all those grievances come from?"

Perhaps a statement from an executive of the IAM might clarify the management position:

"Although some strategy has entered into the area of negotiations, the greater difficulty at this point lies in the apparent management lack of understanding regarding the spirit and intention of the Executive Order; lack of experience in bargaining technique; and an unwillingness to share coveted traditional management prerogatives or authority. In addition to the inbred paternalistic attitude and tendencies, we encounter local management fears of violating regulations promulgated by

higher echelons of authority. Many departmental regulations had their origin many years prior to the Executive Order and therefore appear to restrict negotiations from the local management's point of view, which invariably results in alleged 'impasses.' In summary, it may be said that until such time as experience is gained, and governing regulations are updated and revised to permit a degree of flexibility, local management personnel will experience some degree of uncertainty as to the latitude which may be exercised in the process of negotiations."

Basic management and union attitudes can thus be condensed into attitudes comparable to those of management and union personnel of the 1930s immediately after the passage of the Wagner Act. Management feels that its managerial prerogatives are being taken away and that higher levels of authority are not supporting it. Unions are quite distrustful of management since they feel that they will not receive all the benefits that they have coming. However, in spite of management's feelings, one personnel officer in the federal service felt that the executive order had provided more latitude in personnel and labor relations policies than had existed previously and that there was more cooperation between the line and staff functions within the government service.

One of the initial strategies by management throughout the federal service to invalidate the executive order rather than submit to the possibility of strong unions was to raise many procedural questions about the order.[13] The managers pointed out that the order raised many more questions than it answered, and that unless volumes of explanatory material were issued, the order could not be effected at an early date. Questions were raised such as: What constitutes a bargaining unit? What is a conflict

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[12] Hart, cited at footnote 7, at p. 210.

[13] Hart, cited at footnote 7, at p. 211.

of interest? What issues are negotiable? How are elections set up? What constitutes a majority in a representation election? These questions obviously sound like many of the questions which were raised in the early days of the Wagner Act.

Unit Determination

The most time-consuming and controversial part of the program under the executive order thus far has been the determination of the appropriate bargaining unit. In defining the various types of unit which would be acceptable in the government service, the executive order noted that in the event of any controversy a qualified arbitrator would be selected to render an advisory opinion.[14] The arbitrator in these cases was: (1) to investigate the facts and render an advisory decision on the appropriateness of a unit for exclusive recognition; or (2) to determine and advise whether a union represents a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit by an election or by other appropriate means. Here again is a similar format to the National Industrial Recovery Act in its determination of appropriate bargaining units. However, the results of an advisory decision are not binding upon an agency head which is a significant difference from an election or determination of a unit by the NLRB.

One unique regulation is that in order for a union to be declared the exclusive representative of an appropriate bargaining unit, it must obtain a majority vote of at least 60 per cent of the eligible voters in an election or it must receive an absolute majority of those eligible to vote.[15] Most labor organizations have been quite disturbed about this rule since only a majority vote of those eligible and voting is necessary for exclusive recognition in the private sector.

In some instances, management has utilized the no-run-off election regulation to grant informal or formal recognition to the unions involved rather than exclusive recognition to one of them. For instance, if two unions are involved in a representation election and neither receives a majority vote due to the no-union voters, a no-run-off election must be held. Under formal recognition management must consult with these two unions rather than negotiate terms and conditions of employment.

The most difficult problems occurring in determination of the appropriate bargaining unit have been those in which a craft or specialized union has sought recognition for a small group within a larger group. In several cases, management has attempted to have the larger group recognized as the appropriate bargaining unit for the sake of efficiency only to be turned down in the advisory arbitration decision. Indeed most of the cases today are being determined on the basis of private industry practice in terms of the *American Potash* decision[16] which favors craft-type units.[17] How-

[14] The advisory opinions were authorized under Section 11 of the Executive Order. Subsequent procedural guides were issued including: United States Dept. of Labor, "Procedural Guide for Majority Status Determinations Under Section 11 of Executive Order 10988," Washington, D. C., p. 11 (Processed); and United States Dept. of Labor, "Rules for the Nominations of Arbitrators Under Section 11 of Executive Order 10988," Washington, D. C., 1963, p. 10 (Processed).

[15] John W. Macy, Jr., "Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Serv-ice," *Management Relations with Organized Public Employees,* ed. Kenneth O. Warner, Public Personnel Association, Chicago, 1963, p. 212.

[16] *American Potash and Chemical Corp.,* 107 NLRB 1418 (1954).

[17] For examples supporting this contention, see the following advisory arbitration decisions: *Pacific Air Force Base Command, APO 953, San Francisco, California, and American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Lodge 882,* decision dated March 23, 1964, Paul Prasow, Arbitrator; *Washington Area Metal Trades Council,*

ever, the membership composition of some craft-type locals has caused complications when they request broad industrial-type unit determination, and similarly, industrial unions have requested craft-type units in some instances. Thus, the basic strategies of given unions shift from unit to unit depending upon their relative strength.

Another problem which is similar to that of private industry is the problem of the conflict of interest or the question of whether certain supervisory employees should be permitted to be members of unions, and if permitted, whether they should be active in union activities.

Since the problem of unit determination has been so time-consuming, few problems have arisen in the area of unfair labor practices. Foreseeing future possible problems in these areas, the President on May 21, 1963, issued a Code of Fair Labor Practices which spell out possible unfair labor practices for both agency management and unions. These practices include prohibitions for discrimination on the basis of union membership, race, color, creed, national origin, and for striking or any form or substitute form of a strike.

As a result of union organization drives, the membership in employee unions is growing at a slow rate.[18] Most of the increases have occurred in government installations having industrial-type functions. In some cases, decreases in membership of certain unions have occurred particularly if another union at a given location has been

granted exclusive recognition. Since the member is not represented by the minority union, there is little reason for him to continue his membership, and thus he drops out or becomes a member of the majority union. In still other instances, separate segregated locals of the same union have ceased to exist since they were denied recognition due to practices of racial discrimination.

Scope of Collective Bargaining

The possible subject matter in view of Civil Service Rules and Regulations has been an interesting matter of conjecture. Negotiations in the government service are concerned with

". . . working conditions, promotion standards, grievance procedures, safety, transfers, demotions, reductions in force, and other matters consistent with merit system principles. Negotiations should not include matters concerning an agency's mission, its budget, its organization and assignment of personnel, or the technology of performing its work."[19]

Essentially Mr. Macy means terms and conditions of employment with non-fiscal implications can be negotiated. A union official states:

"In representing employees covered by the Classification Act, wages may not be a subject of negotiations, while hours and terms of employment may be negotiated. In representing Ungraded Service Employees, known as wage board or per diem employee employed by the various agencies, the question is not as easily answered. Labor is represented by two of five members on the Navy

AFL-CIO, and United States Naval Research Laboratory, decision dated November 5, 1963, Rolf Valtin, Arbitrator; *United States Naval Air Station, Oceans, Virginia Beach, Virginia, and Fifth Naval District, Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, and Intervenor, American Federation of Government Employees,* decision dated August 19, 1963, Joseph M. Stone, Arbitrator; and *Norfolk Navy Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia, and Norfolk Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, and American*

Federation of Technical Employees, AFL-CIO, and American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, and Pattern Makers Association of Portsmouth, Virginia, and Vicinity, AFL-CIO, decision dated July 24, 1963, George S. Ives, Arbitrator.

[18] Letter of John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman, United States Civil Service Commission, to the President, January 17, 1964.

[19] Macy, cited at footnote 15, at p. 209.

Wage Board, while the Army and Air Force Wage Boards have no employee representation. These two boards have the power to recommend wage rates to their respective agency Secretaries, based on the results of surveys made by local commands. Though we believe many of the other agencies have the power to recommend their own wages, they traditionally follow the Army and Air Force pattern. Other agencies and some of the bureaus, such as those under the Department of Interior, have been negotiating on wages with the IBEW since 1948."[20]

From these statements, it would appear that wages are not a subject of negotiation except in certain isolated instances.[21] However, in examining the basic training materials of the United States Civil Service Commission[22] and in listening to several government management personnel, the question of wages is either directly or indirectly brought into the discussion. Although the prevailing rate of wages is set by law, other types of wage policy can be bargained including overtime, call back, call in, and shift differentials. Another way of bargaining rates of pay would be to subject particular job grades to negotiations or to the grievance procedure. The union would indicate that it is too low and thus attempt to raise the rate of pay. If an installation has the incentive system, the union may bargain

over step increments within the rate range system. If the union feels that a man has not been promoted rapidly enough, it may prosecute a grievance for more than one step of incentive pay. Under the government incentive system in some installations, the union will be able to grieve over the size of the performance awards ($100, $200 and $300 depending on grade) which are usually granted annually. If an employee receives less than he feels he is entitled to, he can grieve. Although wages are set, there are several different ways of raising wages through negotiation and the grievance procedure.

Although assignment of work is a managerial prerogative, unions have the right to negotiate tours of duty, rotation assignments, rest periods, clean-up time, scheduling of shifts, and vacation schedules.[23] Policies on career development such as promotions, training opportunities, apprenticeships, and disciplinary policies and practices and many other ·fringe benefits and services can be bargained.

Negotiation Strategies and Tactics[24]

Both the strike and the threat to strike are important weapons in the union's arsenal of economic force in private employment.[25] In the government service, these weapons are not available. Many government management personnel have then asked: "How can the

[20] For additional information, see, Wollett, cited at footnote 11, at p. 10.

[21] Under a proposed model for collective bargaining in the government in Canada, wages are negotiable. See, Saul Frankel, *A Model for Negotiation and Arbitration Between the Canadian Government and its Civil Servants,* Industrial Relations Centre, McGill University, Montreal, 1962, pp. 42-44.

[22] United States Civil Service Commission, "Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service," *Personnel Methods Series No. 15,* Washington, D. C., United States Government Printing Office, 1962, pp. 5.20-5.21.

[23] United States Civil Service Commission, cited at footnote 22, at p. 5.21. See, also,

United Federation of Postal Clerks, *Advanced Manual on Collective Bargaining Contracts and Union Organization,* Washington, D. C., 1964, p. 1.8. (Processed).

[24] For agreements negotiated as of September 1, 1963, see, United States Civil Service Commission, Employee Relations Section, Program Planning Division, Bureau of Programs and Standards, *Agreements Negotiated by Agencies and Employee Organizations Under E. O. 10988,* Washington, D. C., September 1, 1963, p. 7.

[25] For comments on the effective use of the threat to strike in some government circles, see, Wollett, cited at footnote 11, at pp. 11-13.

union do anything to us if they can't strike?"

Although the Code of Fair Labor Practices proscribes any practice which substitutes for a strike, it would be very difficult to determine if a key man in the assembly line or in production was malingering or whether the man was actually ill or tired. One excellent method of displaying force on the job by the union is to follow the rules. With the myriad of rules and regulations in any organization, the union could slow down production and activity by following the rules explicitly. Safety rules are an excellent example. If a man drives a lift truck and normally crosses the yellow line to move diagonally through a large unoccupied area and save time, he may suddenly decide to follow the rule that no lift truck operator shall cross a yellow line and thus go all the way around the given area which takes more time.

Still other union tactics would be the refusal to work overtime, and refusal to work Saturdays or Sundays during the period leading up to negotiations. Although the strike vote is out, a vote of confidence in the leadership during negotiations would strengthen the hand of the union negotiating team. Moral and economic support may be obtained from other unions primarily to finance public relations during negotiations.

One of the most effective union weapons in collective bargaining in the government service is the use of lobbying to obtain wage increases. The postal unions have been particularly effective in obtaining wage increases through effective lobbying.[26] An effective legislative and political program can obtain wage increases which are fixed by law, and can ascertain new and better sources of revenue for the given governmental agency with which to finance these increased wages.[27] One agency manager indicated that there definitely were political overtones to negotiations at his installation.

In negotiations, if both parties express their views or positions in writing, a measure of union power can be achieved by the threat of potential publication of the positions, particularly if the union demands are reasonable.[28] Obviously the publication of these positions could also be used for political activity for possible increases by Congress.

Several tactics are available to management during the course of negotiations. One of the recent innovations in strategy by management has been to incorporate in the collective bargaining agreement statements of United States Civil Service Regulations. As one union official stated:

". . . management usually insists on writing into the agreements, statements of personnel policy which were unilaterally arrived at prior to collective bargaining. These statements of policy often stem from the Federal Personnel Manual, but may be unique to a specific installation or agency."

A tactic which stems from this strategy is management's refusing to discuss a particular section of the collective bargaining agreement since it has already been answered by federal regulations. Management may also contend that the contract items are not relevant because they are a violation of regulations.

Another important strategy is the use of the "impasse" by management or by the union. Since unions are not allowed to strike and there is no provision for arbitration during negotiations, manage-

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[26] For an illustration of methods used in the legislative area, see, United Federation of Postal Clerks, cited at footnote 23, at pp. 4.4-4.6.

[27] Wollett, cited at footnote 11, at p. 14.
[28] McGinn, cited at footnote 11, at p. 7.

ment just waits until discussion of the specific segment of the contract deadlocks. No panel or board is available for the solution of such deadlocks nor is any machinery established for the resolution of such conflicts. Currently there is no provision for mediation, conciliation, fact finding, or advisory arbitration in such situations. The only recourse which a union has in these situations is noted by another union executive:

"When reasonable arguments fail to persuade the management of a specific installation, we may appeal to the higher levels of the agency's personnel function. When this fails, there is very little that can be done. For this reason, we feel that there should be some form of compulsory arbitration machinery in lieu of the right to strike."

If top management backs the lower echelons of management, there is little that the union can do in the event of an impasse.

The "discretion doctrine" is another management strategy. This doctrine states that on the local level, the operating head can negotiate only within the discretion assigned to him by the agency or department head. This sounds very much like some types of decentralized negotiations in large corporations. Obviously this doctrine could be construed to cover only those issues not in the *Federal Personnel Manual*. If this is the case, there would be essentially no changes in labor relations in the federal service since the *Manual* does cover just about every topic in the employee relationship. There is some evidence that this doctrine has been followed in several agencies. For example, the Regional Labor Relations Councils in the Post Office Department can invalidate sections of local agreements once they have been negotiated and signed by both parties if they violate laws and regulations. Obviously the solution is to

have the agreements thoroughly examined by the Labor Relations Councils before they are signed at the local level.

In future negotiations, management will also be able to provide a "show of strength" in the initial phases by checking back with top agency management and duly informing the union that the agency is behind it during the negotiations. At any time during negotiations if management is able to prove that the union is striking through some type of substitute method, executives will be able to fire those who are involved with little recourse for the fired men.

Another managerial tactic would be the sustaining of minority unions so as to weaken the majority union. This tactic could be effected through the available types of recognition. Thus by sustaining minority unions through informal and formal recognition, the majority union would have some difficulty in the enlargement of its membership. In addition, management's hand would be strengthened at the bargaining table. A new aspect of this problem is the current circulation within the government of a new rule which would continue existing agreements for up to two years and thus curb uncertainty in the bargaining relationship by rival unions claiming to have sufficient membership for exclusive recognition.

Other Phases of Collective Bargaining

Since determination of the appropriate bargaining unit has been quite complex and negotiations are still in their initial stages there is little concrete evidence of the path to be taken in grievance solution, arbitration, and enforcement. In many agencies, an existent grievance procedure is still in effect. In other agencies, a grievance procedure has been negotiated with no terminal arbitration step. In most of these instances, the last step in the grievance procedure is

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advisory arbitration which again is just an expert opinion for the head of the agency who will make the decision. Grievances will be filed on promotions, demotions, and the grade of a particular job.

Some strategies have appeared in grievance handling. For instance, an IAM executive states:

". . . In our experience we find local management most reluctant to forward grievances to higher echelons of authority for review. Tactics are used to delay resolution of problems as long as possible. A favorite tactic above the immediate supervisory level is to postpone prearranged meetings for alleged emergency situations which arose, unavailability of a key management figure, or to raise questions on procedure for the filing of grievances at the formal or written stage."

In a few situations I have checked, some of these same problems occur. However, in many installations, the precise opposite has been true—management has bent over backward to process grievances, and implement the executive order as fully as possible. This situation again demonstrates that in many ways both public and private sectors of employment with their concomitant labor and management problems are similar in nature.

In the contracts that have been signed, there has been little evidence of problems of enforcement. Once the contract is implemented, local management has adhered to the terms of the contract. Both labor and management have apparently made a unified cooperative effort to enforce the contract.

Future Problems

Although management feels that the chief problem with the executive order in most instances is the continuing attempt to usurp managerial prerogatives and although the union feels that the major problem is the desire on the part of management to maintain the status quo, there are a number of other significant problems which need to be solved.

First, both management and labor feel that one of the most important problems in the use of collective bargaining in the federal service is the inadequacy of the professional staff in the area of labor relations. The present personnel staff are poorly equipped to handle negotiations, grievances and arbitration cases. Thus the present professional personnel staff needs to be trained, and additional personnel in the area of labor relations need to be retained by the federal service.

Second, the rules and regulations should be amended so that a majority union may be designated the exclusive representative if it receives a majority of those eligible and voting. A provision should be established for a runoff similar to that under the Taft-Hartley Act so that ultimately a majority union would be determined if more than 50 per cent of the workers stated that they wished to be represented by a union.

Third, an independent labor board reporting to the President should be established for the government service which would serve as a "government" NLRB with similar functions.[29] Essentially this would separate the quasi-judicial functions existing in collective bargaining away from those of the personnel function within the agency. Currently the personnel function represents management in negotiations and yet attempts to solve grievances in a quasi-judicial role. This labor board would determine appropriate bargaining units, determine the exclusive representative if there is one, and handle unfair labor practice cases and other problems arising which should not be handled by either labor or management. The advi-

[29] Hart, cited at footnote 7, at pp. 219-220.

sory arbitrator role could be eliminated if this board were set up.

Fourth, an impartial method of solving the "impasses" which occur during negotiations, preferably one of the time-honored methods of mediation, conciliation, or fact finding, should be used to resolve the differences.

Fifth, there is a definite problem of uniformity of interpretation and general application of the executive order by the various agencies of the government. Although these differences are due to previous regulations existing before the executive order, some of these could be resolved by an independent labor board outside the United States Civil Service Commission.

Sixth, terminal, binding arbitration in the grievance procedure could be established so that a truly impartial decision may be rendered on the particular issue in question. Thus precedents would be set, and there would be no chance of overturning the decision at some higher level.

The impact of the Executive Order has been substantial upon the federal service. Ultimately the government employee will have a greater sense of economic security and self-respect, and the federal service will benefit due to more effective management and more productive labor. Their spirit of cooperation will improve morale within the government service and provide a more effective servant of the people. **[The End]**